Spatar v. Avon Oaks Ballroom

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
[Cite as Spatar v. Avon Oaks Ballroom, 2002-Ohio-2443.] COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO JUDGES LORETTA SPATAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs HON. JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, P.J., HON. ROBERT A. NADER, J., HON. DIANE V. GRENDELL, J. ACCELERATED CASE NO. 2001-T-0059 AVON OAKS BALLROOM, OPINION Defendant-Appellee. CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Case No. 99 CV 1789 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. ATTY. ROBERT R. MELNICK MELNICK & MELNICK Federal Building, #300 18 North Phelps Street Youngstown, OH 44503 ATTY. JOSEPH K. OLDHAM OLDHAM & DOWLING 195 South Main Street, #300 Akron, OH 44308-1314 (For Defendant-Appellee) (For Plaintiff-Appellant) 2 JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, P.J. {¶1} In this accelerated calendar case, appellant, Loretta Spatar, appeals from the decisio of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, granting appellee, Avon Oaks Ballroom ( th ballroom ), summary judgment on appellant s claim for negligence.1 {¶2} On the evening of October 22, 1997, appellant, a seventy-three year old woman, was patron of the ballroom, which she frequented. While attempting to walk off the dance floo appellant slipped and fell, thereby sustaining a fractured hip. {¶3} As a result of this slip and fall, on September 29, 1999, appellant filed a complain against appellee in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. Therein, appellant claimed th her fall was proximately caused by a foreign substance that had been there for a sufficient period o time that it should have been swept or mopped up to prevent injury. Further, as a result of previou falls that occurred on the dance floor, appellant alleged that appellee was on notice of the likelihoo of injury, and that their failure to adequately light the ballroom contributed to her injuries. {¶4} On August 9, 2000, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that eve if appellant could present evidence tending to show that she fell because the floor was waxed an slippery, there is no evidence that appellee failed to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition Further, appellee suggested that there was no evidence as to what caused appellant to slip and fal Rather, appellant could only speculate that she might have fallen because the floor was slippery o 1. As an aside, we note that Albert Revella ( Mr. Revella ), the owner of the ballroom, was not named as a party to the action. 3 there could have been food/wax on the floor. {¶5} In turn, on October 10, 2000, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition t appellee s motion for summary judgment, claiming that a properly maintained floor could hav prevented the fall. Appellant suggested in the memorandum that wax was applied onto the danc floor in a haphazard and sporadic manner, thus creating a hazardous conditions that foreseeabl would cause a patron to slip and fall. {¶6} Appellant also suggested that poor lighting created a hazardous condition th contributed to her fall, and that prior falls put appellee on notice that its method of maintaining th floor created a hazardous condition and would cause a reasonable person to reconsider the method o maintaining the floor to prevent additional falls. {¶7} To support her position, appellant submitted her affidavit and deposition testimony along with the deposition testimony of Mr. Revella, the owner of the ballroom. She also include appellee s answer to appellant s request for production of documents and appellee s response t interrogatories. {¶8} In turn, on November 1, 2000, appellee filed a brief in reply to appellant s brief i opposition to summary judgment, suggesting that appellant s affidavit contradicted her depositio testimony, and that the affidavit was insufficient to oppose summary judgment because it merel contained appellant s opinion. In support of its position, appellee submitted portions of Mr. Revel and appellant s deposition testimony.2 2. As an aside, we note that appellant s and Mr. Revella s depositions were filed with the trial court. 4 {¶9} After taking the matter under advisement, on May 11, 2001, the trial court grante appellee s motion for summary as to appellant s claim. It is from this judgment appellant appeal advancing four assignments of error and reiterating the arguments set forth in her memorandum i opposition to appellee s motion for summary judgment: {¶10} [1.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant in granting summary judgmen since defendant created a dangerous condition [and] breached its duty of care owed to appellant b improperly and negligently maintaining the dance floor herein which does not require actual o constructive notice to defendant/appellee[.] {¶11} [2.] