STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DONTE COFIELD

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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DONTE COFIELD,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________

October 18, 2016

 

Submitted September 28, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Manahan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 09-02-0186.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paul H. Heinzel, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief; Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, Legal Assistant, on the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Donte Cofield, appeals from an order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

In February 2009, defendant was indicted and charged with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2) (count one); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d (count two).

On April 19, 2008, defendant and the victim, defendant's ex-girlfriend and the mother of one of his children, engaged in a dispute while in her vehicle. The victim sat in the driver's seat while defendant sat in the front passenger seat; there were no other passengers in the car. During the dispute, defendant pulled out a knife, which he possessed before entering the vehicle, and repeatedly stabbed the victim approximately fifty-seven times in the neck and chest. Defendant then fled the scene without seeking medical attention for her. The victim subsequently died as a result of the injuries sustained during the stabbing.

Upon his arrest, defendant told police that the victim had been attacked by an assailant hiding in the rear of the vehicle. He later acknowledged this version of events was a falsehood.

Defendant's trial counsel retained Dr. Gerald Cooke, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist. Dr. Cooke evaluated defendant and determined he was legally competent to stand trial. In his report, Dr. Cooke described defendant's "well documented history of explosive outbursts" and his behavior at the time of the homicide as consistent with an "Intermittent Explosive Disorder" diagnosis. Dr. Cooke concluded that defendant did not have the capacity to form the specific intent to kill, as defendant "struck out blindly and in the heat of passion, rather than acting purposely or knowingly." After conducting a follow-up evaluation, as well as reviewing the State's expert reports, Dr. Cooke maintained his initial opinion, that defendant did not act purposely or knowingly.

Dr. Charles F. Martinson, M.D., the State's psychiatric expert, also evaluated defendant. Contrary to Dr. Cooke's opinion, Dr. Martinson opined that defendant did exhibit the specific intent to kill. Based on his interview with defendant and review of the discovery material, Dr. Martinson noted defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing could be inferred by his conduct close in time and place to the killing. Dr. Martinson reviewed defendant's medical records from over a two-year period obtained from the Mercer County Correctional Facility. In a supplemental report, Dr. Martinson stated that the mental health team observed defendant as "present[ing] in a way that will convince the court that he is not guilty by reason of insanity," that defendant's behavior was inconsistent with psychosis or post-traumatic stress disorder and that he was ambivalent regarding his mental health treatment.

On February 8, 2011, defendant plead guilty to count one as amended to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a. The State agreed to dismiss count two of the indictment. The plea agreement recommended a maximum custodial sentence of twenty-three years, with a parole disqualification period equal to eighty-five percent of the maximum term imposed pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a), and a five-year period of parole supervision. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement on May 9, 2011, to twenty-three years with a NERA parole disqualifier.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging only the sentence imposed. On April 9, 2013, this court affirmed the sentence. State v. Cofield, No. A-5860-10 (App. Div. April 9, 2013).

On June 10, 2013, defendant filed a PCR alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to pursue an insanity defense. The PCR judge held oral argument on March 7, 2014. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the judge denied the PCR after holding that trial counsel was not ineffective by not pursuing an insanity defense. This appeal followed.

Defendant raises the following argument on appeal1

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST[-]CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL, RESULTING IN A GUILTY PLEA WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FREELY, KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.

"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). Under Rule 3:22-2(a), a criminal defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief if there was a "[s]ubstantial denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of New Jersey[.]" "A petitioner must establish the right to such relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence." Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 459. "To sustain that burden, specific facts" that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision" must be articulated. State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

Claims of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel are well suited for post-conviction review. See R. 3:224(a)(2); Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 460. In determining whether a defendant is entitled to relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, New Jersey courts apply the two-prong test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698 (1984). Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 463; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).

Under the first prong of the Strickland test, a "defendant must show that [defense] counsel's performance was deficient." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Under the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.

