People v Figueroa

[*1] People v Figueroa 2022 NY Slip Op 22278 Decided on September 7, 2022 Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County Licitra, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on September 7, 2022
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

The People of the State of New York

against

Figueroa, Defendant.



Docket No. CR-018891-21BX



For the People: Darcel Clark, District Attorney of Bronx County (by ADA Marline Paul)

For Mr. Figueroa: The Bronx Defenders (by William John)
Wanda L. Licitra, J.

The defense's C.P.L. § 30.30 motion alleges that the People did not discharge their discovery duties before stating ready for trial. First, the defense argues that the People did nothing regarding documents held by the Fire Department of New York ("FDNY"). The People respond that they have no duty to discover FDNY records because the discovery statute does not deem those records to be in their possession. Second, the defense argues that the People did nothing regarding "Giglio material"—or records about extrinsic prior misconduct—for all except two of the police witnesses in this case. The People respond that they have no discovery duty regarding misconduct records for these officers because they do not intend to call them to testify.

On both counts, the Court disagrees with the People. First, when information is not in the People's possession, the discovery statute does not ask them to do nothing. Instead, the statute requires them to make "diligent, good faith effort[s]" to ascertain the existence of such information and make it available. (C.P.L. § 245.20[2]). Where the People fail to establish any such efforts, they fail to adequately defend their COC. Second, the discovery statute requires that the People disclose information favorable to the defense in their possession or in the possession of law enforcement. (See C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k]). That includes information tending to "negate the defendant's guilt" and "support a potential defense." (Id.) Prior misconduct by officers involved in this case—regardless of whether the People call them to testify—is such favorable information. Accordingly, the People cannot categorically refuse to do anything regarding an officer's prior misconduct simply because they have decided not to call them to testify.

For each reason, the People's certificates of compliance and statements of readiness were illusory. Nonetheless, the defense requested a motion schedule before the C.P.L. § 30.30 clock had expired. As a result, the Court finds that 90 days are charged, and so the defense's motion to dismiss must be DENIED.[FN1]

[*2]I. The discovery statute

The People's specific discovery burden depends on whether information is in their possession. If discoverable material is in their possession, they must "actually produce" it to the defense. (People ex rel. Ferro v. Brann, 197 AD3d 787, 787-88 [2d Dep't 2021]; C.P.L. § 245.20[1]). By law, the People's "possession" includes "all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency." (C.P.L. § 245.20[2]). For information that is not within the People's possession, the discovery statute requires them to make "diligent, good faith effort[s]" to do two things. (Id.). First, they must make a "diligent, good faith effort" to "ascertain the existence" of discoverable material. (Id.). Second, they must make a "diligent, good faith effort" to "cause" that material to "be made available for discovery." (Id.).

Once the People complete these steps, Article 245 directs them to certify it in a certificate of discovery compliance ("COC"). (C.P.L. § 245.50[1]). Tracking the steps above, that COC must certify that the People exercised "due diligence" and made "reasonable inquiries" to "ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery." (C.P.L. § 245.50[1]). It must also certify that the People then "made available all known material and information subject to discovery." (Id.).

A proper COC is one that truthfully certifies these facts and is filed "[w]hen the prosecution has provided the discovery required by subdivision one of section 245.20." (C.P.L. §§ 245.50[3], [1]). Such a proper COC is a prerequisite to a valid statement of readiness. (C.P.L. § 245.50[3]). As many courts have made clear, the People's repeated belief that the statute's "adverse-consequence" clause applies to this trial readiness determination is incorrect. (See People v. Vargas, 171 N.Y.S.3d 877, 880-81 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]; People v. Darren, 75 Misc 3d 1208[A], at *6 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2022]; People v. Aquino, 72 Misc 3d 518, 526-27 [Crim. Ct., Kings County 2021]; People v. Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d 266, 272 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2021]). Indeed, earlier this year, the Legislature rejected an amendment to the adverse-consequence clause that would have applied it to trial readiness determinations. (See People v. Carrillo, 75 Misc 3d 1227[A], at *3 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]; see also Amer. Airlines, Inc. v. State Comm. For Human Rights, 29 AD2d 178, 181 [1st Dep't 1968] ["In [*3]addition, the rejection by the Legislature of the amendments . . . sought by the Commission . . . is significant circumstance against the construction sought by [them].").

