Pinero v Puram

[*1] Pinero v Puram 2015 NY Slip Op 51755(U) Decided on November 30, 2015 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on November 30, 2015
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : TOLBERT, J.P., IANNACCI and CONNOLLY, JJ.
2014-1466 N C

John Eric Pinero, Respondent,

against

Moe Puram and Ultimate Auto Sales, LLC Doing Business as Moes Cars, Appellants.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Fourth District (Joy M. Watson, J.), entered December 13, 2013. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,639.50.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the action is dismissed.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover the principal sum of $2,695.11 for repairs made to the engine of a used truck he and his son had purchased from defendants, alleging that engine problems had arisen within two weeks of the purchase. The evidence at a nonjury trial of the action showed that the used truck, a 2003 Dodge Dakota, with an odometer reading of 113,556 miles, had been purchased from defendants' dealership on December 3, 2012 without an express warranty. The New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Retail Certificate of Sale MV-50 form included defendants' certification that, at the time of delivery, the vehicle was "in condition and repair to render satisfactory and adequate service on the public highway under normal use." Plaintiff's son testified that, on December 3, 2012, as he was driving the truck from defendants' Hicksville dealership to his home in Port Jefferson, the engine light had come on. Defendants' witness testified that their mechanic had inspected the truck prior to the sale and again on January 4, 2013, and had found no problem with the engine. At the time of the January 4, 2013 inspection, the truck's odometer reading was 113,948 miles. Ultimately, when the odometer reading was 114,869 miles, plaintiff brought the truck to his mechanic to have the engine repaired. In a judgment entered December 13, 2013, from which defendants appeal, the District Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,639.50.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

It is clear that the transaction in issue was not covered by the Used Car Lemon Law (see General Business Law § 198-b) because the odometer reading was over 100,000 miles at the time of sale (see General Business Law § 198-b [d] [3]). Moreover, the evidence at trial showed that plaintiff had driven almost 400 miles between the date of purchase and the date that defendants' mechanic had inspected the car, approximately one month later. As plaintiff did not demonstrate that the defect in the engine for which repairs were made existed at the time the truck had been delivered, plaintiff failed to establish that defendants had breached the implied warranty of merchantability (see UCC 2-314 [2]; see also Ewen v Congers Auto Sales, Inc., 39 Misc 3d 145[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50844[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]) or that they had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 417 (see Kassim v East Hills Chevrolet, 34 Misc 3d 158[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50428[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]).

Consequently, as plaintiff did not assert any viable theory of liability upon which he was entitled to recover, the judgment did not provide the parties with substantial justice, according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807). Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the action is dismissed.

Tolbert, J.P., Iannacci and Connolly, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: November 30, 2015