Town & Country JCD v Vixama

[*1] Town & Country JCD v Vixama 2018 NY Slip Op 51387(U) Decided on September 27, 2018 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on September 27, 2018
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : ANTHONY MARANO, P.J., JAMES V. BRANDS, TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, JJ
2016-2586 N C

Town & Country JCD, Respondent,

against

Andre E. Vixama, Appellant.

Andre E. Vixama, appellant pro se. Town & Country JCD, respondent pro se (no brief filed).

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Second District (Paul L. Meli, J.), entered April 5, 2016. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,514.14.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the action is dismissed.

Plaintiff commenced this commercial claims action to recover the principal sum of $1,514.14 as a result of defendant's alleged breach of a contract to purchase a vehicle from plaintiff. After a nonjury trial, the District Court awarded plaintiff a judgment in the principal sum of $1,514.14.

In a commercial claims action, this court's review is limited to determining whether the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1807-A [a]; 1804-A; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]).

Upon a review of the record, we find that substantial justice was not done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1807-A [a]; 1804-A; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125). Here, plaintiff seeks to recover the sum of $1,514.14 based upon a clause in one of the contractual documents signed by defendant which stated that defendant could potentially be charged a "surcharge in the amount [*2]not to exceed $1967." However, the contract failed to sufficiently specify how the amount of the "surcharge" was to be calculated. In light of this ambiguity, this separate contract will not be enforced.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the action is dismissed.

MARANO, P.J., BRANDS and RUDERMAN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: September 27, 2018