Ortega v New York City Tr. Auth.
Annotate this CaseDecided on December 27, 2017
Supreme Court, Kings County
Aglisberto Ortega, Plaintiff,
against
New York City Transit Authority, METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, AND RANDY NICOLETTI, Defendants.
502824/2016
Attorney for Plaintiff
Anthony M. Makrides, Esq.
Makrides & Marashlian LLP
419 Park Avenue South, 7th Fl.
New York, NY 10016
Attorney for Respondent City of New York
Laurence Heisler, Esq.
130 Livingston St., 11th Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Katherine A. Levine, J.
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:
Papers/Numbered
Plaintiff's Notice of Motion with Accompanying Affidavits and Exhibits 1
Defendants' Affirmation in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint 2
Plaintiff's Affirmation in Reply 3
This case raises the issue of whether, pursuant to CPLR § 203(f), a claim asserted in an amended complaint is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original complaint were interposed, when the notice of claim contained the proposed amended claim. It also raises the issue of whether a plaintiff, who fell into the subway tracks, may amend his complaint to include claims that the New York City Transit Authority ("TA") was negligent in failing to install safety technology in the subway system and barriers on the subway platform, when the notice of claim included the general claim of negligent design of the platform but did [*2]not include the specifics set forth above.
Plaintiff Aglisberto Ortega ("plaintiff" or "Ortega") moves for an order, pursuant to CPLR § 3025(b), for leave to file an amended summons and complaint. On January 4, 2015, plaintiff fell into the subway track bed from the platform at the Lorimer Street station and was hit by an oncoming "J" train operated by Randy Nicoletti ("Nicoletti"). In the hours before plaintiff fell, he had consumed three glasses of whiskey.
On March 30, 2015, plaintiff served a timely notice of claim on defendants, TA, Metropolitan Transit Authority ("MTA") and Nicoletti (collectively referred to as "defendants"), alleging, inter alia, negligence in the ownership, management, operation, maintenance, and control (hereinafter cumulatively referred to as "maintenance and control") of the train and subway station and platform, and failure to properly design the platform.
On February 4, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants, alleging that his injuries were caused by the general negligence of defendants in the maintenance and control of the subway platform and train. However, the complaint did not allege the specific nature of this negligence, nor did it allege the negligent design claim set forth in the notice of claim. Plaintiff noted in his complaint that a timely notice of claim had been filed.
On October 27, 2016, plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to include a second and third cause of action. The second cause of action merely restates the claims made in the notice of claim which particularize defendant's alleged negligence in the maintenance and control of the subway platform and train. The specific claims include negligent failure to keep the platform and its tiles safe and free from ice, negligent hiring and supervision of employees, failure to operate the subway at a safe speed and with due regard for persons who have fallen from the platform, and failure to sound a warning, avoid colliding with plaintiff and braking efficiently (hereinafter, "specific maintenance and control claims"). The third cause of action is for the negligent design of the platform; in particular, the MTA's failure to install and utilize platform edge doors, rails, walls, or barriers, to prevent passengers from falling on the subway tracks, and to conduct studies as to the technology available to prevent passengers from being hit by a train if they fall onto the tracks.
Defendants oppose plaintiff's motion on the grounds that the proposed amendments are "palpably insufficient and patently devoid of merit as a matter of law," and would cause "undue prejudice and surprise to defendants" and hindrance in the preparation of their defense. In particular, defendants contend that they "cannot be charged with any such knowledge of these completely different and new factual allegations" and will suffer prejudice as a result. Furthermore, defendants contend that the new claims do not relate back to the original complaint, as required by CPLR § 203(f), and are therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
Based on the relation-back doctrine, as set forth in section 203(f) of the CPLR, this Court finds that plaintiff's proposed amended claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. This doctrine permits a plaintiff to interpose a claim which otherwise would be barred by the statute of limitations, where the allegations of the original complaint gave notice of the "transactions or occurrences" to be proven and the cause of action would have been timely if asserted in the original complaint. Martin v City of New York, 153 AD3d 693, 694 (2nd Dep't 2017); Maxine v Ashkenazi, 136 AD3d 990, 992 (2nd Dep't 2016). Defendants need not be put on notice regarding every factual allegation or legal theory upon which the amended claims are based, so long as the [*3]original complaint put them on notice of the occurrences which triggered the amended claims. O'Halloran v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 60 N.Y.S.3d 128, 132 (1st Dep't 2017); Pendleton v. City of New York, 44 AD3d 733, 736 (2nd Dept. 2007).
This Court finds that although the original complaint includes only general claims of negligence in the maintenance and control of the subway platform and train, it was sufficient to give notice of the "transactions or occurrences to be proven"; i.e., plaintiff's specific maintenance and control claims relating thereto. See, Jackson v. New York City Transit Auth., 30 AD3d 289, 291(1st Dep't 2006) (General negligence claim asserted in the notice of claim held sufficient to encompass the plaintiff's more specific claims regarding absence of handholds or grab bars inside the bus). Furthermore, the latter claims and the general negligence design claim, which were included in the notice of claim, were incorporated by reference in the original complaint. See, Lipford v. City of Rochester, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161262, *8 (W.D.NY 2017) (All claims set forth in notice of claim are incorporated by reference in original complaint); Regeda v. City of New York, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186256, *37 (E.D.NY 2012) (Same). Since a notice of claim is required for bringing a tort action against the City, it is an "integral part of the complaint." Lipford, supra, 2017 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 161262, at *8.
Similarly, this Court finds that although the notice of claim did not allege the specific nature of defendants' alleged negligent design, it encompassed and was sufficient to give notice of the claims of failure to install barriers and intrusion technology and to conduct studies, since such claims fall within the general category of negligent design. See, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998) (General allegations in complaint encompass specific facts necessary to support those allegations); Jackson, supra, 30 AD3d at 291. Therefore, pursuant to the relation-back doctrine, plaintiff is not barred from interposing specific amended claims relating to the negligent design of the platform, which would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendants further argue that plaintiff's proposed amended claims are lacking in merit. In the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, a motion to amend a pleading should be freely granted unless the amendment patently insufficient or lacking in merit. CPLR 3025(b); McCaskey, Davies & Assoc. v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 59 NY2d 755, 757 (2013); Gomez v Buena Vida Corp., 152 AD3d 497, 498 (2d Depot 2017); Calamari v Panos, 131 AD3d 1088, 1089 (2nd Dep't 2015). If the proposed amendment clearly lacks merit, it serves no purpose and needlessly complicates discovery and trial. Thomas Crimmins Contracting Co. v. New York, 74 NY2d 166, 170 (1989). This Court has no authority to examine the merit of a particular claim unless the "lack of merit is clear and free from doubt." MBIA Ins. Corp. v J.P. Morgan Sec., LLC, 144 AD3d 635, 639 (2nd Dep't 2016); Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 227 (2nd Dep't 2008); Sample v. Levada, 8 AD3d 465, 467-468 (2nd Dep't 2004). Defendants did not particularize the deficiencies of plaintiff's proposed amended claims and thus failed to establish that the lack of merit was "clear and free from doubt." Furthermore, defendants failed to establish that they would suffer prejudice if the Court were to grant leave to file the amended complaint. Defendants' claim that their "qualified immunity" defense would be compromised is without merit, as they are not barred from raising this defense in an amended answer.
Since the proposed amended complaint relates back to the claims in the original complaint and it is not patently lacking in merit, and defendants would not suffer any prejudice [*4]as a result of amending the complaint, this Court grants plaintiff leave to file the proposed amended complaint This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
DATED: December 27, 2017
_____________________________________
KATHERINE A. LEVINE, J. S.C.
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