JUSTUS v. STATE EX. REL. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY

JUSTUS v. STATE EX. REL. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY
2002 OK 46
61 P.3d 888
Case Number: 96744
Decided: 05/28/2002

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

PERRY JUSTUS, Plaintiff/Appellee
v.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant

ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II

¶0 Perry Justus refused to take a chemical test after being arrested for driving under the influence and, as a result, the Department of Public Safety revoked his driver's license. The arrest occurred in the parking lot of the apartment complex where Justus lives. The district court, Honorable Roma McElwee, reversed the revocation order, finding as a matter of law that the parking lot is not a public parking lot for purposes of Oklahoma's implied consent statute. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, reversed. Justus sought certiorari review.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;
COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED;
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Larry A. Morgan, Odell D. Campbell, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee
J. Robert Blakeburn, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant

BOUDREAU, Justice:

¶1 The parties stipulated to the following facts. Perry Justus (Justus) lives at Quail Ridge Apartments in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The Quail Ridge parking lot has three entrances. All three have signs reading, in pertinent part: "Private Property, Tenants and Invited Guests Only!" Two of the entrances have gates that are locked after 10:00 p.m. The third entrance is the main entrance and has no gate, but opens directly into the main office where the business of the apartment complex is transacted.

¶2 On August 24, 2000, at about 3:00 a.m., Oklahoma City police officers arrested Justus in the Quail Ridge parking lot for driving under the influence of alcohol. Pursuant to Oklahoma's implied consent statute,

¶3 Appeals from implied consent revocation orders are heard de novo in the district court, both on the law and on the facts. In re Braddy,

¶4 "The primary goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent." TXO Production Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n,

¶5 We begin our review with Oklahoma's implied consent statute,

¶7 We look to the statutory definition of public parking lot to resolve the issue. The Legislature has defined public parking lot for purposes of Title 47.

¶9 We view the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of § 1-142(b) as too broad in that it would make virtually every private parking lot a public parking lot for purposes of Title 47. "The general rule is that nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the act itself." Huffman v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,

¶10 In sum, the Legislature defined public parking lot for purposes of Title 47. The statutory definition is clear and unambiguous. Using the plain meaning of the statutory language, we hold that the Quail Ridge parking lot is not a public parking lot for purposes of Oklahoma's implied consent statute because it is not on a public right of way dedicated to public use and is not owned by the state or a political subdivision thereof. We vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;
COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED;
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

¶11 V.C.J. WATT, LAVENDER, OPALA, SUMMERS,and BOUDREAU, JJ. CONCUR; C.J. HARGRAVE, HODGES, KAUGER, and WINCHESTER, JJ. DISSENT.[61 P.3d 890]

FOOTNOTES

1This is but a short excerpt of § 753, but it is the only language of § 753 that is material to the narrow issue in this case.

2The definition of public parking lot is found in Chapter 1 of Title 47. Chapter 1 contains definitions that expressly apply to Title 47. See 47 O.S. 2001 § 1-101.

3The parties stipulated that the Quail Ridge parking lot is private property, and there is no allegation that it is on right of way dedicated to public use.