STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. GLENFORD G. FINDLAY
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3909-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GLENFORD G. FINDLAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted November 8, 2021– Decided November 19, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 17-04-0886.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, on the
briefs).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lucille M.
Rosano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After a jury trial, defendant appeals from his convictions for second-
degree conspiracy to commit carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A.
2C:15-2(a)(2); first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2); second-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).
Defendant argues primarily that the motion judge erred in denying his motion
for a Wade1 hearing and that the trial judge imposed an excessive sentence. We
affirm.
Around 3:30 a.m. on August 31, 2016, Tikah Arrington was sitting in her
car in front of her apartment building in the parking lot with the windows rolled
down. A car with two occupants pulled into the parking lot and parked alongside
Arrington's driver's side. The occupant in the front passenger's seat told
Arrington to "get out of [her] car." The front passenger then exited the car and
attempted to open Arrington's driver's side door. The front passenger opened
the driver's side door of Arrington's car and pointed a gun at her stomach.
Arrington fled to her apartment building where she observed the gunman's
1
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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vehicle and her vehicle being driven away. Five minutes after the carjacking ,
Arrington and her friend called 9-1-1 to report the armed robbery.
Officers Wayne Adams and E.H. Carter, Jr. were the first officers to arrive
at the scene and speak with Arrington. Adams testified that Arrington described
the armed front passenger as being "between [five foot six inches] and [five foot
eight inches], wearing a white t-shirt, blue jeans, short haircut" and having a
medium complexion. Arrington described the driver of the car as being in his
early twenties and wearing "a white t-shirt with his hair[] [in] dreads, braids,
pushed up in like a bun and a bandana around it."
Detective John Bocchino was assigned to investigate the carjacking of
Arrington. Later in the morning of the carjacking, Arrington arrived at the East
Orange police precinct to view a photo array of over 650 photos. Arrington
flagged eight photos from the array, noting that two photos resembled the
assailant who exited the vehicle and none of the remaining photos resembled
either assailant. When the police showed Arrington updated versions of the two
photos that she previously flagged, she stated neither were the assailants.
Bocchino went to the scene of the carjacking and recovered surveillance
camera footage from Arrington's apartment building, which he showed to
Arrington. The surveillance video showed the assailants arriving next to
A-3909-18
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Arrington's vehicle at 3:11 a.m. and Arrington running away twenty-nine
seconds later.
On September 1, 2016, Bocchino created another array with six
photographs from the previous array. Detective Sharieff Greenwood conducted
the photo array and recorded the procedure. Arrington identified co-defendant
Dashawn Ward as the "one who actually took [her] vehicle" at gunpoint,
prompting Bocchino to obtain an arrest warrant and arrest defendant.
On September 7, 2016, Bocchino asked Arrington to return to the police
station again to view a second six-photo array. Detective Rolando Baugh
administered the photo array, which was also video recorded. Arrington
identified defendant as the driver of the vehicle. After Arrington's
identification, Bocchino asked Baugh to complete pretrial identification
documentation, including a Photo Array Eyewitness Identification Procedure
Worksheet (the worksheet), which Baugh only partially completed. Bocchino
later arrested defendant outside of his apartment building.
On February 5, 2018, the motion judge denied defendant's motion to
dismiss the indictment but granted defendant's motion for a testimonial Wade
hearing for later that month regarding Arrington's pretrial identifications. The
judge explained that he granted the motion for a hearing "not . . . because there
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was suggestiveness," but "because there's not enough information to determine
the system variables." The motion judge heard testimony from Bocchino and
Baugh and reviewed the pretrial identification procedure recordings before
denying defendant's motion.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments for this court's
consideration:
POINT I
A VERY SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF
IRREPARABLE MISIDENTIFICATION EXISTS
WHERE THE STATE DID NOT OFFER A
REASONABLE EXPLANATION FOR OMITTING
ANSWERS TO MATERIAL QUESTIONS ON THE
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE
WORKSHEET AS REQUIRED, ONE OF WHICH
RELATED TO ITS STAR WITNESS'S LEVEL OF
CERTAINTY.
POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION
WHERE SHE FOUND AGGRAVATING FACTOR
SIX APPLIED BASED SOLELY ON THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME.
I.
We begin by addressing defendant's argument that the motion judge's
conclusion the record does not demonstrate suggestiveness contradicts his
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findings and that he improperly concluded the Wade hearing before defendant
was able to examine estimator variables.
