Shea v Catholic Health Sys., Inc.
Annotate this CaseDecided on November 10, 2004
Supreme Court, Erie County
MAUREEN A. SHEA and BRENDAN SHEA, her spouse, Plaintiffs,
against
CATHOLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., SISTERS OF CHARITY HOSPITAL OF BUFFALO, NEW YORK; ALAN WANG, M.D.; PARKSIDE MEDICAL ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, P.C.; PATRICIA FEIL, R.N., Defendants.
2003/10020
LIPSITZ, GREEN, FAHRINGER, ROLL, SALISBURY &
CAMBRIA, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
By Gregory P. Krull, Esq.
BROWN & TARANTINO, LLP
Attorneys for Defendants Alan Wang, M.D., Parkside Medical
Anesthesia Associates, P.C., and Patricia Feil, R.N.
By Kimberly A. Cline, Esq.
DAMON & MOREY, LLP
for Defendants Catholic Health Systems, Inc., and Sisters of
Charity Hospital of Buffalo, New York
By Eric C. Naegely, Esq.
John P. Lane, J.
Defendants Alan Wang, M.D., Parkside Medical Anesthesia Associates, P.C., and Patricia Feil, R.N., move for judgment pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) dismissing in part the derivative cause of action alleged by plaintiff Brendan Shea based upon his claim that as a result of the negligence of defendants in treating his wife, plaintiff Maureen Shea, he was caused to undergo medical [*2]procedures and incurred medical expense. Defendants Catholic Health Systems, Inc., and Sisters of Charity Hospital of Buffalo, New York join in the motion. The motions are granted for the reasons that follow.
On May 29, 2001 Maureen Shea was admitted to Sisters Hospital for a scheduled caesarean section delivery. In their complaint and bill of particulars, the Sheas allege that during the preparation for her delivery, Mrs. Shea was negligently administered the drug anectine, and as a result she had a reaction that caused temporary paralysis and respiratory arrest as well as emotional and psychological injuries. Plaintiffs contend that all of the defendants jointly and severally failed to exercise due and reasonable care for Mrs. Shea by administering or allowing anectine to be administered notwithstanding an entry in her chart that she preferred to have a pre-natal intravenous injection of a non-codeine based drug because of previous allergic reactions to codeine. Brendan Shea contends that because his wife sustained psychological and emotional injuries, including fear of childbirth following administration of the anectine, he underwent a vasectomy procedure to allow him to resume marital relations without exposing her to the fear of pregnancy. It is that part of his derivative cause of action, in which he fails to allege a duty owed him by defendants, that is challenged by their motions.
A physician's duty of care is ordinarily owed solely to the physician's patients (see Purdy v Public Adm'r. of County of Westchester, 72 NY2d 1, 9 [1988]). Only in limited circumstances is a physician's duty of care extended to a patient's family members (see Cohen v Cabrini Med. Ctr., 94 NY2d 639 [2000]). As an example, in the absence of a special relationship that may exist between the parents of an infant plaintiff and a physician treating the infant, the duty owed by a physician to his or her patient is not usually extended to the infant's family members (see Tenuto v Lederle Labs., Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 90 NY2d 606 [1997]). In Tenuto, the Court held that a physician owed a duty to warn a father of the risk that he might contract polio from his child as a result of the vaccination of the child. The Court recognized that in more unique circumstances immediate family members of a patient can be within the class of persons to whom health care providers may be held liable for their negligence in the care and treatment of their patients. In Cohen, the Court of Appeals refused to extend a physician's duty of care to a non-patient wife, who was unable to bear a child conceived with her husband following an alleged malpractice upon her husband. The Court found that the physical harm suffered by the plaintiff was the result of her voluntary election to undergo an additional procedure and thus the physician could not exercise any control. It is worthy of note that in this case, Brendan Shea voluntarily chose to undergo a vasectomy.
Here there was no duty of care owed by defendants to Brendan Shea, and he was not in the zone of danger when defendants' alleged malpractice took place (see Cohen [no duty of care owed by defendant physician to plaintiff wife after he allegedly caused infertility of plaintiff's husband]; cf. Moreta v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 238 AD2d 149 [1997] [defendants owed a duty of care to plaintiff in utero at the time they discontinued his mother's tuberculosis medicine]; see also Albala v City of New York, 54 NY2d 269 [1981][medical malpractice committed against the mother of a child not yet conceived does not give rise to a cause of action in favor of the child if that tort caused injury to him during gestation]).
The claim asserted by Brendan Shea is not supported by the logic of the rule that each spouse has a primary cause of action for injuries and pecuniary loss against a physician whose negligence in performing sterilization, fertility testing or test reporting resulted in a wrongful conception (see [*3]Miller v Rivard, 180 AD2d 331[1992]). There being no special relationship between Brendan Shea and defendants and no direct duty owed by them to him, his claim for injuries and medical expenses fails (see generally Pingtella v Jones, 305 AD2d 38, lv dismissed 100 NY2d 640 [2003] [psychiatrist owed no duty of care to child who was stabbed by his mother, the psychiatrist's patient]).
"A line must be drawn between the competing policy considerations of providing a remedy to everyone who is injured and of extending exposure to tort liability almost without limit" (DeAngelis v Lutheran Med. Ctr., 58 NY2d 1053, 1055 [1983]). Courts have declined to extend a physician's duty of care to a spouse stating the principle that to do so could "expand traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds and create an almost infinite universe of potential plaintiffs" (Ellis v Peter, 211 AD2d 353, 356 [1995], quoting Widera v Ettco Wire & Cable Corp., 204 AD2d 306, 307 [1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 804 [1995]). In Pingtella, the Fourth Department stated:
To hold otherwise could place unacceptable restraints on the treatment of patients and leave medical providers open to a broad array of possible claims. Family members of a patient could allege a broad range of physical and emotional damages from the physician's treatment of the patient. We are not willing to extend a physician's liability in that manner.
(302 AD2d at 43; see also Shaw v QC-Medi New York, Inc., 10 AD3d 120 [2004]). While the Court of Appeals now allows a mother to recover damages for emotional distress arising from medical malpractice that results in the stillbirth of her child, no duty is owed to the expectant father, who is limited to seeking recovery on a claim for loss of use of services and consortium (see Broadnax v Gonzalez, 2 NY3d 148, 155 n 3 [2004]).
Thus, the law is well established that extending a physician's duty of care to non-patients is limited to specific circumstances, including a special relationship between the third person and the patient. Another limitation is that the injury to the third person must be related to the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Extending these principles to the case at hand, Brendan Shea cannot recover for the injuries and medical expenses he incurred as a result of his voluntary vasectomy through his derivative cause of action. These damages are not directly related to the alleged malpractice involved in the care of his wife and were outside the foreseeable zone of danger at the time.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Buffalo, New York
November 10, 2004
_________________________________
John P. Lane, J.S.C.
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