People v Williams

Annotate this Case
[*1] People v Williams 2018 NY Slip Op 50333(U) Decided on March 16, 2018 City Court Of Mount Vernon Armstrong, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 16, 2018
City Court of Mount Vernon

The People of the State of New York,

against

Khalil Williams, Defendant.



17-1733



Westchester County District Attorney

Mount Vernon Branch

David Hawkins, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant

116 Haven Avenue

Mount Vernon, New York 10553
Adrian N. Armstrong, J.

Defendant is charged by superceding misdemeanor information with one count of Assault in the Third Degree in violation of Penal Law § 120.00(01); one count of Criminal Trespass in the Second Degree in violation of Penal Law § 140.15; one count of Endangering the Welfare of a Child in violation of Penal Law § 260.10(01); and one count of Harassment in the Second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.26(01)).

Defendant moves for an order 1) precluding the People from use at trial defendant's prior criminal history or prior uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct; 2) suppressing certain statements allegedly made by defendant, or in the alternative, granting a Huntley/Dunaway hearing to determine the admissibility of such statements.

It is alleged that on June 28, 2017 at approximately 10:30 p.m., at 126 South 7th Avenue, Apartment 80, in the City of Mount Vernon, County of Westchester and State of New York, the defendant entered into the residence of the victim, Nicole Duncan. Once inside the residence the defendant got into a verbal altercation with the victim. The defendant allegedly struck the victim in the face multiple times with his fists, causing the victim to fall to the ground. As a result of the defendant's action the victim called the police and was transported and treated at Montefiore Hospital for her injuries. The victim provided the Mount Vernon Police with both an oral and written statement regarding the incident.

Shortly after the incident at the aforementioned location, at approximately 12:05 a.m. on June 29, 2017, the defendant walked into Mount Vernon Police Headquarters and asked to file a report, and a complaint against Nicole Duncan. Police Officer Mitchell who had been at Montefiore Hospital speaking to the victim was notified of the defendant's presence at Mount Vernon Police Headquarters and came back to Police Headquarters to meet with the defendant.

Officer Mitchell read the defendant his Miranda Warnings and the defendant signed said form at approximately 12:32 a.m. The defendant advised the officer that he did go to the subject location to pick up his daughter. He further informed Officer Mitchell that when he arrived at the apartment, the victim began to yell and scream at him, and then picked up a chair and threw it at him. He stated that he was able to block the chair with his arms. He then admitted to pushing the victim, causing her to fall to the ground. He then stated that he left the residence with his daughter. At approximately 1:10 a.m. the defendant was placed under arrest.

Defendant argues that any and all statements allegedly made by and/or elicited from him were obtained illegally because 1) they are the tainted fruit of an unlawful arrest; 2) they were made after he was subjected to custodial interrogation without first being advised of his Miranda rights; 3) he made the statements without knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to remain silent; and 4) he made the statements involuntarily, in the alternative, defendant requests a Huntley/Dunaway hearing.

The People consent to a Huntley hearing, but oppose the Dunaway hearing request. The People maintain that the defendant failed to state a sufficient legal basis for suppression as required by the CPL.

A motion to suppress evidence "must state the ground or grounds of the motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact." CPL § 710.60(1). A motion to suppress must be summarily granted where the defendant alleges a legal ground warranting suppression and the People concede the truth of the factual allegations. CPL § 710.60(2)(a). A Court may summarily deny a motion to suppress if the defendant fails to allege a proper legal basis for suppression or if the "sworn allegations of fact do not as a matter of law support the ground alleged." CPL § 710.60(3)(b).

"[T]he sufficiency of [the] defendant's factual allegations should be evaluated by (1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) [the] defendant's access to information." People v. Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993). However, even if the defendant's factual allegations are deficient, summarily denying a motion to suppress is disfavored. In Mendoza, supra, the Court of Appeals explained:



The CPL does not mandate summary denial of defendant's motion even if the factual allegations are deficient. If the Court orders a Huntley or Wade hearing, and defendant's Mapp motion is grounded in the same facts involving the same police witnesses, the court may deem it appropriate in the exercise of discretion to consider the Mapp motion despite a perceived pleading deficiency. Indeed, considerations of judicial economy militate in favor of this procedure; an appellate court might conclude that summary denial of the Mapp motion as improper, requiring the parties and witnesses to reassemble for a new hearing, often months or years later.

As stated above, summary denial of suppression motion is disfavored. In the interest of judicial economy and in light of the fact that the branch of defendant's motion seeking a Huntley hearing "is grounded in the same set of facts and involv[es] the same police witnesses" (People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 429 [1993]), defendant's motion for a Dunaway hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to effectuate his arrest is granted.

The Sandoval motion is granted on consent, and shall be renewed before the trial judge. Since the People have not indicated that they plan to introduce any evidence of defendant's prior bad acts on their direct case, the motion for a Ventimiglia hearing is denied as premature at this time. In the event the People later indicate they plan to introduce such evidence, the defendant may renew the motion before trial.

Accordingly, the defendant's motion for a Dunaway/Huntley hearing is granted. Defendant's motion for a Sandoval hearing is granted and respectfully referred to the trial judge.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.



Dated: March 16, 2018

Mount Vernon, New York

HON. ADRIAN N. ARMSTRONG

City Judge of Mount Vernon

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.