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in that there have been prio falls at the Avon Oaks Ballroom that placed defendant on notice that the defendant s method o maintaining the floor created a hazardous condition[.] {¶12} [3.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant in granting summary judgmen to appellee since a material issue of fact exists concerning the creation [and] maintenance of hazardous condition due to dim/inadequate lighting[.] {¶13} [4.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant in granting summary judgmen to appellee since the affidavit attached to appellant s memorandum in opposition to appellee motion for summary judgment was not inconsistent with her previous oral deposition testimony bu clarified, expanded upon [and] amplified it[.] {¶14} Before addressing the merits of appellant s assignments of error, we will lay out th appropriate standard of review. {¶15} An appellate court reviews a trial court s decision on a motion for summary judgmen 5 de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 1996-Ohio-336. Pursuant to Civ.R 56, summary judgment is appropriate when: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2 the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can reach onl one conclusion, which is adverse to the party against whom the motion is made, such party bein entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor. Civ.R. 56(C); Mootispaw Eckstein, 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 1996-Ohio-389; Leibreich v. A.J. Refrigeration, Inc., 67 Ohi St.3d 266, 268, 1993-Ohio-12; Bostic v. Connor (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146. {¶16} Material facts are those facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under th governing law of the case. Turner v. Turner , 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340, 1993-Ohio-176, citin Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 248. To determine what constitutes a genuin issue, the court must decide whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to requir submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law Turner at 340 {¶17} A party seeking summary judgment on the grounds that the nonmoving party canno prove its case bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and o identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of materi fact on the essential elements of the nonmoving party s claim. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 1996-Ohio-107. Accordingly, the moving party must specifically point to some evidence of the typ listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence t support the nonmoving party s claim. Id. If the moving party satisfies its initial burden under Civ.R 56(C), the nonmoving party has the burden to respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in th 6 rule, so as to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact. Id. However, if the nonmoving part fails to do so, then the trial court may enter summary judgment against that party. Id. {¶18} For organizational purposes, we will begin with the fourth assignment of erro Therein, appellant maintains that the trial court erred when in concluded that her affidav contradicted her deposition testimony. Thus, appellant seems to suggest that the trial court shoul have considered the affidavit as evidentiary material. {¶19} The reason relied upon by the trial court was that the affidavit failed to create dispute as to any issue of material fact. We agree. {¶20} In Barile v. East End Land Development (Dec. 23, 1999), 11th Dist. No. 98-L-149 1999 WL 1313639, at 7, this court determined that a party may not create a factual issue by simpl filing an affidavit that contradicts his/her earlier deposition testimony: {¶21} We *** hold that a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgmen by submitting an affidavit which without explanation, directly contradicts his/her previous depositio testimony. As we noted in McCain, if it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of person who submits an affidavit which contradicts the affiant s earlier testimony per Turner, [i would be equally inappropriate to allow an opposing party to defeat a motion for summary judgmen by creating an issue of fact through a contradictory affidavit. [Emphasis sic.] McCain at 2. {¶22} Moreover, there is no logical reason to allow a person who has been examined i deposition to raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit which contradicts his/her earlie testimony. Parties to litigation should not be allowed to thwart the purpose of Civ.R. 56 by creatin issues of fact. If this were permitted, the utility of summary judgment as a valuable procedure fo 7 screening out sham factual issues would be greatly undermined. Franks v. Nimmo (C.A.10, 1986 796 F.2d 1230, 1237. {¶23} *** {¶24} Our conclusion here is not meant to act as an absolute bar