In demonstrating that counsel's performance was deficient under the first prong of Strickland, a defendant must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]" Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694); State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 579 (2015).

Further, in satisfying the second prong, because prejudice is not presumed, a defendant must typically demonstrate "how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047 n.26, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 668n.26 (1984) (citation omitted). See also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 482, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1037, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985, 998 (2000). There must be "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.

The United States Supreme Court has applied these principles to a criminal defense attorney's representation of an accused in connection with a plea negotiation. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384-85, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398, 406-07 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407-08, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379, 390 (2012). A defendant must demonstrate with "reasonable probability" that the result would have been different had he received proper advice from his trial attorney. Lafler, supra, 566 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1384, 182 L. Ed. 2d at 407 (citing Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698). A defendant must make that showing by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1454, 185 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2013).

Our review of an order granting or denying PCR contains consideration of mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2005). We defer to a PCR court's factual findings and will uphold those findings that are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (citations omitted). However, a PCR court's interpretations of law are provided no deference and are reviewed de novo. Id. at 540-41.

Defendant contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue an insanity defense. We disagree.

In addition to noting the plea negotiations engaged in by trial counsel, the PCR judge relied on other factors in holding that trial counsel provided effective assistance, including the initial and supplemental reports of defendant's expert, Dr. Cooke, and the State's expert, Dr. Martinson. The PCR judge also considered the plea and sentencing hearings, police reports and defendant's statements to police, as well as the comprehensive colloquy that established the factual basis for the guilty plea.

From our review of the record, we are satisfied defendant's trial counsel's performance was not deficient. Defendant's trial counsel pursued the efficacy of an insanity defense on defendant's behalf through the evaluation conducted by Dr. Cooke. While Dr. Cooke was of the opinion that defendant lacked the specific intent to kill, he did not opine that defendant was "unaware of the nature and quality of the act." In the absence of that determination, defendant could not meet his burden of proof requisite to sustain the affirmative defense of insanity. N.J.S.A, 2C:4-1; State v. Handy, 215 N.J 334, 357 (2013).

It is undisputed that defendant's conviction after trial would have exposed him to a potential sentence of thirty-years imprisonment. Defendant was advised during the plea process of the potential for imposition of this sentence. The State's proofs were overwhelming; including the testimony of numerous fact witnesses and compelling physical evidence. By any objective analysis, defendant likely would have been convicted. When considering the above, the argument that defendant's counsel was ineffective by negotiating a plea on his behalf is unavailing. To the contrary, counsel's failure to seek a plea agreement under these circumstances would form the basis for an ineffective assistance claim.

"Adequate assistance of an attorney is measured according to whether the counsel has professional skills comparable to other practitioners in the field." State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 351 (1989). "The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether he [or she] met the constitutional threshold for effectiveness." Nash, supra, 212 N.J. at 543. Here, we find counsel's performance with respect to his representation of defendant including pursuit of an incapacity defense and negotiation of a favorable plea agreement was well within and, arguably, exceeded the minimum standard of effective assistance of counsel.

In sum, the record is devoid of any basis to support the finding that counsel's performance was deficient or that he was not functioning in a manner guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Gaitan, supra, 209 N.J. at 349-50. As did the PCR judge, we conclude defendant has not made out a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 463.

Notwithstanding our determination as to the failure to make out a prima facie case, we briefly address the second Strickland prong. We hold with respect to the second prong, that defendant has failed to demonstrate how any alleged deficiency resulted in a prejudice that, "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698; Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52 (citation omitted).

Finally, we reject defendant's argument the court erred in denying his petition without an evidentiary hearing. "An evidentiary hearing . . . is required only where the defendant has shown a prima facie case and the facts on which he relies are not already of record." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 3:22-10 (2015). The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle defendant to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999). As defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, no evidentiary hearing was required.

Affirmed.


1 Defendant filed a pro se supplemental brief which did not raise any additional arguments.


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