People v Stamps

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People v Stamps 2018 NY Slip Op 33912(U) August 13, 2018 County Court, Westchester County Docket Number: 18-0360 Judge: Anne E. Minihan Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] '"'.J - FILED AND ENTERED COUNTY COURT: STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER ONf-/3- 2018 ------------------------------------------------------------------)( WESTCHESTER THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ·-against- BRYAN STAMPS, FILED,._ DECISION & ORDER Ind No.: 18-0360 AU5 1 3 2018 c. IDONI 11 De ~en"Q~fu~t'~fr~y "e;..C:!-!!~;N ;y CLERK ------------------?-------------------------.COON:f-V-G~.\.~!.E~CHESTER . MINIHAN, J. ' -- Defendant BRYAN STAMPS, by Westchester County Indictment No. 18-0360, is charged with Attempted Murder in the Second Degree (Penal Law§ 110/125.25 [1]); Assault in the First Degree (Penal Law§ 120.10[1]); Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law§ 265.01 [2]); Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Penal Law§ 260.10[1]). Defendant has filed an omnibus motion consisting of a Notice of Motion, an Affirmation in Support thereof, and a Memorandum of Law. In response thereto, the People have filed an Affirmation in Opposition together with a Memorandum of Law. Upon consideration of these papers, the stenographic transcript of the grand jury minutes and the Consent Discovery Order, entered in this case, this court disposes of the motion as follows: A. MOTION for DISCOVERY, DISCLOSURE and INSPECTION CPL ARTICLE 240 The parties have entered into a stipulation by way of a Consent Discovery Order consenting to the enumerated discovery in this case. Defendant's motion for discovery is granted to the extent provided for in Criminal Procedure Law Article 240. If there any further items discoverable pursuant.to Criminal Procedure Law Article 240 which }).ave not been provided to defendant pursuant to the Consent Discovery Order, they are to be provided forthwith. As to the defendant's demand for exculpatory material, the People have acknowledged their continuing duty to disclose exculpatory material at the earliest possible date upon its discovery (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]; Giglio v United States, 405 US 150 [1972]). The People have also acknowledged their duty to comply with People v Rosario, (9 NY2d 286 [ 1961 ]). In the event that the People are or become aware of any material which is arguably exculpatory and they are not willing to consent to its disclosure to the defendant, they • I [* 2] are directed to immediately disclose such material to the Court to permit an in camera inspection and determination as to whether such must be disclosed to the defendant. Notably, the People have a continuing duty to disclose the terms of any deal or agreement made between the People and any prosecution witness at the earliest possible date (see People v Steadman, 82 NY2d 1 [1993]; Giglio v United States, 405 US 150 [1972]; Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]; People v Wooley, 200 AD2d 644 [2d Dept 1994]). As to the defendant's demand for scientific related discovery, the People have ~cknowledged their continuing duty to disclose any written report or document concerning a\ physical or mental examination or test that the People intend to introduce, or the person who created them, at trial pursuant to CPL 240.20 (l)(c). Defendant's motion for a further Bill of Particulars is denied. The Bill of Particulars set forth in the Consent Discovery Order provided to the defendant has adequately informed the defendant of the substance of his alleged conduct and in all respects complies with CPL 200.95. Except to the extent that the defendant's application has been specifically granted herein, it is otherwise denied as seeking material or information beyond the scope of discovery (see People v Colavito, 87 NY2d 423 [1996]; Matter of Brown v Grosso, 285 AD2d 642 [2d Dept 2001]; Matter of Brown v Appelman, 241AD2d279 [2d Dept 1998]; Matter of Catterson v Jones, 229 AD2d 435 [2d Dept 1996]; Matter a/Catterson v Rohl, 202 AD2d 420 [2d Dept 1994]). B. MOTION to INSPECT and to DISMISS and/or REDUCE CPL ARTICLE 190 The court grants the defendant's motion to the limited extent that the court has conducted, with the consent of the People, an in camera inspection of the stenographic transcription of the · grand jury proceedings. Upon such review, the court finds no basis upon which to grant defendant's application to dismiss or reduce the indictment. The defendant, who bears the burden of refuting with substantial evidence the presumption of regularity which attaches to official court proceedings (People v Pichardo, 168 AD2d 577 [2d Dept 1990]), has offered no sworn factual allegations, in support of his argument that the grandjury proceedings were defective. The minutes reveal a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence, and that the Assistant District Attorney properly instructed the grand jury on the law, and only permitted those grand jurors who heard all the evidence to vote the matter (see People v Ca/bud, 49 NY2d 389 [1980]; People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36 [1984]; People v Burch, 108 AD3d 679 [2d Dept 2013]). The evidence presented to the grand jury, if accepted as true, is legally sufficient to establish every element of each offense charged (CPL 