to a trial court consideration of every contradictory affidavit filed in opposition to summary judgment. Fo example, an exception is recognized in situations where the affiant can provide a legitimate reaso for the conflict, such as confusion or a lack of access to the material facts. Williams v. American Mu Life Ins. Co. (Dec. 6, 1996), Trumbull App. No. 96-T-5478, unreported, at 4, 1996 WL 76090 citing Bulishak v. Finast Supermarkets (Mar. 19, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 62301, unreported {¶25} In the instant matter, appellant attempts to argue that her affidavit is not inconsisten with her previous deposition testimony; rather, the affidavit clarified, expanded upon, and amplifie her deposition testimony. We disagree. {¶26} Even though appellant was specifically asked during her deposition why she fel appellant seemed uncertain as to what caused her to slip and fall on the dance floor. As such, sh theorized that there were various reasons as to why she may have fallen: {¶27} Q. My question is why did you fall down, if you know? {¶28} A. Because the floor must have been slippery. {¶29} Q. Okay. {¶30} A. You wouldn t have fallen if it wasn t slippery. {¶31} Q. Do you know {¶32} A. And it was dark, you couldn t see if there was anything on the floor. 8 {¶33} Q. That s my next question, you don t know there s something on the floor or no you didn t see anything? {¶34} A. No, it was too dark. {¶35} *** {¶36} Q. Do you think anything anybody at the Avon Oaks Ballroom did or did not d back on October 22, 1997, led to your fall? 3 {¶37} A. Well, sometimes the wax is more than -- sometimes they have more wax on th floor than other times and the floor becomes very slippery different times. {¶38} *** {¶39} Q. Other than that, do you think anything that anyone did or did not do that night i any way contributed to your fall? {¶40} A. It was dark, you can t see, so I don t know if there was anything else ther There might have been, there could have been, let s just say that. {¶41} *** {¶42} Q. Okay. Other than the possibility that there was something on the floor that yo couldn t see, and the possibility that the floor must have been slippery due to waxing, do you thin anything else that someone associated with Avon Oaks Ballroom did or did not do that night ma have led in any way to your fall? 3. We note that during the deposition, appellant s counsel objected to this question on the basis that it called for appellant to provide a legal conclusion. Despite that fact, appellant referred to this portion of the testimony in her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment and appellate brief. 9 {¶43} A. There could have been food there; they bring cookies and birthday cakes. {¶44} Q. But you don t have any personal knowledge of that that there was food on th floor? {¶45} A. Like I said, I wasn t looking, I didn t know. (Emphasis added.) {¶46} Thus, during her deposition, appellant theorized as to the possible causes of her fal to-wit: that the floor must have been slippery or there may have been food or wax on the floo However, in her affidavit, appellant now opined that she was certain that [her] fall on the floo surface was due to the extremely slippery surface ***. This statement is inconsistent with he deposition testimony as she stated therein that she may have fallen for a number of reasons. {¶47} Under these circumstances, it was appropriate for the trial court to find th appellant s affidavit contradicted her earlier deposition testimony. Accordingly, appellant s fourt assignment of error is meritless. {¶48} A further reason that the affidavit failed to create any dispute as to an issue of materi fact is found in our analysis of the remaining assignments of error. To summarize, appellant affidavit contained only conclusory statements, statements which failed to demonstrate proximat cause, and statements which were unsupported personal opinion. {¶49} For example, in the first assignment of error, appellant contends that appellee create the hazardous condition of a slippery dance floor by not implementing a uniform maintenance polic and by haphazardly tossing wax onto the dance floor. {¶50} Appellee counters, in part, by maintaining that appellant was unable to precisel 10 explain the reason for her fall. In a slip and fall case, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to identify o explain the reason for the fall. Stamper v. Middletown Hosp. Assn. (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 65, 67 68, citing Cleveland Athletic Assn. Co. v. Bending (1934), 129 Ohio St. 152. If, however, th plaintiff is unable to identify the cause of the fall, then a finding of negligence on the part of th defendant is precluded. Stamper at 68. {¶51} As previously mentioned, during her deposition, appellant provided various reason as to why she may have fallen, such as a slippery floor or food/wax on the