Robinson v 156 Broadway Assoc., LLC

Robinson v 156 Broadway Assoc., LLC 2012 NY Slip Op 07069 Decided on October 23, 2012 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on October 23, 2012
Tom, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, DeGrasse, Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
8353 110305/10

[*1]Mary L. Robinson, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v

156 Broadway Associates, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.




Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York (Howard R.
Cohen of counsel), for appellant.
Becker & D'Agostino, P.C., New York (Michael D'Agostino of
counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.), entered April 2, 2012, which denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, in this action where plaintiff was allegedly injured when, while departing for work, she slipped and fell on ice located on the top step of the exterior staircase of defendant's building. The evidence shows that a snowfall of over 10 inches ended in the early morning hours, and plaintiff's fall occurred between 6:00 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. Plaintiff failed to show that an unreasonable amount of time had elapsed from the end of the storm to defendant's efforts to clear the premises (see Espinell v Dickson, 57 AD3d 252 [1st Dept 2008]; Whitt v St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 258 AD2d 648 [2d Dept 1999]). Moreover, plaintiff's testimony that water dripped from the accumulated snow on the ledge above the doorway does not raise a triable issue, since defendant was entitled to the same grace period before clearing the snow and stopping the drip.

Furthermore, although it is undisputed that the handrails on the stairway were too short to comply with the Building Code, this does not warrant the denial of defendant's motion. Plaintiff slipped immediately upon placing her foot on the stairway, and never attempted to find or hold the handrail. Thus, any violation of the Building Code was not a proximate cause of her fall (see Ridolfi v Williams, 49 AD3d 295 [1st Dept 2008]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: OCTOBER 23, 2012 [*2]

CLERK