SILVER v. CPC-SHERWOOD MANOR, INC.

SILVER v. CPC-SHERWOOD MANOR, INC.
2006 OK 97
151 P.3d 127
Case Number: 102632
Decided: 12/19/2006

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

FRANK J. SILVER, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
CPC-SHERWOOD MANOR, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant/Appellee.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I

¶0 Plaintiff brought a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against defendant nursing home. During the course of the litigation, the defendant allegedly discovered that plaintiff had been convicted of robbery and aiding and abetting a murder. The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that it should be relieved of all liability because the plaintiff was statutorily prohibited from employment in a nursing home under

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED;
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED.

Jonathan E. Shook, James E. Erwin, Shook, Huggins & Johnson, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the plaintiff/appellant.
Laurence L. Pinkerton, Judith A. Finn, Pinkerton & Finn, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the defendant/appellee.
Mark Hammons, Jeff A. Lee, Hammons & Associates, Inc., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for amicus curiae Oklahoma Employment Lawyers' Association.

TAYLOR, J.

I. ISSUES

¶1 The dispositive question before this Court is whether the after-acquired evidence doctrine has no effect on damages, limits damages, or bars liability in an action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. We answer in cases of wrongful termination in violation of public policy when the employee is not statutorily disqualified from the employment, the after-acquired evidence doctrine limits compensatory damages rather than bars all liability.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶2 This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The trial court ruled that as a matter of law the plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is barred by the after-acquired evidence doctrine. We review questions of law under a de novo standard. Fowler v. Norman Municipal Hospital,

III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 This is the second time that this action has been before this Court. See Silver v. CPC-Sherwood Manor, Inc.,

¶4 On remand, the nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine. As an undisputed fact in its motion for summary judgment, the defendant asserted that Silver had been convicted of and imprisoned for the crimes of robbery and of aiding and abetting a murder. The defendant averred that if it had known of Silver's criminal record, it would have terminated him or could not have hired him based on the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act,

¶5 The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals held that Silver's conviction, discovered after the nursing home terminated his employment, was a complete bar to his claim for relief for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. This Court granted certiorari.

IV. ANALYSIS

¶6 This Court has not previously decided the effect of the after-acquired evidence doctrine in cases of wrongful termination. The Colorado Supreme Court has stated the general rule: under the after-acquired evidence doctrine, an employee's relief for wrongful discharge may be barred or limited by the employer's post-discharge discovery of an employee's wrongdoing. Crawford Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Weissman,

¶7 In support of its position that the after-acquired evidence doctrine precludes all recovery by Silver for wrongful termination, the nursing home relies on Summers v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); Washington v. Lake County, Illinois, 969 F.2d 250 (11th Cir. 1992); and Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D.C. Kan. 1989).

¶8 Courts recognize the after-acquired evidence doctrine either as a bar to an employer's liability or as a limit on the remedy. Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330 (Tenn. 2005); see McKennon,

¶9 When the employee's claim of wrongful termination is based on a violation of public policy, courts are reluctant to bar recovery but generally apply the after-acquired evidence doctrine to limit relief. See McKennon,

¶10 In fashioning a rule, the McKennon Court determined that after an employer establishes that it would have discharged the employee based on the after-acquired evidence, reinstatement and front pay, which is pay after the discovery of the employee's wrongful conduct, would not be appropriate remedies.

¶11 In response to federal certified questions, the Arizona Supreme Court answered the questions of whether the after-acquired evidence doctrine applies and how it limits or precludes damages in cases of wrongful termination in violation of public policy and in cases for breach of an employment contract. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792 (Ariz. 1998). The O'Day court answered "that after-acquired evidence is a defense to a breach of contract action for wages and benefits lost as a result of discharge if the employer can demonstrate that it would have fired the employee had it known of the misconduct." Id. at 796.

¶12 Addressing the after-acquired evidence doctrine in cases of wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the O'Day court recounted the three approaches: (1) after-acquired evidence "is not admissible because it is irrelevant or because it undermines the public policy goals" advanced by a wrongful termination action, (2) the after-acquired evidence doctrine is a complete bar to relief, and (3) the after-acquired evidence doctrine only limits relief. Rejecting the first approach, the court determined that it was irreconcilable with the employer's right to discharge an employee for wrongful conduct. The court determined the second approach failed to attribute any consequences to the employer's wrongful conduct.

¶13 The O'Day court adopted the third approach because it assigned consequences to both the employer's and the employee's wrongful conduct. 959 P.2d at 796. The court noted that the fears associated with a complete bar to recovery would be diminished by limiting damages. Id. at 797. The fears are: (1) an employer might conduct a search to find employee misconduct that it could use as a pretext for a discharge, (2) an employer might reserve knowledge of an employee's wrongdoing in case and until a discrimination charge would be made, and (3) an employee might tolerate repeated harassment or discrimination because of an imperfect work record. Id. The O'Day court also answered that "in an action in tort, after-acquired evidence will only affect the remedies available to the employee." Id.

¶14 Before the McKennon and O'Day decisions, this Court in Mosley v. Truckstops Corp. of America,

¶15 This Court has not addressed the after-acquired evidence doctrine outside the worker's compensation retaliatory discharge context. However, this Court has stated that McKennon "would afford helpful guidance . . . in the context of a state common-law claim." Brown v. Ford,

¶16 We recognize that Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), which relied on McKennon, found that the plaintiff's claims were barred. Id. at 339. Camp concluded that the after-acquired evidence doctrine bars all relief where "an employee who is disqualified from employment by government-imposed requirements nevertheless obtains a job by misrepresenting the pertinent qualifications." Id.; see Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ., 319 N.J. Super. 148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) aff'd, 750 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the public policy prohibiting an employee statutorily disqualified from public employment trumps the competing public policy prohibiting discrimination). Both Camp and Cedeno involved an employee who was statutorily banned from the employment and are factually distinguishable from the facts in the present case.

¶17 In the present case, Silver alleges that the nursing home did not ask if he had ever been convicted of a felony, but it asked about criminal convictions within the last ten years. Silver alleges that he left the answer blank, even though he could have truthfully answered "no" since it had been more than ten years since his conviction. Title 63, section 1-1950.1(C)(1) allowed the nursing home to temporarily hire Silver until the completion of a criminal arrest check. After the nursing home temporarily hired Silver, the onus was on it to provide Silver's name and relevant information within seventy-two hours to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) for a criminal arrest check.

V. CONCLUSION

¶18 Silver's claim for wrongful termination was not barred as a matter of law based on the nursing home's discovery of his felony conviction. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Silver. The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated. The cause is remanded for further proceedings.

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED.

Lavender, Opala, Kauger, Edmondson, Taylor, Colbert, JJ., concur.

Watt, C.J., concurs in result.

Winchester, V.C.J., Hargrave, J., dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 The nursing home also relies on Ballard v. Muskogee Reg'l Med. Ctr., 238 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001), for the proposition that "the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. to find that the Hospital had established to the satisfaction of the jury what the court called the 'anyway' defense, that is, that the Hospital would have terminated the plaintiff for poor work performance regardless of her exercise of free speech right." A reading of Ballard, a mixed-motive case, not an after-acquired evidence doctrine case, shows that the court relied on McKennon, in reaching its decision on whether a "front pay" award was appropriate. Ballard, 238 F.3d at 1254.

The nursing home also relies on Pratt v. Okla. Dept. of Agric., 1983 OK CIV APP 5, 661 P.2d 533, which has no precedential value. See Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, rule 1.200, 12 O.S.2001, ch. 15, app.