floor. Accordingly, w determine that appellant was able to provide adequate explanations as to the reason for her fall. {¶52} Returning to appellant s argument, the parties do not dispute that appellant was business invitee, that is one rightfully on the premises of another for purposes in which th possessor of the premises has a beneficial interest. Bowins v. Euclid Gen. Hosp. Assn. (1984), 2 Ohio App.3d 29, quoting Scheibel v. Lipton (1951), 156 Ohio St. 308, paragraph one of the syllabu {¶53} In Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 203, 204, the Suprem Court of Ohio explained that a business entity owes an invitee a duty of reasonable care: {¶54} A shopkeeper owes business invitees a duty of ordinary care in maintaining th premises in a reasonably safe condition so that its customers are not unnecessarily and unreasonabl exposed to danger. See Campbell v. Hughes Provision Co. (1950), 153 Ohio St. 9 ***. A shopkeeper is not, however, an insurer of the customer s safety. Further, a shopkeeper is under n duty to protect business invitees from dangers which are known to such invitee or are so obviou and apparent to such invitee that he may reasonably be expected to discover them and protect himse against them. Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 45 ***, paragraph one of the syllabus 11 (Parallel citations omitted.) {¶55} Thus, in the instant matter, we must determine whether, in constructing the evidenc most favorably to appellant, reasonable minds could find that appellee breached its duty o reasonable care when it maintained and applied wax onto the dance floor. {¶56} Turning to the evidence adduced below, the record indicates that Mr. Revella ha owned the ballroom since 1965, and that he obtained help from his family to run the business. Th facility is used primarily for ballroom dancing and wedding parties. {¶57} During his deposition, Mr. Revella explained that normally, the day of a dance or th day before a dance, his daughter applies wax to the hardwood dance floor, which causes the floor t be slippery: {¶58} Q. How do you maintain the floor? {¶59} A. We don t add anything to it. We put a little wax on, when the people sta dancing, just sprinkle it around a little bit. And the people maintain it themselves. I have no nothing I put on there, no further -- nothing chemical. {¶60} Then, after the dance, it s got a big, wide mop, all the wax is taken off the floor. {¶61} Q. So you put the wax on before a dance begins? {¶62} A. Before they dance. {¶63} Q. Is that during the course of any evening that the dances -{¶64} A. Well, it all depends. When they get done cleaning up, they -- that s the last pa of the job; they wax the floor. They just sprinkle it around certain areas. {¶65} Q. Who sprinkles the wax around? 12 {¶66} A. My daughter. {¶67} Q. Do they use a mop, or they just -{¶68} A. No, no, we -{¶69} Q. Tell me how you do it. {¶70} A. Well, they ve got cans -- I should say maybe a little double-header whiskey glas full, and they walk around just toss it like you re feeding the chickens. And it s four times on on side; four on the other side and about three in the middle, just walking and just swing it. {¶71} Q. Oh, you just kind of just pour it and throw it on the floor? {¶72} A. Yeah, just like you re feeding chickens, kind of spread it out a little bit so wouldn t be in one spot. {¶73} Q. And what s the purpose of doing that? {¶74} A. So the people make the floor more slippery for the people to dance. {¶75} Q. Okay. That helps them dance. {¶76} A. Yes. {¶77} Q. You say you do that just before the dances start? {¶78} A. No, I said when they re done cleaning up, you know, where -- usually it s done couple days before, whenever they clean up. {¶79} Q. And what do you mean by cleaning up, you mean the day before? Tell me wh you mean by that; I m not quite sure. {¶80} A. Well, after the dance, like I mentioned, my daughter goes in there and cleans up What she has to do is clear all the tables off and put everything in garbage cans and take them ou 13 {¶81} Then, she washes the tables and ashtrays, sets the chairs back in place, sweeps th dance floor with a big, wide mop, and then after that, she ll go around, and she ll wax it. {¶82} Q. Okay. And this is at the end of a day that you re open for dancing? {¶83} A. No, she doesn t go up until, maybe, the next day or the day after. {¶84} Q. Would she do this the day of the facility being open for dancing? {¶85} A. Sometimes, if -{¶86} Q. Okay. {¶87} A. -- it gets a little behind, yes. {¶88} *** {¶89} Q. Okay. But you re saying, normally, you put this wax on earlier that day or the da before -{¶90} A. Right. {¶91} Q. -- a dance -{¶92} A. Right. {¶93} Q. -- the day of the facility being open for dancing? {¶94} A. Uh-huh. {¶95} In turn, appellant claims that the slipshod application of wax by appellee wa unorthodox and unsafe and caused an unnatural accumulation of wax on some portions