MEHDIPOUR v. WISE

MEHDIPOUR v. WISE
2003 OK 3
65 P.3d 271
Case Number: 96297
Decided: 01/21/2003

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

[65 P.3d 271]

FARAMARZ MEHDIPOUR, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
JEFF WISE, MICHAEL ARNETT, individually and d/b/a ARNETT LAW FIRM, and KELLY SEXTON, Defendants/Appellees.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV

¶0 The District Court of Oklahoma County, Bryan C. Dixon, Judge, dismissed plaintiff's civil suit for damages on a finding that plaintiff, an inmate serving a sentence for a felony conviction, was under a legal disability to bring the action by reason of

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED
THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS REVERSED,
AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

Faramarz Mehdipour, Cushing, Oklahoma, Plaintiff/Appellant Pro Se.
Robert J. Meyer, ARNETT LAW FIRM, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorney for Defendant/Appellee.

SUMMERS, J.

¶1 Certiorari was granted in this case to address a conflict between decisions of the Courts of Civil Appeals on the issue of whether inmates are statutorily deprived of the capacity to file a civil action against a third party which does not involve an asserted violation of constitutional rights. We answer in the negative.

The statute in question,

A sentence of imprisonment under the Department of Corrections suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced, except the right to make employment contracts, during confinement under said sentence, subject to the approval of the Director of the Department of Corrections, [65 P.3d 271]when this benefits the vocational training or release preparation of the prisoner, and forfeits all public offices, and all private trusts, authority or power, during the term of such imprisonment. Provided however, such persons during confinement shall not be eligible to receive benefits under the unemployment compensation law.

I

¶2 The facts of this matter are not in dispute. Faramarz Medipour was convicted of a felony, and while he was incarcerated filed this tort action below seeking damages from his former attorneys and their law firm for acts which he alleged constituted an abuse of process. The defendants argued that Mr. Mehdipour was under a legal disability to file the suit because under the provisions of Section 65, as interpreted by the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, Division No. I, in Welborn v. Wallace, 2001OK CIV APP 2,

¶3 On accelerated appeal pursuant to Okl.Sup.Ct. Rule 1.36 , the Court of Civil Appeals, Division No. IV, declined to follow Welborn v. Wallace, supra, and reversed the trial court's judgment. The defendants argue that the appellate court should have followed Welborn, and urge us to vacate its decision refusing to do so and reaching the opposite result.

II

¶4 At common law prisoners serving sentences of imprisonment for life or term of years for conviction of a felony were deemed "civiliter mortuus" or "civilly dead." Under statutes enacted following that doctrine, the right to commence a civil lawsuit was often held to be included as one of the rights suspended by imprisonment. See generally Avery v. Everett, (Ct. App. N.Y.,1888) 18 N.E. 148; Annotation, Right In Absence of Express Statutory Authorization, of One Convicted of Crime and Imprisoned or Paroled, To Prosecute Civil Action, 74 A.L.R. 3d 680.

¶5 With the exception of the Welborn decision, however, our courts have consistently declined to interpret our statutory provisions in a manner which would deprive prisoners access to civil judicial process. This is the first time this particular question has been directly before us, but this is not the first occasion this Court has had to consider other issues raising questions about the intent of this statutory language. In doing so, our rulings have long recognized the fundamental policy considerations and constitutional implications which would arise from a holding that prisoners may be deprived of their right to seek the protection of the courts to protect their personal and property rights.

¶6 In Welborn the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an inmate's lawsuit brought against his former attorney for the refund of his unused retainer fee, based on its finding that an inmate's legal capacity to file a civil action against a third party which is not related to his incarceration or does not involve an asserted violation of his constitutional rights, is one of the "civil rights"which is lost or at least suspended during imprisonment under Section 65. In support of its conclusion, that court cited Byers v. Sun Savings Bank,

¶7 In the instant case the Court of Civil Appeals, Division No. IV, declined to follow the ruling of Welborn v. Wallace, supra, based on its view that Welborn misinterpreted the meaning of

¶8 We agree. In Byers this Court plainly rejected the proposition that under our statutes all civil rights of an incarcerated felon are suspended during his imprisonment, that he is civilly dead. In that case an inmate executed a promissory note and mortgage to his attorney as a fee for obtaining his parole, and later ratified the contract in writing after being paroled. When the attorney attempted to enforce his contract, defendant asserted his civil death, "civiliter mortuus," as a defense to the validity of the note, contending he had been without capacity to enter into the contract by reason of his imprisonment, and also had no power to ratify the contract after his parole as his sentence had not been removed.

