People v Holland
Annotate this CaseDecided on December 31, 2003
Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, New York County,
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff,
against
MICHAEL HOLLAND, Defendant.
Docket No. 2003NY037431
Robert M. Stolz, J.
The parties to this action seek rulings, pre-trial, on the People's Molineux and Defendant's Sandoval applications, as well as the admissibility of certain statements of the complainant under the prompt outcry exception to the hearsay rule and the disclosure of the school records of the complainant.
The defendant is charged with forcible touching, sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child. It is alleged that the defendant, who was a school headmaster, perpetrated these crimes by upon a 15 year-old student while attending a conference in New York City on March 21, 2003. More particularly, it is charge that on that date, in a hotel room the defendant massaged the complaining witness and stuck his hand inside his swimming trunks and touched his genitals. Defendant contends that the complaining witness is either delusional or lying about the incident, characterizing his version of the events as implausible. The People, to rebut this contention, seek to introduce the testimony of another student that the defendant engaged in similar conduct with him. That incident allegedly occurred nine days before the charged crime and was reported in early May, some two months later. It is currently the subject of felony charges against the defendant in Massachusetts.
Under People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), and its progeny, evidence of prior crimes may be introduced by the People if offered for a relevant purpose other than to establish criminal propensity. Such evidence may be admissible if linked to a specific material issue or fact relating to the crime charged and if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact. Such evidence offered in rebuttal must, additionally, counter some affirmative fact which the defendant attempted to prove. People v Blair, 90 NY2d 1003 (1997).
In this case, testimony concerning the Massachusetts incident is not relevant to any specific material issue which the People must establish on their direct case. The People's argument that it is relevant to rebut the defense claim that the complaining witness is lying or delusional is unpersuasive. Though well put, the People's argument is essentially that the jury should believe the victim in this case because the defendant engaged in similar conduct on [*2]another occasion, and plainly both victims could not be lying or delusional. To allow this proof in the People's case-in-chief would be to invite the jury to conclude that the defendant must be guilty in this case because of his prior uncharged conduct. Viewed in that light, this evidence appears to be precisely the sort of propensity proof that Molineux proscribes. See People v. Hudy, 73 NY2d 40 (1988). Moreover, even if it were properly provable for the purposes that the People argue, the prejudicial effect of this evidence would be so great as to outweigh its probative value. Accordingly, absent an "opening of the door" by the defense, the People will not be allowed to introduce this evidence in their direct case. However, any pre-trial ruling as to the admissibility of such evidence on rebuttal would be premature.
The People also seek to cross-examine the defendant about the Massachusetts incident should he choose to testify. Since this involves a pending criminal charge, the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination in implicated. While a defendant who takes the stand puts his credibility in issue and is subject to cross-examination, his choice to testify in the case on trial does not, by itself, effect a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination as to pending unrelated charges. Assuming an invocation of the privilege, and the absence of any door-opening assertions by the defendant, the People will be precluded from questioning him concerning the pending charges. People v Betts, 70 NY2d 289 (1987).
The People also seek to introduce testimony of the complainant's statement about the incident to a 19 year old collegian who accompanied the defendant, the complainant and another student to New York. This statement was made shortly after the incident occurred. The People also seek to prove that later that night the complainant spoke about the incident by phone with two administrators at the school. This proof is offered under the "prompt outcry" exception to the hearsay rule.
Evidence that a victim of a sexual assault promptly complained about the incident is admissible to corroborate the allegation that an assault took place. The complaint is timely if made at the first suitable opportunity. Additionally, only the fact of a complaint, not its accompanying details, may be elicited. People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d 10 (1993). Whether an outcry is prompt is determined by the particular circumstances of each case. See People v Aguirre, 262 AD2d 175 (1st Dept., 1999) (complainant's report to a friend the day after attack and to a trusted adult the week following the second and third attacks qualified as prompt outcries); People v Vanterpool, 214 AD2d 429 (1st Dept., 1995) (child victim's complaint to a cousin within three weeks of an incident constituted a prompt outcry). Additionally, seriatim outcries to different listeners are admissible if each qualifies as prompt. People v Santos, 243 AD2d 276 (1st Dept., 1997). Under the circumstances of this case, as represented at oral argument and in written submissions, the complaints made to the collegian, as well as the subsequent statements made to administrators, qualify as prompt outcries. Accordingly, the People will be permitted to elicit the fact that these complaints were made shortly after the incident.
The defendant also seeks the discovery of the school records of the complainant, which the People have turned over to the court. When considering such a request, the court must balance the public policy favoring the confidentiality of school records, especially those of students with special needs, against defendant's right to cross-examine and confront witnesses against him. People v Boyea, 222 AD2d 937 (2nd Dept., 1995); People v Gutkaiss, 206 AD2d 628 (3rd Dept., 1994). In this case, as in Boyea and Gutkaiss, the court has conducted an in-camera [*3]review of the complainant's school records and concludes that they contain no material which would support the defendant's assertions concerning the complaint, including the allegations that the complainant is delusional or has a history of lying. See also People v. Duran, 276 AD2d 498 (2nd Dept. 2000) (inspection of complainant's psychiatric records not required absent a showing that they contain material bearing on complainant's ability to perceive the incident or that complainant had a history of paranoia, hallucinations, delusions or false claims of sexual attack). The additional fact that the defendant, in his capacity as headmaster, already has knowledge of the complainant and his background further militates against disclosure of these documents. The defendant's request for disclosure is therefore denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Copies of this decision and order are being mailed to the parties.
New York, New YorkRobert M. Stolz
Judge of the Criminal Court
Decision Date: December 31, 2003
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