People v Jerome
Annotate this CaseDecided on February 16, 2018
City Court of Hudson, Columbia County
People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
against
John J. Jerome, Defendant.
CR-00833-17
Paul Czajka, Esq., Columbia County District Attorney, by Joyce Crawford, Assistant District Attorney
For the Defendant: John M. Leonardson, Esq., Columbia County Conflict Defender
Brian J. Herman, J.
This criminal matter was commenced by the filing with this Court of a misdemeanor information alleging that on June 20, 2017 the defendant violated NYS Penal Law §240.50(2), Falsely Reporting an Incident in the Third-Degree which provides:
"A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the third degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, he or she . . . . [r]eports, by word or action, to an official or quasi-official agency or organization having the function of dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property, an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a catastrophe or emergency which did not in fact occur or does not in fact exist[.]"Specifically, the defendant is accused of reporting by word a medical emergency and it is alleged that an emergency did not in fact occur or exist.
At arraignment on July 14, 2017 the defendant pled not guilty to the charge. On September 14, 2017, the matter was scheduled for a jury trial to commence on February 5, 2018.
Defendant has now moved by notice of motion dated January 24, 2018 seeking dismissal of the charge alleging this court lacks geographical jurisdiction rendering the filed charge defective, seeking dismissal of the charge on the grounds that the accusatory instrument is defective and legally insufficient, dismissal of the accusatory instrument as being "duplicitous," for an order postponing the trial, and for an order granting a Sandoval Hearing and a Ventimiglia [*2]Hearing.
The People filed an affirmation dated January 30, 2018 in opposition to defendant's motion. Thereafter the Defendant filed an affirmation in response and the People replied with an affirmation in reply. Additionally, the defense counsel filed with the court a letter dated February 8, 2017 making corrections to defense counsel's affirmation in reply.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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This misdemeanor information alleges that on June 20, 2017 at 71 Prospect Avenue, Hudson, New York, the defendant reported by word to the Columbia County 911 that he was having a medical emergency requiring assistance and transport to Columbia Memorial Hospital. The information further alleges that paramedics were dispatched as "priority one" medical emergency. During the ride to Hudson, the defendant allegedly stated that he just needed a ride to Hudson and that the emergency did not in fact occur or exist.
In support of the misdemeanor information, supporting depositions of two paramedics are attached. The supporting depositions attest that they received a call for a man with chest pains walking down the road in Millerton, New York. The depositions further allege that the defendant was taken into their ambulance, he was assessed, and the defendant was allegedly asked which hospital he wanted to be taken to, to which the defendant allegedly responded, Columbia Memorial Hospital in Hudson.
It is further alleged in the supporting depositions that in route to the hospital, the defendant refused further medical treatment and stated that he did not need an ambulance, that in fact he needed a ride to Hudson for his daughter's graduation.
The supporting depositions further allege that when he was taken to Columbia Memorial Hospital in Hudson, he stated that he was going to use the bathroom and walked out of the hospital without receiving any treatment.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the motions submitted by the defendant were well outside the time specified by Criminal Procedure Law §255.20(2). However, "[i]t is a fundamental and nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite that an information state the crime with which the defendant is charged and the particular facts constituting the crime." People v. Hall, 48 NY2d 927 (1979). Further, "prudence counsels in favor of deciding Defendant's facial sufficiency challenge at this juncture." People v. Smith, 48 Misc 3d 1201(A) (Criminal Court, Bronx County 2015).
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Geographical Jurisdiction
Defense counsel states in his affirmation that since Columbia County 911 is located outside of the City of Hudson (in the Town of Greenport), and that since the alleged telephone [*3]call [FN1] made by the defendant was made outside of Hudson and Columbia County (i.e. Millerton, New York), the phone call was neither made from a location in the City of Hudson, nor made to a location in the City of Hudson. Therefore, defense asks that the accusatory instrument be dismissed in that this court lacks geographic jurisdiction.
The People opposed Defendant's position that this court lacks geographical jurisdiction. The People rely upon CPL §20.50, which applies the principals in CPL §20.40 to cities. Specifically, the People rely upon CPL §20.40(2)(c) and CPL §20.40(4)(g)[FN2] .
CPL §20.40(2)(c) provides that,
". . . a person may be convicted in an appropriate criminal court of a particular county, of an offense of which the criminal courts of this state have jurisdiction pursuant to section 20.20, committed either by his or her own conduct or by the conduct of another for which he or she is legally accountable pursuant to section 20.00 of the penal law, when . . . [e]ven though none of the conduct constituting such offense may have occurred within such county . . . [s]uch conduct had, or was likely to have, a particular effect upon such county or a political subdivision or part thereof, and was performed with intent that it would, or with knowledge that it was likely to, have such particular effect therein . . ."The term, "particular effect" is defined in CPL §20.10 (4): "Particular effect of an offense. When conduct constituting an offense produces consequences which, though not necessarily amounting to a result or element of such offense, have a materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare of a particular jurisdiction, or result in the defrauding of persons in such jurisdiction, such conduct and offense have a particular effect upon such jurisdiction."
The People contend that the alleged false reporting of a medical emergency has such a particular effect upon the City of Hudson, therefore geographical jurisdiction is conferred on this court.
