People v Hoyte
Annotate this CaseDecided on March 14, 2018
Supreme Court, Kings County
The People of the State of New York
against
Jesse Hoyte, Kelby Snell, Defendant.
9287-2017
For the People: Maria Neri, Esq., Kings County District Attorney's Office
For Defendant Hoyte: Martin Goldberg, Esq.
Joanne D. Quinones, J.
Defendant Jesse Hoyte is charged under indictment number 9287/2017 with two counts of Criminal Possession of Weapon in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law (PL) sections 265.03(1)(b) and (3), and one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree, in violation of PL section 265.01(1). Co-defendant Kelby Snell is charged under the same indictment with four counts each of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Second Degree, in violation of PL section 170.25, and Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree, in violation of PL section 170.20. Defendant Hoyte now moves to sever the charges against him from those against his co-defendant. The People oppose the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion to sever is granted.
BACKGROUND
It is alleged that on November 18, 2017 the police responded to a radio run of shots fired at 947 East 80th Street. When the police arrived at the location they observed shell casings on the sidewalk in front of the location as well as blood and bullet marks on the stoop. Through the open front door, they observed co-defendant Kelby Snell lying on the floor bleeding. They requested identification from the co-defendant who handed the police his wallet. The wallet contained two forged driver's licenses and two forged credit cards. The police then met with defendant Hoyte's mother who informed them there was video surveillance. The video showed the defendant and co-defendant on the stoop, the co-defendant is then seen fall onto the defendant and the defendant is observed pulling a firearm out of his jacket and start shooting at an unknown individual. Defendant is then seen pulling the co-defendant into the location. The police subsequently secure the scene and obtain a search warrant. Upon execution of the search warrant, a magazine containing seven rounds of ammunition, an empty magazine, a Billy club, a switchblade and 37 rounds of mixed ammunition are recovered from the location. Based on [*2]these allegations, Defendant Hoyte was arraigned on a felony complaint charging him with various criminal possession of a weapon charges as well as reckless endangerment and other charges. Co-Defendant Snell was separately charged in a felony complaint accusing him of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second and third degrees.
DISCUSSION
Defendant Hoyte argues that severance should be granted because he is charged with various weapons offenses whereas the co-defendant is charged with completely different crimes related to forged instruments. He further asserts that he is not charged with acting in concert with the co-defendant on any charge and thus, the matters were improperly joined.
The People contend that the matters are properly joined pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) sections 200.40(1)(c) and 200.20(2)(a) because all the offenses are based on facts arising out of the same criminal transaction. They further submit that because the matters are based on the same criminal transaction, the defendant cannot seek a discretionary severance under CPL section 200.20(3).
CPL section 200.40(1)(c) permits two or more defendants to be jointly charged in a single indictment provided that all the offenses charged are based upon the same criminal transaction. CPL section 40.10(2) defines a criminal transaction as "conduct which establishes at least one offense, and which is comprised of two or more or a group of acts either (a) so closely related and connected in point of time and circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal incident, or (b) so closely related in criminal purpose or objective as to constitute elements or integral parts of a single criminal venture." In determining whether two acts are part of the same criminal transaction, the court must look at the nature of the crime and the underlying facts (People v Griffin, 137 AD2d 558, 559 [2nd Dept 1988]). However, factors such as same time, date and place are not dispositive, "there must also be some substantive similarity in the nature of the offenses and the manner of their commission" (People v Summers, 191 Misc 2d 386, 388 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2002]).
Contrary to the People's position, the court finds that the conduct with which defendant and co-defendant are charged do not arise from the same criminal transaction. Other than occurring at the same place and at the same approximate time, the offenses charged against each defendant are not "substantively similar" in nature or in manner of commission. Here, there has been no connection shown between co-defendant Snell's alleged possession of forged credit cards and driver's licenses found in his wallet and Defendant Hoyte's alleged criminal conduct in possessing a loaded firearm and shooting it at an unknown individual (see People v Pabon, 96 AD2d 870 [2nd Dept 1983] [defendant's arrest for possession of a .22 caliber gun and gravity knife made 45 minutes after and three blocks away from where he committed a robbery with a sawed-off shotgun found not to be part of same criminal transaction]). Additionally, contrary to the People's contention, the offenses are not "of such nature that either proof of the first offense would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the second, or proof of the second would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the first" (CPL § 200.20[2][b]). Proof of co-defendant's Snell's possession of forged instruments are not properly admissible against defendant Hoyte in a trial for weapons possession charges (see People v Communiello, 180 AD2d 809, 810 [2nd Dept 1992] [denial of defendant's severance motion when offenses charged were not based upon the same act or criminal transaction was reversible error]; see also Pabon, 96 AD2d at 871 [defendant should have been granted a separate trial]).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the defendant's motion to sever is granted.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
March 14, 2018
Joanne D. Qui±ones, A.J.S.C.
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