¶9 The Court discussed at length the question of what rights are forfeited by a convicted felon who was sentenced to prison under the existing statute, Section 2813, Rev. Laws 1910 providing:

"A sentence for imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term less that for life, suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, authority or power, during the term of such imprisonment."

The Court distinguished between "natural"and "civil rights," the former being those innate rights which are inherent and come from the elementary laws of nature, such as life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and self-preservation. The comprehensive term "civil rights," the Court explained, pertains to those rights which are the outgrowth of civilization. They arise from the needs of communities and are given and defined by those positive laws which are enacted by communities as necessary to the maintenance of organized government. The Court stated that "political rights", which includes the right of suffrage, and the rights to hold office and participate in the administration of government, are included within "civil rights", which is a broader and more comprehensive term.

¶10 The Court found a literal construction of the statute in question could not be justified, as it would lead to a result in conflict with important policies of the law. Considering the provisions of Section 2813 together with Section 732, Wilson's Rev. & Ann. Stat. (section 877, Rev. Laws 1910), which read: "All persons are capable of contracting, except minors persons of unsound mind, and persons deprived of civil rights," the Court found the relevant inquiry to be the extent to which those primary rights endowed by nature are limited by the statute, and stated:

"The language of these statutes, in the absence of other recognized and established principles of law, would seem to divest a citizen of all rights whatsoever and render him absolutely civiliter mortuus, but the principles of law which this verbiage literally imports had its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and doubtlessly has been brought forward into modern statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its literal significance or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of government. At any rate, the full significance of such statutes have never been enforced by our courts for the principal reason that they are out of harmony with the spirit of our fundamental laws and with other provisions of statutes. "

The Court there noted that the modern trend has been to extend, rather than limit, those natural rights except where they are expressly abridged by statute.

¶11 In Grooms v. Thomas,

¶12 In Davis v.Pulliam,

"The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administrated without sale, denial, delay or prejudice."

The court relied on Byers, and noted that while a felon may lose those rights described as "political" in Byers, i.e, he may be disenfranchised, denied the right to hold office or not otherwise allowed to participate in government or to enjoy the full fruits of citizenship, his "natural " rights, those affecting his existence, personal liberties, and safety, are constitutionally protected.

¶13 The Court's decision was not based on plaintiff's status as a parolee rather than as a prisoner. The Court spoke strongly of the preposterous situations which would result from treating persons who are very much alive and entitled to legal recognition and protection, as if they were "civilly dead" for all purposes, including filing a civil action. In holding that plaintiff parolee's civil death was not a legal defense to his personal injury action, the Court emphatically found that rumors of his "death" had been "greatly exaggerated." At 1308.

¶14 In Sholer v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety,

¶15 Quite recently this Court addressed the issue of the right of an inmate to bring a civil action in light of the language of Section 65. In Kordis v. Kordis,

¶16 See also Dopp v. Okla. Local Bank,

¶17 It is additionally true that this Court has often implicitly recognized the right of an imprisoned person to commence a private civil action against a third party. See for example the following: Harmon v. Harmon,

¶18 It is always important to recognize that the right to reasonable access to the courts is not the same thing as having a right to appear personally in court to participate in a lawsuit which has been filed there. While those issues are not before us today, we observe that an inmate has no absolute or unconditional right to appear personally in a civil trial where he is a litigant. We have numerous decisions concerning the discretion of the trial court to decide the issue of whether and under what circumstances an inmate may appear in person. See for instance Kordis v. Kordis, supra; Harmon v. Harmon, supra; Johnson v. Scott, supra.

III

¶19 In summary, the statute in question does not deprive Plaintiff of his right to file and be heard on his non-constitutionally-based claim against the Defendants. Such a reading of the statute would clearly offend Art. 2 § 6 of the constitution. Although we agree with the ruling of the Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, we have granted certiorari to reconcile conflicting published opinions among divisions of that Court. Accordingly, the opinion of that Court is vacated, the decision of Welborn v. Wallace, supra, is overruled insofar as it is inconsistent with today's pronouncement, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

¶20 WATT, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ. - Concur