NR DEED, LLC v. JOHN-HAROLD HAHN, JR
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2511-19T1
NR DEED, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOHN-HAROLD HAHN, JR.,
a/k/a John Harold Hahn, Junior;
Mrs. John-Harold Hahn, Junior,
a/k/a John Harold Hahn, Junior,
wife of John-Harold Hahn,
Junior; and State of New Jersey.
Defendants-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted January 13, 2021 – Decided February 3, 2021
Before Judges Geiger and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. F-
004542-18.
John Marshall, appellant pro se.
Goldenberg, Mackler, Sayegh, Mintz, Pfeffer, Bonchi
& Gill, attorneys for respondent (Keith A. Bonchi, of
counsel and on the brief; Elliott J. Almanza, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant John-Harold Hahn, Jr., a/k/a "John Marshall (flesh and blood
man)," (Hahn) appeals from a December 23, 2019 Chancery Division order
denying his motion to vacate the final judgment entered against him and a
February 10, 2020 order denying his motion for reconsideration.
Hahn is the record title owner of property in the Town of Hammonton (the
property). He failed to pay the real estate taxes on that property for
approximately four years. The municipality conducted a tax sale. Christiana
Trust, LLC, purchased the tax sale certificate and assigned it to plaintiff NR
Deed, LLC, which filed this action against Hahn to foreclose the tax sale
certificate.
Plaintiff attempted to personally serve defendant with process on multiple
occasions at three different addresses, including a Blackwood address shown as
Hahn's address on the deed and municipal tax records, and the property itself.
Those attempts were thwarted by defendant assuming the false identity of John
Marshall, removing mailboxes from the property, and purportedly transferring
title to the property to a third party by an unrecorded deed, and reconveying the
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property to himself by way of a second unrecorded deed, using an alias as the
grantee.
The process server advised that the Blackwood address was an
unoccupied, vacant store front. Plaintiff then undertook diligent inquiry to
locate defendant. A postal inquiry revealed that there was "no mail receptacle"
at the property. A postal inquiry for the Blackwood address was return marked:
"Moved, left no forwarding address."
Plaintiff also had a skip trace performed to identify other potential
addresses for Hahn. In addition to the Blackwood address, the skip trace
revealed another potential address in Williamstown. Attempts to serve Hahn at
that address were also unsuccessful as the returns stated it was gated and locked
when each attempt at service was made. A subsequent postal inquiry for the
Williamstown address was returned marked: "Moved, left no forwarding
address."
Plaintiff then undertook substituted service by mail, publication, and
posting the property. As part of that effort, a copy of the summons and
complaint was simultaneously mailed by certified and regular mail to the
Williamstown address, the Blackwood address, and the property. The mailings
to the Blackwood address were returned marked "NMR" (no mail receptacle).
A-2511-19T1
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The regular mail to the Blackwood address was not returned, but the certified
mailing was returned marked "attempted not known" and "no such person." The
mail to the property was not returned.
The notice to absent defendant was published in the Press of Atlantic City,
a newspaper of general circulation in Atlantic County, on September 20, 2018.
On October 15, 2018, a copy of the complaint and notice to absent defendant
was posted on the property.
In addition, numerous motions, pleadings, and orders were sent to the
property by simultaneous certified and regular mail. These mailings included
the motion for an order setting time to redeem, the request to enter default, and
the final judgment. Some of those mailings were returned marked "unclaimed"
or "no mail receptacle."
Hahn did not file a responsive pleading or move to the dismiss the action
for lack of service of process. Final judgment was entered on March 20, 2019.
An inspection of the property revealed it was occupied, so plaintiff sought and
obtained a writ of possession. On July 24, 2019, the writ of possession was
served on Hahn at the property by a sheriff's officer. A lockout of the property,
which was found to be vacated, was completed on August 15, 2019.
A-2511-19T1
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On October 28, 2019, using the name John Marshall, Hahn moved to
vacate the final judgment. He claimed plaintiff's complaint was invalid and
served on the "wrong defendant." Hahn also claimed that John Marshall was
the owner of the property by an unrecorded deed. Plaintiff opposed the motion,
arguing that Hahn had been residing at the property and evading service, noting
Hahn was found there when the sheriff's officer served the writ of possession.
During oral argument on the motion, Marshall admitted that he used to be
known as Hahn. The court found that Hahn and Marshall were the same person.
The court recounted plaintiff's diligent inquiry and its attempts to serve Hahn.
The court further found that there was circumstantial evidence that Hahn may
have been evading service. The court concluded that the published notice to
absent defendant and posting of the property satisfied the rule for substituted
service. It also found that the order setting the time, place, and amount to
redeem were served by mail on December 5, 2018, and the final judgment was
served by mail on August 15, 2019. Lastly, the court found Hahn was personally
served with the writ for possession by a sheriff's officer on July 24, 2019, "which
confirm[ed] that Mr. Hahn was residing at the property and was evasive of
service of process."
A-2511-19T1
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The court found that plaintiff undertook diligent inquiry and service of
process was properly made by publication and mailing. The court reiterated that
Hahn attempted to evade service.