When the defense alleges that the People's COC was not proper, it is incumbent on the People to come forward and establish that they met the relevant statutory burden. (See People v. Payne, 75 Misc 3d 1224[A], at *2 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022] [People established they disclosed "any and all" documents held by the New York City Law Department]; People v. Alvia, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22233, at *2-*3 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022] [People established they disclosed body-worn camera videos]). That is because the People are the only party who know about the efforts they made. Efficiency and general principles of law suggest that "[t]he party in possession of information should bear the burden of producing it." (See People v. Spaulding, 75 Misc 3d 1219[A], at *4 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]).

The discovery statute is not impracticable. Should the People face any difficulties in ascertaining the existence of discovery or actually producing it, the statute provides the People numerous opportunities to petition a court for relief. For instance, the People may ask a court to modify the discovery periods for "good cause." (C.P.L. § 245.70[2]). Or they may ask a court for permission to state ready on an improper COC because of "special circumstances." (C.P.L. § 245.50[3]). Or they may ask for a protective order to withhold some materials entirely. (C.P.L. § 245.70).

II. FDNY records

According to the People, this case concerns an alleged DWI in which police arrested Mr. Figueroa at the scene of a "damage[d]" vehicle "in the middle of the road," FDNY was then "called to the scene," and Mr. Figueroa was afterwards taken to the hospital. (Pr. Resp at 15-16). As a result, from the beginning of this case, it was plain to the People that FDNY was substantively involved. Indeed, the People's recitation of events suggests that the NYPD may have been the ones who called FDNY in the first place.

Despite these circumstances, the People present no information about any efforts they made to ascertain the existence of or disclose discoverable material from FDNY. (See id. at 6-8). Instead, the People only state that because "FDNY reports are not in the People's possession" or "in the possession of law enforcement," they "are not required to gather it in order to file a valid COC." (Id. at 8).

The People misapprehend their discovery duties. Under C.P.L. § 245.20[2]—entitled "[d]uties of the prosecution"—where discoverable material exists "but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody, or control," the People must make "a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain [its] existence" and "cause [it] to be made available for discovery." Thereafter, in their COC, the People must certify that they took these steps. (See C.P.L § 245.50[1]). "Upon a challenge, it is incumbent on the People to articulate what efforts they made to ascertain the existence of the challenged discoverable material and to make it available for discovery." (People v. Francis, 75 Misc 3d 1224[A], at *5 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]).

Here, the People fail to articulate any efforts whatsoever to ascertain the existence of FDNY reports and make them available for discovery. "Instead, the People only claim, incorrectly, that they have no obligations regarding this material at all, simply because it was not in their control" or with a law enforcement agency. (Id.). But here, "[i]t is of no moment that the agency that responded was not a law enforcement agency." (People v. Rahman, 74 Misc 3d 1214[A], at *2 [Sup. Ct., Queens County 2022]). Failure to do anything regarding FDNY records [*4]when that agency responded to an arrest involving an allegedly intoxicated person, who was thereafter transported to the hospital, "falls far short of the due diligence the statute requires of the People in this context." (See id.).

Where FDNY records related to a case are reasonably likely to exist, the People must make a "diligent, good faith effort" to ascertain their existence and "cause" them to be made available for discovery before filing their COC. (C.P.L. §§ 245.20[2], 245.50[1]; Rahman, 74 Misc 3d 1214[A], at *2; Francis, 75 Misc 3d 1224[A], at *5; People v. Ajunwa, 75 Misc 3d 1220[A], at *3 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]). Here, they failed to establish any such efforts. Therefore, their COC was not proper and ineffective to support a valid statement of readiness.

III. "Giglio material" for police witnesses whom the People do not intend to call to testify

The next question is whether the People must disclose evidence about prior misconduct by police witnesses whom the People choose not to call to testify. Under the discovery statute—and under New York's ethical rules—the People have a duty to disclose favorable evidence to the accused. (C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k]; NY R. Prof. Conduct § 3.8). This mandate is "broader" than the constitutional Brady/Giglio duty to disclose material favorable evidence because it "abandons the requirement that only 'materially' exculpatory information need be disclosed." (NY State Assembly, Memorandum in Support of Legislation, A4360A; see also NYC Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Opinion 2016-3: Prosecutors' Ethical Obligations to Disclose Information Favorable to the Defense [2016] ["Rule 3.8 on its face is not subject to the same materiality limitation [as Brady/Giglio."]]).

