Village of Ridgefield Park v. New York Susquehanna & Western Railway Corporation

The jurisdiction of the [STB] over

(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and
 
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State, is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.
 
[ 49 U.S.C.A. 10501(b)(1) and (2).]
 
The ICCTA defines transportation as

(A) a locomotive, car, vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; and
 
(B) services related to that movement . . .

(A) a bridge, car float, lighter, ferry, and intermodal equipment used by or in connection with a railroad;
 
(B) the road used by a rail carrier and owned by it or operated under an agreement; and
 
(C) a switch, spur, track, terminal, terminal facility, and a freight depot, yard, and ground, used or necessary for transportation;
 
[ 49 U.S.C.A. 10102(6).]
 
The ICCTA defines rail carrier a

a person providing common carrier railroad transportation for compensation ...
 
[ 49 U.S.C.A. 10102(5).]
 
The Appellate Division interpreted that statutory language

as follows:

The language of the statute does not expressly limit preemption to strictly economic regulation nor does it state that the states retain historic police powers over railroads and their property. We are told, pursuant to the clear language of the statute, that the construction and operation" of the railroad's facilities falls within the Board's express and exclusive jurisdiction. 49 U.S.C.A. 10501(b)(1) and (2). By definition, a railroad's facility, warehouse, yard, "property," "instrumentality," and "equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property," "regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use" are all within the scope of the Act's concept of transportation. 49 U.S.C.A. 10102(9)(A). Thus, pursuant to the statutory language, the Board appears to have exclusive jurisdiction over everything pertaining to the railroad's facility in the Village mentioned in the Act's definition of transportation, i.e., the tracks and sidetracks, the sand tower, the lube oil and diesel fueling facilities and tanks, the converted box cars, the yard bulls, the proposed engine house, and so on.
 
The legislative history and policy surrounding the statute may also be considered in determining the scope of a statute's preemption. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494, 116 S. Ct. 2240. The section-by-section analysis portion of the congressional "history" to the ICC Termination Act, entitled Section. 10301. General Jurisdiction, for example, states,
 
This provision replaces the railroad portion of former Section 10501. Conforming changes are made to reflect the direct and complete pre-emption of State economic regulation of railroads. . . . The former disclaimer regarding residual State police powers is eliminated as unnecessary, in view of the Federal policy of occupying the entire field of economic regulation of the interstate rail transportation. Although States retain the police powers reserved by the Constitution, the Federal scheme of economic regulation and deregulation is intended to address and encompass all such regulation and to be completely exclusive.
 
[H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-422, Dec. 18, 1995; (emphasis supplied).]
 
When the Act was adopted, Congress retained the section entitled general jurisdiction, delineated as 10501. However, the Congressional intent stated above with regard to the proposed 10301 readily applies to 10501. Both sections cover the same topic, general jurisdiction. The only distinction is the section number assigned. From the language in this legislative history, Congress surely intended the Act to preempt all State economic regulation of railroads. But it is also apparent from the noted history that Congress intended the states retain certain police powers reserved by the Constitution. We conclude that all state action with any economic impact on railroads was preempted by the Act and that the states retained a certain residuum of historic police powers, but presumably those not related to railroad service, operations and physical properties or structures.
 
A review of the "Rail Transportation Policy" section of the Act reveals the Act's focus is on the deregulation of many aspects of the interstate railroad system, not only on strictly economic aspects. For example, one policy stated is to "reduce regulatory barriers to entry into and exit from the industry." 49 U.S.C.A. 10101(7). Another policy is to "minimize the need for Federal regulatory control over the rail transportation system and to require fair and expeditious regulatory decisions when regulation is required." 49 U.S.C.A. 10101(2). Another policy is to increase "competition and demand for services. 49 U.S.C.A. 10101(1). The Policy section also states that "it is the policy of the United States Government . . . (8) to operate transportation facilities and equipment without detriment to the public health and safety." 49 U.S.C.A. 10101(8). The policy section also states that safety, safe and suitable working conditions, unlawful discrimination, anti-trust violations, and energy conservation are policy considerations. Id. at (3), (11), (12) and (14). However, the dominant public policy emphasis is on a very substantial overall deregulation of the railroad industry. As aptly stated in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1996), "[b]y preempting state regulation of railroad operations, and granting exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of almost all aspects of railroad operations to the [Board], Congress removes the ability of states to frustrate its policy of deregulating and reviving the railroad industry." The Act obviously intended that national transportation interests dominate over parochial concerns and impulses.
 
