People v Walton (Godfrey)

[*1] People v Walton (Godfrey) 2021 NY Slip Op 50956(U) Decided on October 8, 2021 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 8, 2021
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, J.P., MICHELLE WESTON, DAVID ELLIOT, JJ
2018-135 Q CR

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Godfrey Walton, Appellant.

Appellate Advocates (Martin B. Sawyer of counsel), for appellant. Queens County District Attorney (Johnnette Traill, Sharon Y. Brodt and Aurora Alvarez-Calderon of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Althea E. M. Drysdale, J.), rendered December 4, 2017. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his guilty plea, of driving while intoxicated (per se), and imposed sentence. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review so much of an order of that court (Karen Gopee, J.) as denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

In an accusatory instrument dated January 30, 2016, defendant was charged with, among other things, driving while intoxicated (per se) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2]). The record containing the court's action sheet shows that the case was adjourned for open-file discovery to March 31, 2016. On February 17, 2016, the People filed a certificate of readiness along with the supporting deposition of Officer Chidichimo. On March 31, 2016, defense counsel indicated to the court, among other things, that the People handed over open-file discovery to defense counsel who accepted these materials. On June 2, 2017, after various proceedings and court appearances, defense counsel moved to dismiss the information on, among others, statutory speedy trial grounds (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). The Criminal Court (Karen Gopee, J.) found that 52 days were chargeable to the People and denied the statutory speedy trial motion. Defendant pleaded guilty [*2]to the charge of driving while intoxicated (per se) in full satisfaction of the charges.

On appeal, defendant contends that, in addition to the 52 days of delay the Criminal Court found were chargeable to the People, 18 days from defendant's arraignment on January 30, 2016 to February 17, 2016, when the People filed the officer's supporting deposition, are chargeable to the People. Defendant further contends that 36 more days are chargeable to the People because they failed to announce their readiness for trial at various court proceedings conducted prior to defendant's CPL 30.30 motion. The People respond that the Criminal Court properly determined that they should be charged with only 52 days of delay.

While the judgment of conviction was rendered upon defendant's plea of guilty prior to the enactment of CPL 30.30 (6), we need not decide here whether the subdivision should be applied retroactively since, as set forth more fully below, the period from January 30, 2016 to February 17, 2016 is not, in any event, chargeable to the People.

The People were required to announce their readiness for trial within 90 days from the commencement of this criminal action which involves a class A misdemeanor (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). Periods of adjournment for voluntary open file discovery are excluded from speedy trial calculations (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; People v Dorilas, 19 Misc 3d 75, 77 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2008] [superseded by legislation on other grounds]). On January 30, 2016, the court's action sheet indicates that the case was adjourned for open-file discovery. Furthermore, the record establishes that defense counsel subsequently accepted the discovery materials that the People handed over on March 31, 2016, thus further confirming that counsel had participated in discovery. Under CPL 30.30 (4) (a), a reasonable period of delay resulting from pretrial discovery must be excluded, and this is true even assuming that the People had not yet converted the misdemeanor complaint during the period of time in question (see People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523 [1985]). Thus, the 18-day period is excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (a).

In view of the foregoing, the additional 36 days which defendant challenges, from March 9, 2017 to March 31, 2017 (22 days) and April 5, 2017 to April 19, 2017 (14 days), need not be addressed, since, in any event, fewer than 90 days of delay would be chargeable to the People.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, J.P., WESTON and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: October 8, 2021