Colloquially, lawyers and courts in New York refer to information about police witnesses' prior misconduct as "Giglio material." This is founded upon the theory that instances of prior misconduct may be used to impeach a witness's credibility through cross-examination on the stand. (Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 [1972] ["The government's Brady obligation to disclose material evidence favorable to a criminal defendant applies not only to exculpatory evidence, but also to evidence that could be used to impeach government witnesses."]; People v. Smith, 27 NY3d 652, 661 [2016] ["[A]llegations of misconduct [by] a law enforcement agent [are] favorable to defendant as impeachment evidence."]).

But this form of Giglio is a subset of Brady. While an officer's prior misconduct could tend to "impeach the credibility of a testifying witness" on the stand, (C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][iv]), it could also be favorable in other ways. For instance, it could tend to "negate the defendant's guilt" or "support a potential defense." (See C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][i], [iii]). In the constitutional context, New York's federal courts agree. (See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 70-73 [2d Cir. 2003]). "The fact that [an informant] did not testify at the defendants' trial presents no obstacle to application of Brady and its progeny." (Id. at 70). "A contrary conclusion would permit the government to avoid disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment material simply by not calling the relevant witness to testify." (Id. at 71).

This case presents a clear example of why disclosure of prior misconduct is not limited to witnesses whom the People choose to call to testify. Officer Mena was one of two responding officers who allegedly first observed the charged offense. (Pr. Resp. at 15). The People are not calling him to testify. (Id. at 5-6). Officer Rodriguez arrived later, was "debriefed by the first responding officers," and then made the arrest. (Id. at 15). The People will call Officer Rodriguez to testify. (See id. at 6).

Undermining the credibility of Officer Mena would tend to be favorable to the defense, even if the People do not call him to testify. It would, for instance, tend to "negate the defendant's guilt" and "support a potential defense," (C.P.L. §§ 245.20[1][k][i], [iii]]), as it would undermine the credibility of an informant "in the investigation that led to [the instant] arrest[]," (Jackson, 345 F.3d at 73; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 442 n.18 [1995] [recognizing that a non-testifying informant's suspected role in unrelated crimes could be favorable to the defense as a "reason for [him] to ingratiate himself with" and lie to the police]).

Moreover, at suppression hearings in the Bronx, it is often the case that the People elicit hearsay statements by non-testifying responding officers. (See C.P.L. § 710.60[4] [permitting admission of hearsay at suppression hearings]). In New York, the rule requiring disclosure of favorable information applies to suppression hearings by statute, (C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][vi]), and if material, by constitutional rule, (People v. Williams, 7 NY3d 15 [2006]). Information undermining the credibility of a non-testifying hearsay declarant would be favorable to the defense—and likely admissible—to impeach the declarant's credibility. After all, "New York has traditionally allowed for impeachment of hearsay declarants." (Robert A. Barker & Vincent C. Alexander, New York Practice Series — Evidence in New York State and Federal Courts § 8:96 [2021] [collecting cases]; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8-111 [noting the same]; accord F.R.E. 806 [permitting impeachment of hearsay declarants who do not testify]).

In sum, this Court joins the reasoning of the federal courts in New York. Favorable information includes all evidence and information about a police witness's prior misconduct, regardless of whether the People intend to call that officer to testify. Just because prior misconduct could "impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness" does not mean that it could not be favorable to the defense in other ways, like to "support a potential defense" or "negate the defendant's guilt." (See C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k]). Where an officer is involved in a case, that officer's credibility "relate[s]" to the case. (See C.P.L. § 245.20[1]). As a result, the People cannot do what they have done here. They cannot categorically refuse to do anything regarding officers' prior misconduct simply because they will not call them to testify in court. Therefore, the COC was not proper and ineffective to support a valid statement of readiness.