210.30[2]). "Courts assessing the 2 [* 3] sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted--and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence--would warrant conviction" (People v Mills, 1NY3d269, 274-275 [2002]). Legally sufficient evidence means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof(CPL 70.10[1]; see People v Flowers, 138 AD3d 1138, 1139 [2d Dept 2016]). "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Jessup, 90 AD3d 782, 783 [2d Dept 2011]). "The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference" (People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 526 [1998]). Defendant's request to dismiss the indictment in furtherance of justice is denied. The defendant has cited no persuasive or compelling factor, consideration or circumstances under CPL 210.40 warranting dismissal of this indictment. In reaching a decision on the motion, the court has examined the factors listed in CPL 210.40, which include, in relevant part, the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; the extent of harm caused by the offense; the evidence of guilt; the history, character and condition of the defendant; any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel; the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the charged offenses; the potential impact of a dismissal on public confidence in the judicial system; the potential impact of dismissal upon the safety and welfare of the community; and other relevant facts suggesting that a conviction would not serve a useful purpose. Having done so, the court has discerned no compelling factor, consideration or circumstance which clearly demonstrates that further prosecution or conviction of the defendant would constitute or result in injustice. Based upon the in camera review, since this court does not find release of the grand jury minutes or any portion thereof necessary to assist it in making any determinations and as the defendant has not set forth a compelling or particularized need for the production of the grand jury minutes, defendant's application for a copy of the grand jury minutes is denied (see People v Jang, 17 AD3d 693 [2d Dept 2005]; CPL 190.25[4][a]). C. MOTION for SANDOVAL and VENTIMIGLIA HEARINGS Defendant has moved for a pre-trial hearing to permit the trial court to determine the extent, if at all, to which the People may inquire into the defendant's prior criminal convictions, prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral conduct. The People have consented to a Sandoval hearing. Accordingly, it is ordered that immediately prior to trial a hearing shall be conducted pursuant to People v Sandoval (34 NY2d 371(1974]). At said hearing, the People shall be required to notify the defendant of all specific instances of his criminal, prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral conduct of which they have knowledge and which they intend to use in an attempt to impeach the defendant's credibility if he elects to testify at trial (CPL 240.43). 3 [* 4] At the hearing, the defendant shall bear the burden. of identifying-any instances of his prior misconduct that he submits the People should not be permitted to use to impeach his credibility. The defendant shall be required to identify the basis of his belief that each event or incident may be unduly prejudicial to his ability to testify as a witness on his own behalf (see People v Matthews, 68 NY2d 118 [1986]; People v Malphurs, 111AD2d266 [2d Dept 1985]). To the extent defendant's application is for a hearing pursuant to People v Ventimiglia (52 NY2d 350 [1981]), it is denied since the People have not indicated an intention to use evidence of any prior bad act or uncharged crimes of the defendant during its case in chief (see People v Molineaux, 168 NY2d 264 [1901]). If the People move to introduce such evidence, the defendant may renew this aspect of his motion. D. MOTION to STRIKE PREJUDICIAL LANGUAGE The Defendant moves to strike certain language from the indictment on the grounds that it is surplusage, irrelevant or prejudicial. The language concluding the indictment merely identifies the Defendant's acts as public, rather than private wrongs and such language should not be stricken as prejudicial. This motion is denied (see People v Gill, 164 AD2d 867 [2d Dept 1990]; People v·Winters, 194 AD2d 703 [2d Dept 1993]; People v Garcia, 170 Misc. 2d 543 [Westchester Co. Ct. 1996]). E. MOTION TO STRIKE ALIBI NOTICE Defendant's motion to strike the alibi notice is denied. Contrary to the defendant's contentions, it is well-settled that CPL 250.00 is indeed in compliance with the constitutional requirements (see People v Dawson, 185 AD2d 854 [2d Dept 1992]; People v Cruz, 176 AD2d 751 [2d Dept 1991]; People v Gill, 164 AD2d 867 [2d Dept 1990]) and provides equality in the required disclosure (People v Peterson, 96 AD2d 871 [2d Dept 1983]; see generally Wardius v Oregon, 412 US 470 [1973]). The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision and order of thi Dated: White Plains, New York A::.52018 Acting Supreme Court Justice 4 [* 5] ' .. To: HON. ANTHONY A. SCARPINO, Jr. District Attorney; W estchestet County 111 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard White Plains, New York 10601 CLARE J. DEGNAN, ESQ. The Legal Aid Society of Westchester County 150 Grand Street, Suite 100 'White Plains, New York 10601 5

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