Roy-Nickles v St. Mary's Hosp.
Annotate this CaseDecided on December 22, 2004
Supreme Court, Kings County
RITA ROY-NICKLES, Plaintiff,
against
ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL and THE EYE BANK FOR, SIGHT RESTORATION, INC., Defendants.
23204/04
Joseph S. Levine, J.
In an action to recover damages, defendant, St. Mary's Hospital ("St. Mary's"), moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)5 to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based upon res judicata of the dismissal of plaintiff's first action. Defendant, The Eye Bank for Sight Restoration, Inc. ("Eye Bank"), cross-moves for the same relief. Plaintiff opposes both motions, arguing that she is suing under a different capacity, therefore, plaintiff's claim is not barred by res judicata.
Plaintiff's first action, Index Number 28120/03, as the Proposed Administratrix for the Estate of Richard Nickels, alleged medical malpractice and lack of consent for the removal of Richard Nickles' corneas after his death on June 28, 2002. After oral argument, this Court granted defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action, lack of capacity to maintain the action and failure to properly serve defendant Eye Bank in an order dated March 19, 2004. Judgment was served and six weeks later, plaintiff's prior counsel served a motion to renew and reargue the decision. Plaintiff's new counsel withdrew the motion on August 6, 2004. Plaintiff did not serve a subsequent Notice of Appeal from the Order or the Judgement. Prior to withdrawing the motion, plaintiff commenced the current action on July 23, 2004 alleging that defendants negligently and illegally performed or allowed the removal of Richard Nickles' corneas without consent, despite plaintiff's right to possession of her dead husband's body for the purpose of preservation and burial, and that as a result, plaintiff endured [*2]mental suffering and anguish.
Defendants argue that the doctrine of res judicata mandates dismissal of the current action because both actions brought by the plaintiff involve the same parties, assert a common cause of action that arose out of the same transaction, and a final determination was made on the merits in the prior action. Defendants argue that should the Court find the instant action not barred by res judicata, it would be barred by collateral estoppel because there is an identity of issues that were decided on the merits in the prior action, whether plaintiff could maintain a claim for negligence and lack of consent for the removal of her deceased husband's corneas.
Plaintiff argues that in the present action defendants owed a duty to the surviving spouse and were negligent in the handling of her deceased husband's remains, whereas in the prior medical malpractice action, a duty was owed to the patient for the negligent removal of decedent's corneas. Plaintiff maintains that the instant action was brought by plaintiff, individually, while the prior action was brought by plaintiff as the proposed administrator. Plaintiff contends that a judgment against a personal representative in one action will not be binding against that person when she pursues her rights as an individual in a second action, therefore, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are inapplicable.
A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that the cause of action may not be maintained because of collateral estoppel or res judicata. CPLR § 3211(a)(5). This state has adopted the transactional analysis approach in deciding res judicata issues, so that "once a claim is brought to final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy." O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357 (1981), citing Matter of Reilly v. Reid, 45 NY2d 24. The Court finds that both actions involve the same parties and that both actions are based upon the same transaction or series of transactions regarding negligence and lack of consent for the removal of Richard Nickel's corneas on June 28, 2002. These issues were decided on the merits in the prior action when the court granted defendants' CPLR § 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. When no appeal has been taken from a previous dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, a second action is barred on the ground of res judicata and should be dismissed. Flynn v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 20 AD2d 636 (1st Dept. 1964); McKinney v. City of New York, 78 AD2d 884 (2nd Dept. 1980). Plaintiff was given a full and fair opportunity to contest those issues and the Court's decision.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel also precludes a party from re-litigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same. Ryan v. New York Telephone Company, 62 NY2d 494 (1984). Plaintiff's reliance upon Hellstern v. Hellstern, 279 NY 327 (1938) in asserting that a judgment against a personal representative in one action will not be binding against that person when she pursues her rights as an individual in a second action is misplaced. While a party appearing in one capacity is generally not bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a subsequent action in which the party appears in a different capacity, Juan C. v. Cortines, 89 NY2d 659 (1997); Hellstern, 279 NY 327, supra, there are exceptions to the rule that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual based upon reason and practical necessity, Heller v. Schwartz, 179 Misc. 911 (NY County 1943). [*3]In addition, the Court of Appeals in Hellstern adopted the rule stated by Judge Cardozo in Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Neiberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306, that "a judgement in one action is conclusive in a later one not only as to any matters actually litigated therein, but also as to any that might have been so litigated, when the two causes of action have such a measure of identity that a different judgment in the second would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first...therefore, the factual situation brings the effectiveness of the former judgment as a bar to the bringing of the present action squarely within the rule above quoted." Id. at 332-333. The Court finds that the issues of negligence and a lack of consent with respect to the removal of the corneas from plaintiff's deceased husband on June 28, 2002 were raised in the prior action and were decided against plaintiff when the motion to dismiss was granted. As such, both actions are premised on the exact same transaction or series of transactions and have such a degree of identity that a judgment in this action would impair the interests established by the dismissal of the first action. The theories upon which plaintiff now relies upon were available when plaintiff commenced the first action that was dismissed.
After oral argument and upon the papers filed herein, the Court finds that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as such, defendants' motion and cross-motion pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5) to dismiss are granted.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
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J.S.C
December 22, 2004
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