The court found that the 2014 deed from Hahn to Shirley Katz was
unrecorded. Hahn admitted the deed conveying the property to Marshall was
also unrecorded. Therefore, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-89.1, Katz and Marshall
were bound by the by the foreclosure judgment as if they had been parties to the
action and a judgment had been entered against them. For these reasons, the
court concluded there was no basis to vacate the judgment and denied the motion
On January 10, 2020, Hahn moved for reconsideration. Hahn asserted that
the court erred in determining that service of process was proper. He argued
that service was defective and violated his right to due process. He claimed that
it was not clear that the process server really attempted to serve him at the
Blackwood address. He further claimed that the process server failed to make
multiple attempts at service at that address. Hahn also claimed that plaintiff
failed to provide proof that the complaint was mailed to the address that
plaintiff's counsel believed Hahn resided and, therefore, even substituted service
was not properly effectuated. Lastly, Hahn claimed that when compared to the
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property's assessed value, the amount of the judgment would result in an
inequitable windfall.
Following oral argument, the court issued a February 6, 2020 oral decision
and February 10, 2020 order denying the motion. The court found that:
personal service in this case was not only attempted at
the subject property where the defendant admittedly
resided during the initiation and foreclosure until
eviction, but also two other properties where the
defendant was found to . . . potentially have connection
by way of a skip trace search. When personal service
could not be effectuated plaintiff sent numerous
mailings to the subject property. Notice was posted in
the press and on the subject property. Therefore, this
[c]ourt finds that the service of process was properly
made . . . by publication and mailing to the subject
property, and by diligent attempts to serve the
defendant.
....
The [c]ourt finds that the [twenty-two] attempts
through written mail[ings] present[] a presumption that
service was effectuated under [SSI Med. Services v.
State Dep't of Human Services, 146 N.J. 614, 621
(1996)].
....
The [c]ourt also finds the defendant cannot fail to
claim a certified mail and then argue that the plaintiff
did not comply with the statutory notice requirements .
...
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The court applied the doctrine of unclean hands due to Hahn's posting of
a large sign that read: "No trespassing to all persons, officers, and governmental
agencies, including but not limited to federal officers of the IRS, HEW, HUD,
Environmental Health Services Workers that are unconstitutional agencies, and
to all local members of Planning and Zoning boards," and "that there would be
a land use fee of $5,000 per person." The court also noted Hahn's lack of a mail
receptacle. The court found plaintiff made diligent efforts to serve Hahn.
Based on these findings, the court determined Hahn did not meet the
standards for reconsideration and denied the motion. This appeal followed.
Defendant raises the following points for our consideration.
POINT I
THE TR[IAL] COURT ERRED IN VACATING
DEFAULT [JUDGMENT]. THE NAME ON THE
WRIT IS A CORPORATE LEGAL FICTION AND
NOT ME. THE REAL OWNER OF SAID
PROPERTY[,] [ON] MIDDLE ROAD[,]
HAMMONTON, NEW JERSEY[,] IS FLESH AND
BLOOD MAN OF GOD JOHN MARSHALL.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF WAS AWARDED SAID
PROPERTY[,] THE ORIGINAL OWNER SOLD
SAID PROPERTY ON DECEMBER 9, 2014[,]
BEFORE [THE] TAX SALE. MARCH 20, 2019
JUDG[]MENT DATE. CONTRACT MAKES THE
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LAW, BLACK'S LAW 2D 704 BOLV. 135 ALLEN V.
MERCH BANK OF N.Y. 22 WEND. (NY) 215, 233.
After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal,
excepting as noted, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in the
Chancery Judge's December 13, 2019 and February 6, 2020 oral decisions. We
add the following comments.
"The decision whether to grant . . . a motion [to vacate a final judgment
of foreclosure] is left to the sound discretion of the trial court[.]' U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n v. Curcio, 444 N.J. Super 94, 105 (App. Div. 2016) (third alteration in
original) (quoting Mancini v. EDS ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting
Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993)). "The trial court's determination . . . warrants
substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse
of discretion." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)). We likewise review the denial of a
motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.
Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996). We discern no abuse of discretion. The
court's factual findings are fully supported by the record, and its legal
conclusions are consonant with applicable law.
The record demonstrates that Hahn attempted to evade service in several
ways. "The primary method of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a
A-2511-19T1
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defendant in this State is" by personal service. R. 4:4-4(a). "[I]n personam
jurisdiction may [also] be obtained by mail under the circumstances and in the
manner provided by [Rule] 4:4-3." R. 4:4-4(a). Rule 4:4-3(a) provides that "[i]f
personal service cannot be effected after a reasonable and good faith attempt, .
. . [t]he party making service may, at the party's option, make service
simultaneously by registered or certified mail and ordinary mail, and if the
addressee refuses to claim or accept delivery of registered mail and if the
ordinary mailing is not returned, the simultaneous mailing shall constitute
effective service." R. 4:4-3(a). Plaintiff met those requirements. 1
The record reflects that after attempts at personally serving Hahn at
multiple addresses, plaintiff sent copies of the summons and complaint
simultaneously by certified and regular mail to the Hammonton property, the
Blackwood address, and the Williamstown address. Service of process was thus
proper under Rule 4:4-3(a) and afforded Hahn adequate due process.
Hahn attempted to avoid foreclosure by conveying the property to Katz,
then back to Hahn under the name Marshall, by unrecorded deeds. Pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 54:5-89.1, Katz and Marshall were bound by the foreclosure judgment
1
The judge's misapplication of Rule 4:4-4(b)(1)(c), which applies to substituted
service outside this State, was harmless error. See R. 2:10-2.
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in the same manner as if they had been made parties to the action and a judgment
had been entered against them.
Hahn's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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