People v Padmore (Dwight)

[*1] People v Padmore (Dwight) 2014 NY Slip Op 50988(U) Decided on June 18, 2014 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on June 18, 2014
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON and SOLOMON, JJ.
2012—2260 K CR

The People of the State of New York, Appellant,

against

Dwight Padmore, Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Geraldine Pickett, J.), dated September 5, 2012. The order granted defendant's motion to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by providing that the branches of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the charges of driving while ability impaired and driving while intoxicated are denied, and the information is reinstated with respect to these charges; as so modified, the order is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for all further proceedings.

Defendant was charged in an information with driving while ability impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1]), common-law driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), and reckless driving (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212). In the information, a police officer alleged that she had arrived at a specified location and had observed a parked Toyota vehicle. The driver's side view mirror was broken and had fallen off the vehicle. The officer further alleged that defendant had admitted to her that, while driving his Nissan Maxima, he had hit and sideswiped the parked Toyota, causing damage, and that two passengers had driven defendant's vehicle away from the scene of the accident. In addition, the police officer stated that she had observed that defendant exhibited signs of intoxication—slurred speech, red watery eyes, the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath, and an unsteady gait. The Criminal Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the information on the ground that it was facially insufficient.

To be sufficient on its face, an information must contain factual allegations of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charge, demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged, and contain nonhearsay factual allegations "that establish, if true, every element of the offense charged" (People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 137 [1987]; see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1] [b], [c]; People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228-229 [2009]; People v Jones, 9 NY3d 259, 262 [2007]; People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986]). "So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]).

Applying the above standards, the Criminal Court erred in granting the branches of [*2]defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the charges of driving while ability impaired and driving while intoxicated (see People v Granda-Vintmill, 41 Misc 3d 135[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51879[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; People v Asher, 16 Misc 3d 89 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]; People v Lopez, 34 Misc 3d 476, 477 [Crim Ct, Richmond County 2011]; see also People v Lennon, 10 Misc 3d 130[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51956[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2005]). While the circumstances of the accident in this case "may have been capable of innocent explanation . . . they nonetheless supported an inference that a crime had been committed because the vehicle had been driven by a person under the influence of alcohol" (People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 188 [1987]). Corroboration of defendant's statements, including his admission that he was driving his car, was not required (see People v Suber, 19 NY3d 247 [2012]). Thus, the Criminal Court erred in dismissing the charges of driving while ability impaired and driving while intoxicated, on the ground that the information did not specify the time that had elapsed between the accident and the officer's observation that defendant exhibited signs of intoxication.

However, the Criminal Court correctly dismissed the charge of reckless driving, as the factual allegations in the information failed to support that charge (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212; People v Grogan, 260 NY 138, 149-150 [1932]; People v Khurshudyan, 34 Misc 3d 152[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50301[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; People v Dipoumbi, 23 Misc 3d 1127 [A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50974[U] [Crim Ct, NY County 2009]; People v Orlofsky, 70 Misc 2d 298, 300-301 [Saratoga County Ct 1972]; People v Garo, 208 Misc 496, 498 [Broome County Ct 1955]; People v Sas, 172 Misc 845, 846 [Chenango County Ct 1939]; cf. People v McGrantham, 12 NY3d 892, 893-894 [2009]; People v Armlin, 6 NY2d 231, 233 [1959]; People v Cooper, 38 AD3d 678, 679-680 [2007]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branches of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the charges of driving while ability impaired and driving while intoxicated are denied, and the information is reinstated with respect to these charges.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: June 18, 2014