To obtain a Wade hearing, a defendant must "present some evidence of
suggestiveness tied to a system variable which could lead to a mistaken
identification." State v. Anthony, 237 N.J. 213, 233 (2019) (citing State v.
Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 288-89 (2011)). "System variables" include blind
identification, pre-identification instructions, lineup construction, feedback,
recording confidence, multiple viewings, showups, private actors, and other
identifications made. Henderson, 208 N.J. at 288-90. If a defendant proffers
such evidence, the State "must then offer proof to show that the proffered
eyewitness identification is reliable—accounting for system and estimator
variables." Id. at 289.
The defendant may cross-examine the State's witnesses as well as present
their own witnesses and evidence relating to system and estimator variables.
Ibid. At any point during the hearing, if the judge finds that based on the
testimony, defendant's threshold allegation of suggestiveness is baseless, he or
she may end the hearing. Id. at 290-91. "Under those circumstances, the [judge]
need not permit the defendant or require the State to elicit more evidence about
estimator variables; that evidence would be reserved for the jury." Id. at 291.
A-3909-18
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At all times, the burden of proof remains with the defendant to "prove a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. at 289. If the
judge determines that based on the totality of the circumstances the defendant
has "demonstrated a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,
the [judge] should suppress the identification evidence." Ibid. Our Court has
not "created bright-line rules that call for the 'suppression of reliable evidence
any time a law enforcement officer makes a mistake.'" Anthony, 237 N.J. at 239
(quoting Henderson, 208 N.J. at 303); see State v. Green, 239 N.J. 88, 109
(2019) (noting that the Court has not "suggest[ed] that any time a full record of
an identification is not preserved, the evidence must be excluded").
Bocchino testified that he called Arrington on September 6, 2016, spoke
to her briefly and asked her to return to police headquarters to view the second
photo array the next day. He spoke to Arrington for thirty seconds and explained
to her that Baugh would administer the photo array. Bocchino testified that it
was his normal practice to ask the witness prior to administering the photo array
whether anyone had spoken to them before administering the array, but he did
not ask Arrington this question, and Arrington did not voluntarily inform him
that she had heard from or communicated with anyone prior to the arrays. He
did not tell Arrington that he had developed a suspect and did not direct her to
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flag any one photo from the array. At the conclusion of the photo array,
Bocchino took a recorded statement from Arrington.
Baugh testified that he had no prior knowledge of the case, was not
involved in the investigation, and did not select the photos used in the array. He
filled out the photo display instruction form, photo display report form, and
photographic identification form during the recording. Baugh obtained the
worksheet to fill out after the photo array concluded, but he failed to record
responses for each question. He testified that he did not record a response for
question fourteen2 because he was "[p]robably too busy doing things in between
and missed it" and that Arrington did not ask him questions about the
procedures. He also testified that he did not fill out question sixteen3 because
he "forgot" because he was "working and handling so many other tasks" at the
time.
Baugh further testified that he could not recall whether he asked Arrington
to describe her level of confidence when completing Questions twenty-one and
2
Question fourteen reads: "Did the witness ask any questions about the
procedure?"
3
Question sixteen reads: "Did you ask the witness whether he/she had
previously spoken to anyone (law enforcement or civilian) about the
identification?"
A-3909-18
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twenty-two.4 He testified that he wrote that Arrington "states she is positive"
because his "perceived notion [was] that she was positive" and because she
"seemed very sure." However, Baugh testified that he did not believe Arrington
affirmatively stated that she was positive. And although Baugh answered "yes"
to question twenty-two, he did read the answer to question twenty-one to
Arrington before doing so.
The motion judge described Baugh's failure to properly record responses
on the worksheet as "sloppy," and even if Baugh was busy or interrupted, that
did not "justify [his] sloppiness." The motion judge determined that despite the
failure to properly complete the worksheet, there was "nothing to demonstrate
even by a preponderance of the evidence that there was any suggestiveness" and
"absolutely nothing to indicate that anything was suggest[ed] to the witness."
After hearing testimony from Bocchino and Baugh and reviewing the
identification procedure video, the motion judge agreed that the detectives were
"sloppy when completing the report" and they "did not follow the worksheet
4
Question twenty-one reads: "If yes to [number twenty], did you ask the witness
during the procedure to make a statement concerning his/her level of confidence
that the photo he/she selected depicts the perpetrator?" Question twenty-two
reads: "Did you repeat back to the witness the language quoted in the answer to
[number twenty-one] and confirm that is what he/she said about his/her level of
confidence?"