CPL §20.40(2) requires that the alleged conduct must have a materially harmful impact which can only be satisfied only by a "concrete and identifiable injury" to either the county's governmental processes (that is, the executive, legislative or judicial branch of government) or the welfare of the county's community. Moreover, to be materially harmful, the impact must be more than minor or incidental, and the conduct must harm the well-being of the community as a whole, not merely a particular individual [FN3] .
Thus, there is an issue of fact whether the alleged false reporting of a medical emergency and asking to be brought to a hospital within the geographic jurisdiction of this court is [*4]materially harmful to the City of Hudson and whether such alleged criminal act harms the well-being of the City of Hudson as a whole. These questions of fact are within the realm of the trier of fact, namely the jury.
The People also rely upon CPL §20.40(4)(g) which provides that, " . . . [j]urisdiction of such offense is accorded to the courts of such county pursuant to any of the following rules . . . [a]n offense committed in a private vehicle during a trip thereof extending through more than one county may be prosecuted in any county through which such vehicle passed in the course of such trip."
While it is undisputed that a portion of the alleged vehicle trip passed through the City of Hudson, it is not so clear that a vehicular trip in an ambulance is to be considered a trip in a "private vehicle." The Criminal Procedure Law does not provide a definition of the term "private vehicle," however the Vehicle & Traffic Law §396(1) infers that a private vehicle is a vehicle which is not owned or used by, "the United States, this state or by such political subdivision thereof."[FN4] The court will apply this definition to CPL §20.40(4)(g). Therefore, it is a question of fact as to whether or not the ambulance is a vehicle which is not owned or used by the United States, New York state or a political subdivision thereof.
The defendant having raised factual issues regarding the geographical jurisdiction of this court, the burden is now on the People to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that Hudson City Court has geographical jurisdiction over this matter because either the crime was committed here or one of the statutory exceptions is applicable [FN5] . It is for the jury to decide the credibility and sufficiency of the People's evidence.
In light of the foregoing, it is the decision of this court that these questions of facts will be included in the jury charge in this matter, subject to a jury charge conference to be held at trial [FN6] .
Motion to Dismiss for Sufficiency Pursuant to CPL §100.40(1)(b)
Defense also moves for dismissal pursuant to CPL §100.40(1)(b). CPL §100.40(1)(b) states:
"An information, or a count thereof, is sufficient on its face when . . . [t]he allegations of the factual part of the information, together with those of any supporting depositions [*5]which may accompany it, provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information."Defense argues that the factual part of the information, together with the supporting depositions lack allegations of fact and do not provide reasonable cause that the defendant committed the alleged crime and thus the accusatory instrument should be dismissed. The court disagrees and finds that the accusatory instrument along with the two supporting depositions, if true, contain non-hearsay allegations establishing every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof.
Motion to Dismiss for Duplicity
Defense also moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument as being duplicitous in that defendant argues that two different instances of conduct are alleged by the prosecution in support of a single charge.
Specifically, the defense asserts that a, "close reading of the misdemeanor information and the supporting depositions show that they allege two (2) different instance of conduct that could, theoretically and if true, each constitute falsely reporting an incident in the third degree." Defense specifies two instances of conduct in the factual portion of the misdemeanor information, one an alleged phone call to Columbia County 911 and a second alleged conversation with staff at Columbia Memorial Hospital. Upon review of the factual part of the information and the two supporting depositions (which are the applicable portions of the accusatory instrument subject to CPL §100.40 review), only one act is alleged, that if true, would constitute the offense for which the defendant is charged, that being the reporting by word to Columbia County 911 (jurisdictional issues aside). No other word or action is alleged in the accusatory instrument which, if true, would constitute the offense charged. Therefore, court does not find duplicity in the accusatory instrument and therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor information is denied.
As to the defendant's request to postpone the jury trial now scheduled for February 20, 2018 (having already been adjourned because of this instant motion), such request is denied.
As to defendant's request for a Sandoval and Ventimiglia hearings, if hearings are necessary, such hearings will be held prior to jury selection. As mandated by CPL §240.43, "upon a request by a defendant, the prosecutor shall notify the defendant of all specific instances of a defendant's prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral conduct of which the prosecutor has knowledge and which the prosecutor intends to use at trial for purposes of impeaching the credibility of the defendant." This court will treat the defendant's request for hearings as a request for disclosure pursuant to CPL §240.43 and direct the prosecution to notify the defense of any such instances immediately prior to the commencement of jury selection.
The foregoing constitutes the opinion, order and decision of this Court.
Dated: February 16, 2018
Hudson, New York
___________________________
Honorable Brian J. Herman
Hudson City Court Judge Footnotes
Footnote 1:It should be noted that the supporting depositions do not allege that a call was received from the defendant, but rather a call was received "for" the defendant.
Footnote 2:Incorrectly cited in the People's affirmation as CPL §20.40(2)(g).
Footnote 3:Taub v Altman, 3 NY3d 30 [2004].
Footnote 4:Vehicle and Traffic Law § 396 regulates the use of state and other seals and insignia on private vehicles. Use of such seals is prohibited on "private vehicles" which are defined as, "any vehicle not owned or used by the United States, this state or by such political subdivision thereof."
Footnote 5:See, People v. Moore, 46 NY2d 1,6(1978). While Moore discusses county geographical jurisdiction, logic dictates that the same standard would apply to municipal jurisdiction.
Footnote 6:People v Francine CC., 112 AD2d 531 [3d Dept 1985].
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