[Ridgefield Park, supra, 318
N.J. Super. at 398-400.]

Guided by the doctrines of federal preemption and primary jurisdiction, the Appellate Division found that the Village must first seek relief from the STB:
"As the agency with authority delegated from Congress to implement the provisions of the ICC Termination Act, the STB is uniquely qualified to determine whether state law should be preempted." CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 944 F. Supp. at 1584 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496, 116 S. Ct. 2240.) The STB may act on the problem and devise a plan which gives these troubled citizens a measure of relief. We cannot presume and have no reason to believe that the STB will ignore legitimate citizen complaints. The STB may also choose to spell out the precise contours of the residual state police powers which it finds survive the broadly-phrased federal preemption statute and are compatible with the national policy of railroad deregulation and federal primacy. If so, this present action will be promptly reinstated at the trial level upon plaintiff's application and given every priority towards an expedited resolution.
 
[Ridgefield Park, supra, 318 N.J. Super. at 405-07 (footnote omitted).]

Regarding building codes, the STB determined that railroads are exempt from the traditional permitting process but not, as the railroad argues, from most other generally applicable laws:
Given the broad language of 49 U.S.C. 10501(b) and the case law interpreting it, our preliminary view is that local entities such as the Borough can not require that railroads seek building permits prior to constructing or using railroad facilities because of the inherent delay and interference with interstate commerce that such requirements would cause. At the same time, we believe local authorities can take actions that are necessary and appropriate to address any genuine emergency on railroad property, and that interstate railroads such as NYSW are not exempt from certain local fire, health, safety and construction regulations and inspections.
 
[Id. at *8.]
 
Although railroads may not be forced to submit to a local permitting process because of the inherent potential for delay, railroads generally are still subject to state regulation of their facilities. The STB specifically determined that
state and local entities can enforce in a non-discriminatory manner electrical and building codes, or fire and plumbing regulations, so long as they do not do so by requiring the obtaining of permits as a prerequisite to the construction or improvement of railroad facilities. With regard to the kinds of inspections that are permissible on property owned or used by interstate railroads, the potential for interference depends on the nature of the action by the state or local government and the effect on rail transportation and Board remedies; we see no simple, clear line of demarcation that has been or could be drawn, except that the inspection requirements or local regulations must be applied and enforced in a non-discriminatory manner and that preclearance permitting requirements plainly are preempted. Again, we cannot go beyond these general principles here without more information about particular inspection and similar requirements that may be at issue in this case. Parties may file further information and comment on these issues.
 
[Id. at *8 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).]

VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD PARK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEW YORK SUSQUEHANNA & WESTERN RAILWAY CORPORATION, A Corporation authorized to do business in New Jersey,

Defendant-Respondent.

LONG, J., dissenting.
I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division requiring this matter to proceed before the STB, the agency authorized by Congress to implement the ICCTA. 49 U.S.C.A. 10501. Nothing in the after-decided Riverdale case, supra, justifies a different outcome. 1 999 WL 715272. By its own terms, the STB's ruling in Riverdale is preliminary only; it is subject to change depending on a full review of the facts. Id. at *8. Indeed, as the STB itself acknowledged, there may be additional unresolved preemption issues in Riverdale. Id. at *1 n.2. Our ruling here is premature and out of conformity, not only with the principles of preemption, but with the well established rule that litigation is to proceed in a cohesive, and not piecemeal, manner.
In Riverdale, the STB acknowledged that state and local entities retain certain police powers, so long as their actions do not have the effect of foreclosing or restricting the railroad's ability to conduct its operations or otherwise unreasonably burden[ing] interstate commerce. Id. at *5-6. That agency refused, however, to detail which powers it retained and which it ceded without more information as to the particular police power issues that may be involved in this case. Id. at *6.
This case should be heard in the first instance by the STB. After a preemption determination by that agency based on these particularized facts, the actual contours of the state case will be clear; at that time, meaningful action may be taken by local authorities subject to state judicial review. In my view, the majority has created a haphazard scheme for addressing the difficult issue presented by this case.

JUSTICES GARIBALDI and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE LONG'S opinion.

NO. A-101

 
VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD PARK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEW YORK SUSQUEHANNA & WESTERN
RAILWAY CORPORATION, etc.,

Defendant-Respondent.

DECIDED April 5, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz