STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MARCELINO GARCIA
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0360-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARCELINO GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Submitted November 5, 2018 – Decided December 3, 2018
Before Judges Messano and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Accusation No. 16-11-1165.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Dennis Calo, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (William P. Miller, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel; Catherine A. Foddai, Special Deputy
Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Marcelino Garcia pled guilty to eight counts of second-degree
robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2), one count for each of the eight different banks
he robbed over a fifteen-month period between February 2015 and June 2016.
The State of New Jersey agreed to recommend concurrent ten-year terms of
imprisonment, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7.2, and defendant's payment of restitution. Defendant then applied for special
Drug Court probation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).
A TASC1 evaluation concluded defendant "manifest[ed] symptoms of
[m]oderate [o]piate [u]se [d]isorder." It noted, however, that defendant's "self-
report [was] of questionable validity," because defendant denied the use of any
substances other than alcohol and tobacco to the jail's medical staff and
exhibited no "withdrawal symptoms" upon admission to the jail, despite h is
claim of using "a bundle of heroin daily, in conjunction with . . . other substances
. . . ." Defendant's girlfriend "verified [he] engage[d] in the use of substances
and this ha[d] caused negative issues in their relationship." "Based upon
[defendant's] self-report," the evaluator recommended he be referred for
intensive outpatient services.
1
Treatment Assessment Services for the Courts.
A-0360-17T4
2
In his written objection to the court, the prosecutor argued defendant
committed the robberies for profit, not to support a drug habit, and presented a
continuing threat to the community. The prosecutor noted defendant showed no
signs of being under the influence of drugs when arrested, and, in a statement
given to law enforcement at that time, defendant said he committed the robberies
because he had lost his job and needed money. Defendant described how he
researched the banks he robbed and carefully devised and executed his
robberies.
After hearing oral argument, the Drug Court judge reserved decision.
Approximately one week later, he denied defendant's application in an oral
opinion placed upon the record, and filed a conforming order. Another judge
sentenced defendant to eight concurrent sentences of ten years' imprisonment
each, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility as required
by NERA, and restitution. This appeal followed.
Defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
A REMAND FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
DRUG COURT APPLICATION IS REQUIRED
BECAUSE THE DRUG COURT JUDGE APPLIED A
LEGALLY IMPROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND FAILED TO FULLY AND FAIRLY CONSIDER
THE REVEVANT FACTS.
A-0360-17T4
3
A. A Remand is Required Because the
Drug Court Judge Wrongly Applied an
Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review.
B. A Remand Is Required Because the
Drug Court Judge Did Not Fully and Fairly
Consider All the Relevant Facts.
POINT II
RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE
JUDGE REJECTED A RELEVANT MITIGATING
FACTOR AND BASED AN AGGRAVATING
FACTOR ON DEFENDANT'S DRUG ADDICTION
DESPITE CASE LAW PROHIBITING SUCH
CONSIDERATION, AND DEFENDANT'S DRUG
COURT APPLICATION HAVING BEEN DENIED
BASED ON A LACK OF ADDICTION.
After considering these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal
standards, we affirm.
"Special probation 'and Drug Courts serve complementary purposes.'"
State v. Ancrum, 449 N.J. Super. 526, 532 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v.
Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 424 (2007)). "Special probation provides one route, or
track, by which certain offenders become eligible for Drug Court, a specialized
court[] . . . that target[s] drug-involved offenders who are most likely to benefit
from treatment and do not pose a risk to public safety." Ibid. (quoting Meyer,
192 N.J. at 428-29 (internal quotations omitted)). "Under [this] track, to meet
the requirements for 'special probation,' the applicant must have committed a
A-0360-17T4
4
crime that is subject to a presumption of incarceration or a mandatory prison
term, and the judge must find that the applicant satisfies nine separate factors. "
State v. Clarke, 203 N.J. 166, 175 (2010) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(1)).
Three of the nine factors most relevant to this appeal are: factor two, whether
the defendant is drug or alcohol dependent and was so at the time he committed
the present offense; factor three, whether the defendant committed the present
offense while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, its analog
or alcohol; and factor nine, whether danger to the community will result from a
special probationary sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a) (2), (3) and (9).
In denying defendant's application, the Drug Court judge began his oral
decision by stating, "The courts have recognized that the Prosecutor's Office has
discretion in deciding whether or not to admit participants into Drug Court.
Obviously, such discretion . . . is not unfettered and is subject to a court review."
Defendant seizes on this statement and argues that the judge applied the wrong
standard in deciding whether to admit defendant to Drug Court.
Prior to 2012, the prosecutor's objection to a defendant's participation in
Drug Court was sufficient to block admission, and the prosecutor's decision was
subject to review for a patent and gross abuse of discretion. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
14(c) (2009) (amended 2015); see also Clarke, 203 N.J. at 175 (quoting Meyer,
A-0360-17T4
5
192 N.J. at 432 ("If the prosecutor does not consent, the trial judge may only
admit the applicant under track one 'if the judge finds a gross and patent abuse
of prosecutorial discretion.'")). However, in 2012, the Legislature amended
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 and repealed subsection (c). See State v. Hyland, 452 N.J.
Super. 372, 387-89 (App. Div. 2017) (explaining history of the amendment). As
a result, the prosecutor's objection is a factor in the court's "consider[ation] [of]
all relevant circumstances," nothing more. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).
Defendant's argument might have some merit, but for the fact that the
judge immediately continued by indicating he had "on numerous occasions . . .
overruled the State's objection to a person being admitted into Drug Court. The
prior standard was gross and patent abuse of discretion . . . [but] that is no longer
the standard for reviewing the [p]rosecutor's decision whether or not to admit or
reject someone's entry into Drug Court." The judge then considered defendant's
application in light of the nine statutory factors. As a result, we reject
defendant's claim that the judge deferred to the prosecutor's objection and
relinquished his obligation to consider "all relevant circumstances."
For example, the judge found "there needs to be a nexus between the crime
committed and the participant's drug problem." See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(3).
The judge expressed his concern about the "veracity" of defendant's self -
A-0360-17T4
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reported drug abuse. He noted the testimony of defendant's girlfriend and father
during the earlier hearing, but found it was "not fully illuminating" and did not
convince him of defendant's drug abuse. The judge acknowledged, "defendant
was caught while in the jail with drugs," but, after considering the "totality of
the circumstances,"
particularly . . . defendant's behavior in the wake of his
arrest for the robberies, from the bank robberies, the
amounts involved, [2] there didn't appear at that time to
be any indication that . . . defendant was under the
influence when he committed these acts or that he
committed these acts to support his drug habit.
Defendant contends the "judge did not fully and fairly consider all the
relevant facts." He argues the judge discounted the TASC report because it
relied upon defendant's self-report, yet professional standards among medical
providers in the field "are inherently focused on client interviews and self -
reporting." Defendant also claims the judge failed to consider fully the
testimony of defendant's father and girlfriend.
These arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). It is quite clear from the entire record that the judge
2
Defendant told police he obtained more than $55,000 from the bank robberies.
A-0360-17T4
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gave careful consideration to all relevant circumstances. We affirm the order
denying defendant's admission into Drug Court.
Defendant was twenty-four years old at the time of sentencing and had no
prior arrests or convictions. The sentencing judge found aggravating factors
three and nine. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (the risk of re-offense); and (a)(9) (the
need to deter defendant and others). She also found mitigating factors six and
seven. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(6) (defendant would be compensating his victims
through restitution); and (b)(7) (defendant's lack of any prior delinquency or
criminal activity). The judge rejected other mitigating factors urged by de fense
counsel and sentenced defendant as already noted.
Before us, defendant argues there was no support for the judge's finding
of aggravating factor three, and she should have found mitigating factors three,
nine and twelve. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(3) (defendant acted under a strong
provocation, that is, his drug habit); (b)(9) (defendant's character and attitude
made it unlikely he would commit another offense); and (b)(12) (defendant's
willingness to cooperate with law enforcement). We disagree and affirm
defendant's sentence.
"Appellate review of sentencing is deferential, and appellate courts are
cautioned not to substitute their judgment for those of our sentencing courts."
A-0360-17T4
8
State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014) (citing State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606
(2013)). Generally, we only determine whether:
(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the
aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
sentencing court were not based upon competent and
credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application
of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the
sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the
judicial conscience."
[State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65,
(1984)).]
Defendant notes the judge found aggravating factor three based solely
upon defendant's self-reported drug abuse. We recently noted that a defendant's
"substantial level of intoxication" at the time of offense supported a finding that
he or she present a risk of re-offense. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 125
(App. Div. 2018). In State v. Bienek, 200 N.J. 601, 610 (2010), the Court
specifically approved a finding of aggravating factor three premised upon the
defendant's substance abuse problems. While we acknowledge the divergent
conclusions reached by the Drug Court judge and the sentencing judge about the
level of defendant's substance abuse problems, we cannot say the sentencing
judge's determination lacked support in the record. A finding of aggravating
factor three is inconsistent with a finding of the related mitigating factor nine.
A-0360-17T4
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We find no error in the judge's rejection of mitigating factor twelve. The
record reveals that defendant met with members of law enforcement to provide
information. However, defense counsel could not verify what information was
actually provided, whether it was truthful and what, if anything, resulted
thereafter.
Defendant pled guilty to eight separate robberies committed over fifteen
months. He received a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. A
"presumption of reasonableness . . . attaches to criminal sentences imposed on
plea bargain defendants." State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 294 (1987). The
sentence imposed does not shock the judicial conscience.
Affirmed.
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