of the danc floor, thereby causing her to slip and fall. {¶96} As to this point, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that a business owner is no liable to a patron who slips and falls on the floor treated with a dressing so long as such dressing 14 applied and maintained in a customary manner: {¶97} It is not negligence per se to have an oiled floor in a store. If the floor dressing applied and maintained in a proper manner there is no liability to a patron who slips and falls on suc floor. Boles v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1950), 153 Ohio St. 381, 384. See, also, Burkhead Eesley (1958), 107 Ohio App. 519, 522. {¶98} Further, in J.C. Penny Co. v. Robison (1934), 128 Ohio St. 626, the Supreme Cou acknowledged the following: {¶99} 2. While the oiling of floors in storerooms is by no means a universal practice, it quite common, and it is not negligence per se, to have an oiled floor in a storeroom; the duty on th part of the storekeeper towards his customers in reference thereto being the exercise of ordinary car in the application of the oil to the floor, and the maintenance of the floor thereafter. {¶100} 3. The standard would be that degree which persons of ordinary care and prudenc are accustomed to use in oiling the floor of a storeroom and maintaining such floor in its oile condition, having due regard to the rights of others and the objects to be accomplished. {¶101} 4. In an action for personal injury, brought by a customer against a storekeepe predicated upon the alleged negligence of the storekeeper in oiling and maintaining a floor in suc storeroom in a dangerous condition, it is not enough to produce testimony showing that the custome slipped and fell on an oiled floor in such storeroom. There must be testimony tending to show tha some negligent act or omission of the storekeeper caused the customer to slip. (Emphasis added See, also, Eller v. Wendy s Internatl., Inc. (2000), 142 Ohio App.3d 321, 334-335. {¶102} Thus, the mere fact that a floor has been waxed is not sufficient to establis 15 negligence: {¶103} [R]easonable mind could not find that a waxed floor alone creates a dangerou condition and that the information that a person other than the plaintiff also slipped on the sam waxed floor prior to the plaintiff s slip and fall is insufficient to establish that the business ha violated its duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe (as opposed to perfectly safe condition. Shelmon v. Damon s Toledo, Inc. (July 28, 1995), 6th Dist. No. L-95-005, 1995 W 444378, at 2. See, also Colletti v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc. (Mar. 3, 1993), 10th Dist. No. 92AP-1605 1993 WL 69438, at 2. {¶104} Rather, it must appear that the wax was improperly applied and/or maintained. Bole at 384; Robison at paragraph three of the syllabus; Burkhead at 527. Thus, in order to survive summary judgment exercise, appellant had to produce evidence tending to show negligence on th part of appellee so as to create a genuine issue of material fact. Appellant failed to do so. {¶105} For instance, even if the content of appellant s affidavit were considered, she did no present evidence identifying the customary method used to maintain and apply wax on a dance floo and that appellee failed to adhere to such a standard. Rather, appellant simply stated the following i her affidavit: {¶106} 5. I fell on a slippery surface that was more slippery than it needed to be fo ballroom dancing. {¶107} 6. [T]he floor surface has not been properly maintained in that there was uneve bunches of wax that accumulated over the floor that made it excessively slippery beyond what wa needed for ballroom dancing. (Emphasis added.) 16 {¶108} However, appellant does not describe how she came to these particular conclusion [A]ffidavits submitted in a summary judgment exercise must contain more than conclusor statements. Affidavits must also contain a recitation of the operative facts which give rise to such conclusory statement. Burkholder v. Straughn (June 26, 1998), 11th Dist. No. 97-T-0146, 1998 W 553623, at 4. See, also, Evanoff v. Ohio Edison Co. (Nov. 10, 1994), 11th Dist. No. 93-P-0015 1994 WL 652635, at 11. {¶109} Furthermore, the affidavit failed to indicate that the statements were based o appellant s personal knowledge. See Civ.R. 56(E). Therefore, appellant s conclusory opinions th the dance floor was more slippery than it needed to be for ballroom dancing and that the floor surfac was improperly maintained because it contained uneven bunches of wax is insufficient to create a issue of material fact. As such, appellant did not produce adequate evidence tending to show th appellee s maintenance techniques or method of applying wax was improper to create a genuin issue of material fact. Accordingly, appellant s first assignment of error is without merit. {¶110} In the second assignment of error, appellant submits that in response to a interrogatory and during his deposition, Mr. Revella admitted that there had been approximately fiv other occasions where people have fallen on the dance floor. From this, appellant concludes th appellee had actual and constructive notice of an inherently dangerous condition by the method o placing the wax on the dance floor that foreseeably would not only cause the injuries that [appellan sustained but that already produced other falls that only by coincidence had not resulted in seriou injury until [appellant s] mishap. (Emphasis sic.) {¶111} Prior to appellant s incident in 1997, Mr. Revella indicated that since he has owne 17 the ballroom facility, approximately five people have fallen on the dance floor. However, there wa no evidence presented as to what caused the other individuals to fall. Appellant merely infers that was due to the allegedly improper waxing of the dance floor. Yet, there is no evidence in this regar {¶112} It is unreasonable, without any other evidence, to conclude or even infer that merel because five other people have fallen in the ballroom that is was due to wax on the dance floo Therefore, appellant s second assignment of error is meritless. {¶113} In the third assignment of error, appellant contends that reasonable minds may diffe as to whether dim lighting created a hazardous condition that contributed to her fall since she coul not clearly see any obstructions, build-up of wax or any other substance on the floor.4 {¶114} During her deposition, appellant testified to the following: {¶115} Q. My question is why did you fall down, if you know? {¶116} A. Because the floor must have been slippery. {¶117} Q. Okay. {¶118} A. You wouldn t have fallen if it wasn t slippery. {¶119} Q. Do you know -{¶120} A. And it was dark, you couldn t see if there was anything on the floor. 4. Appellant points out that in the May 11, 2000 judgment entry, the trial court never even raise[d] dim lighting as an issue to consider ***. While the trial court may not have specifically discussed the issue of dim lighting in its judgment entry, the trial court nevertheless found appellant s memorandum in opposition to appellee s motion for summary judgment, which addressed the issue of lighting conditions on the dance floor, without merit. Presumably, the trial court considered and later rejected the theory that dim lighting was a contributing factor to the fall when it granted appellee s motion for summary judgment. 18 {¶121} Q. That s my next question, you don t know there s something on the floor or no you didn t see anything? {¶122} A. No, it was too dark. {¶123} *** {¶124} Q. Do you think anything anybody at the Avon Oaks Ballroom did or did not d back on October 22, 1997, led to your fall? {¶125} A. Well, sometimes the wax is more than -- sometimes they have more wax on th floor than other times and the floor becomes very slippery different times. {¶126} *** {¶127} Q. Other than that, do you think anything that anyone did or did not do that night i any way contributed to your fall? {¶128} A. It was dark, you can t see, so I don t know if there was anything else ther There might have been, there could have been, let s just say that. (Emphasis added.) {¶129} While appellant seems to believe that the above testimony proves that an issue o material fact exists as to whether the dim lighting on the dance floor caused and/or contributed to th fall, we believe otherwise. Rather, appellant s deposition testimony indicates that she could not se if there was a foreign substance on the floor due to the dim lighting. She never expressly stated th the dim light caused and/or contributed to her fall. {¶130} In fact, in her affidavit, appellant averred that due to the lighting conditions, she coul not see whether she fell on a foreign substance. This is not the same as saying that the dim lightin 19 caused and/or contributed to the fall: {¶131} 7. *** While the dark conditions might have been nice for ambience, it was not saf as I would learn the hard way when I slipped and fell and suffered serious injuries as a result. On th date that I fell at the ballroom on the wooden dance floor, the ballroom was dimly lit. I could not se whether I also fell on a foreign substance or liquid, in addition to the slippery floor, due to th extremely dark conditions. (Emphasis added.) {¶132} While appellant stated that the lighting on the dance floor was dim, she failed t demonstrate that such lighting caused and/or contributed to the fall. Therefore, no issue of materi fact exists as to this point. Accordingly, appellant s third assignment of error is not well-taken. {¶133} Based on the foregoing analysis, appellant s four assignments of error are meritles and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. ROBERT A. NADER, J., DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concur.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.