Chery v Raie

[*1] Chery v Raie 2018 NY Slip Op 51808(U) Decided on December 6, 2018 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on December 6, 2018
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : JERRY GARGUILO, J.P., ANTHONY MARANO, BRUCE E. TOLBERT, JJ
2017-1408 N C

Imanite Chery and Joshua Louis, Respondents,

v

Rami Raie and Next Car, LLC, Appellants.

Leslie Martin Shamis, Esq., for appellants. Joshua Louis, respondent pro se (no brief filed).

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Second District (Joseph B. Girardi, J.), entered May 1, 2017. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiffs the principal sum of $1,000 as against both defendants.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified by vacating so much thereof as is against defendant Rami Raie and by providing that so much of the action as is against him is dismissed; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

At a nonjury trial of this small claims action to recover the principal sum of $3,000, plaintiff Joshua Louis testified that, in connection with plaintiffs' purchase of a used 2010 BMW automobile from defendant Next Car, LLC, defendants had agreed to pay plaintiffs $1,000 for their trade-in of a 2006 Mercedes automobile, but that, although plaintiffs had delivered possession and title of the Mercedes to defendants, they had not been paid $1,000 or credited with that sum, and had paid the entire purchase price of the BMW to defendant Next Car, LLC. Defendants claimed that plaintiffs had been credited with $1,000 for the trade-in, but failed to produce any documentation of such a credit. Following the trial, the District Court awarded plaintiffs judgment in the sum of $1,000 against both defendants.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

To the extent that the judgment reflected an implicit finding that plaintiffs' testimony was more credible than that of defendants' witness, we find no basis to disturb that determination. However, "[a] corporation has a separate legal identity from its owners, and, as a general matter, the owners are not personally liable for the obligations of the corporation" (Open Door Foods, LLC v Pasta Machs., Inc., 136 AD3d 1002, 1003 [2016]). Here, the evidence indicated that defendant Rami Raie had acted only as a corporate representative in his dealings with plaintiffs. Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiffs sought to impose liability on Raie based on the corporate defendant's malfeasance, we note that such liability would depend on a piercing of the corporate veil, a form of equitable relief which the District Court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, lacks jurisdiction to grant (see 19 W. 45th St. Realty Co. v Doram Elec. Corp., 233 AD2d 184, 185 [1996]; RussianHotline.Com, Inc. v Oceana Holding Corp., 58 Misc 3d 152[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50115[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). As plaintiffs failed to offer any testimony or introduce any evidence that would support a judgment against defendant Raie, we conclude that the judgment, insofar as it was against that defendant, failed to render substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807), and that the action should have been dismissed against him. Otherwise, we find that the judgment rendered substantial justice.

Accordingly, the judgment is modified by vacating so much thereof as is against defendant Rami Raie and by providing that so much of the action as is against him is dismissed.

GARGUILO, J.P., MARANO and TOLBERT, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 06, 2018