A-3909-18
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instructions to a tee," but that even "conced[ing] that this was not done as well
as it should have been done, there's . . . nothing to demonstrate even by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was any suggestiveness." As to
defendant's contention that the detectives had unrecorded conversations with
Arrington prior to the pretrial identification, which establishes suggestiveness,
the motion judge explained that it was unsurprising that the short conversations
that Bocchino had before the photo arrays were not recorded as they involved
Bocchino asking Arrington to come to view the photo array and informing her
that Baugh would be administering the double-blind procedure. The motion
judge properly determined that there was "absolutely nothing to indicate that
anything was suggestive to the witness based on the totality of the
circumstances."
The motion judge concluded the Wade hearing without exploring
estimator variables. The motion judge noted that defendant would "be able to
cross-examine . . . Arrington at length about" the identification procedure and
could put forth arguments calling into question the reliability of her
identification. See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 290-91 (noting that when a trial judge
concludes that a defendant's "initial claim of suggestiveness is baseless, and if
no other evidence of suggestiveness has been demonstrated by the evidence, the
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[judge] may exercise [his or her] discretion to end the hearing" and leave
evidence of estimator variables to the jury). Here, the judge properly ended the
hearing and left the exploration of estimator variables for the jury to determine.
II.
Next, defendant argues that the trial judge imposed a manifestly excessive
sentence. Defendant asserts that the trial judge improperly found aggravating
factor six by considering the elements of the crime in her analysis and, therefore,
improperly double counted his criminal history.
We review a trial judge's sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). This deferential standard applies only
when "the trial judge follows the Code and the basic precepts that channel
sentencing discretion." State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020) (quoting
State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)). We will "affirm the sentence of a trial
[judge] unless: (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of
aggravating and mitigating factors were not 'based upon competent credible
evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts' of
the case 'shock[s] the judicial conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228
(2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-
65 (1984)).
A-3909-18
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A trial judge "must identify any relevant aggravating and mitigating
factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b) that apply to the case." Case,
220 N.J. at 64 (citing State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 72 (2014)). The judge must
then "determine which factors are supported by a preponderance of [the]
evidence, balance the relevant factors, and explain how it arrives at the
appropriate sentence." State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989). The
judge's application of these factors "must be supported by competent, credible
evidence in the record." Case, 220 N.J. at 64.
Judges may consider a defendant's "uninterrupted history of criminality"
in their determination of whether aggravating factor six is applicable. See State
v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 502 (2005). Judges may also consider a defendant's
juvenile and municipal records, State v. Taylor, 226 N.J. Super. 441, 453-54
(App. Div. 1988), as well as a defendant's adult arrests which do not result in
convictions, State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 382 (App. Div. 2012) (noting
that adult arrests that do not result in convictions may be relevant to the sentence
imposed).
Judges must "avoid 'double counting' circumstances that the Legislature
has already incorporated as an element of the offense," such as "[e]lements of a
crime, including those that establish its grade." State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594,
A-3909-18
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608 (2013). However, a judge does not impermissibly double count when they
consider a defendant's prior criminal history for multiple aggravating and
mitigating factors. State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 328 (2019); see State v.
McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 576-77 (App. Div. 2017). A defendant's
criminal record is not included in the "[f]acts that establish[] elements of a crime
for which a defendant is being sentenced" and "should not be considered as
aggravating circumstances in determining that sentence." McDuffie, 450 N.J.
Super. at 576 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000)). Nor is a judge "required to ignore the extent of [a
defendant's] criminal history when considering applicable aggravating factors."
Id. at 577.
In finding aggravating factor three applicable, the trial judge considered
defendant's criminal and juvenile record, which she determined demonstrated a
"reckless disregard for the law." Four juvenile complaints have been filed
against defendant, three of which were dismissed and one of which resulted in a
probationary term. Defendant has two adult arrests, one of which was
downgraded to a disorderly persons conviction resulting in probation , which he
later violated. Defendant also had an outstanding bench warrant for failing to
appear. In finding aggravating factor six applicable, the judge not only noted
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that defendant's charges "are very, very serious" "first[-]degree" charges, which
are "the most serious in the State of New Jersey" and carry a sentencing range
of "[ten] to [thirty] years," but appropriately incorporated her prior consideration
of defendant's criminal and juvenile history in finding factor six applicable.
The trial judge considered these facts, determined that aggravating factor
six is applicable, and imposed a proper sentence. The trial judge did not rely
solely on the fact that defendant's convictions were for "very serious" first-
degree charges, see State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 428 (2001), nor did she double
count.
Affirmed.
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