C.P.L. § 30.30 CALCULATION

Bronx Criminal Court arraigned Mr. Figueroa on December 12, 2021. The highest charge against him was an unclassified misdemeanor punishable by 364 days in jail. Therefore, the People had 90 days from arraignments to validly state ready for trial. (C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b]).

As discussed above, the Court finds that the People's COCs and statements of readiness were ineffective to stop the speedy-trial clock.[FN2] Ninety days after December 12, 2021, was [*5]March 12, 2021. However, because that day was a Saturday, the 90th day fell on the following Monday. (People v. Powell, 179 Misc 2d 1047, 1048 [Sup. Ct., App. Term 2d Dep't 1999]; People v. Mandela, 142 AD3d 81, 85-86 [3d Dep't 2016]). On that Monday, the defense requested a motion schedule, stopping the C.P.L. § 30.30 clock. (C.P.L. § 30.30[4][a]; People v. South, 29 Misc 3d 92, 95 [Sup. Ct. App. Term, 2d Dep't 2010]). Accordingly, 90 days have accrued from arraignments, and the People are within their speedy-trial time.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the People's statements of readiness and COCs were illusory and not proper, but the defense's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Before filing a valid COC and statement of readiness, the People are ORDERED to produce:

1. All information relating to allegations of prior misconduct, including any related underlying material, by Officers Puello, Jagtiani, Woisin, and Mena held by the Bronx District Attorney's Office or the NYPD or is otherwise known to police.a. This directive includes non-privileged documents held by the New York City Law Department if the Law Department represented any of these officers in civil lawsuits regarding their alleged misconduct.

Before filing a valid COC and statement of readiness, the People are further ORDERED to:

2. Engage in a diligent, good-faith effort to ascertain the existence of any material held by the FDNY related to this case, and if it exists, to make it available to the defense.

In addition, to any extent to which the People have not already done so, or to any extent not otherwise covered by the above orders, before filing a valid COC and statement of readiness, the People are also ORDERED to produce:

3. The entirety of their file and the police file for this case except for any work product or any material under a protective order; and4. All evidence and information, including any underlying documents, in the possession of or known to the People or the police, that impeaches the credibility of any witness against Mr. Figueroa.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: Bronx, NY

September 7, 2022

Wanda L. Licitra, J.C.C. Footnotes

Footnote 1:The defense also argues, separate from its COC challenge, that the People untimely filed a superseding information. (Def. Mot. at 14-15). They claim that "the State was required to supplement or amend the Information" before the 90-day speedy-trial period expired. (Id.). The defense cites no case that supports this extraordinary proposition. (See id.). Contrary to the defense's contention, there is no requirement that the People file all superseding informations within 90 days of arraignments. In a misdemeanor case punishable by 364 days in jail, like this one, the People must file a facially sufficient information within the 90-day speedy-trial period. (See C.P.L. §§ 30.30[1][b]; 30.30[5-a]; People v. Colon, 59 NY2d 921 [1983]). However, once the People file a facially sufficient information, C.P.L. § 100.50[1] authorizes them to file "another information" prior to the "entry of a plea of guilty . . . or commencement of a trial." (People v. Thomas, 4 NY3d 143, 147 [2005]). "Significantly, the statute imposes no restrictions on the type of crimes that maybe included in a new information." (Id.). "Since a new crime may be charged, the statute necessarily implies that new facts may be alleged in support of any additional offenses." (Id.). Accordingly, the Court also DENIES this branch of the defense's motion.

Footnote 2:The Court also notes that up until the final COC and statement of readiness, the People were disclosing material piecemeal and improperly filing premature "certificates" of "compliance" and statements of "readiness" after almost every discovery disclosure. The Court reminds the People that a "certificate of compliance must genuinely certify compliance." (People v. Vargas, 171 N.Y.S.3d 877, 878 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]). "It cannot be a certificate of compliance in name only." (Id.). "Nor can it be a simple placeholder that the People file while they continue to disclose discovery files piecemeal." (Id.). A supplemental certificate of compliance is for discovery that the prosecution "subsequently learns of," not for discovery that was already known. (See C.P.L. § 245.60). In this case, however, this issue is moot because the Court concludes that even the People's latest COC and statement of readiness were ineffective.