RODNEY KELLY v. WADE HALE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

RODNEY KELLY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WADE HALE, TIMOTHY TYLER,

COUNTY OF BURLINGTON and

KATHY MEHRER,

Defendants-Respondents.

_______________________________________________

November 23, 2016

Submitted October 18, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Fasciale.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-0827-14.

Rodney Kelly, appellant pro se.

Capehart & Scatchard, P.A., attorneys for respondents (Michelle L. Corea, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Rodney Kelly appeals from various orders entered by the trial court in this matter, including orders dated: May 2, 2014, denying plaintiff's motions for entry of a default judgment and for summary judgment; August 19, 2014, dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint with prejudice; October 14, 2014, denying a motion by another person to intervene; January 26, 2015, denying plaintiff's motion to waive transcript fees; and March 9, 2015, denying plaintiff's motion to vacate the court's orders of August 19, 2014, and January 26, 2015. We affirm.

On August 26, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Law Division against Burlington County, the Burlington County Clerk's Office, and several individuals who work in the Clerk's Office. The judge allowed plaintiff to file an amended complaint, which was filed on May 5, 2014. Plaintiff alleged that between July 2013 and August 19, 2013, he presented certain documents to defendants, and they unlawfully refused to record the documents in the Office of the County Clerk.

Plaintiff claimed that defendants wrongfully refused to file the following: (1) "Notice of Corrupted Chain of Title-an Imperfected [sic] Lien"; (2) "Notice of Breach of Contract-Invalid Note"; (3) "Notice of Breach of Contract-Invalid Note"; (4) "Notice of Breach of Contract-Invalid Note"; (5) "Notice of Breach of Contract-Invalid Note"; (6) "Notice of Breach of Contract-Invalid Note"; (7) "Notice of Breach of Contract-Invalid Note"; (8) "Notice of Breach of Contract-Invalid Note"; and (9) "Notice of Breach of Contract-Invalid Note".

In his amended complaint, plaintiff sought an order compelling defendants to record the aforementioned documents. He also asserted a variety of claims, including claims of negligence under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3; civil conspiracy, official misconduct, common law fraud, tortious interference with contractual relations, and claims of alleged deprivation of constitutional and civil rights under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983.

In June 2014, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff opposed the motion. The motion judge heard oral argument on August 1, 2014, and placed an oral decision on the record.

The judge determined that defendants' motion should be granted. The judge noted that all of plaintiff's claims pertained to the allegation that defendants had improperly failed to accept the nine documents at issue for recording. The judge reviewed the documents and found that they are not documents that may be recorded pursuant to N.J.S.A. 46:26A-2. The judge entered an order dated August 19, 2014, dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

On September 17, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the August 19, 2014 order. On October 1, 2014, the judge heard oral argument on the motion and placed a decision on the record. The judge concluded that there was no basis for reconsideration of his prior order. The judge entered an order dated October 14, 2014, which denied plaintiff's motion.

Plaintiff then filed a motion seeking the judge's recusal. On October 24, 2014, the judge heard oral argument on the motion and stated that the motion must be denied because there was no longer any pending case. The judge also told plaintiff that he had previously ruled on the issues pertaining to the recording of the documents, and if plaintiff disagreed with that ruling, he could seek relief in the Appellate Division.

Sometime later, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a waiver of transcript fees for appeal. On January 23, 2015, the judge heard oral argument on the motion. The judge reviewed plaintiff's income and expenses. The judge found that plaintiff was not indigent and under the circumstances, he could not require the taxpayers to pay the transcript costs for his appeal. The judge entered an order dated January 26, 2015, denying plaintiff's motion.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order dismissing the complaint, compel defendants to record certain documents, and vacate the order denying the waiver of transcript fees. The judge heard oral argument on March 6, 2015, and placed his decision on the record. The judge stated that there was no basis for reconsideration of his earlier decisions. The judge entered an order dated March 9, 2015, denying the motions. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on April 9, 2015.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that: (1) the trial court erred in its application of N.J.S.A. 46:26A-2; (2) defendants violated their ministerial duties to record the documents submitted for recording, while allowing other documents relating to certain mortgages to be filed; (3) the trial court's decision of August 1, 2014, was produced by means of a fraud on the court; (4) defendants' actions constituted misconduct that deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law; (5) the trial court's order is void because county clerks are not authorized to determine the legal authenticity of documents submitted for recording; (6) the trial court erred by determining that plaintiff's documents do not affect an interest in real property; (7) the court erred by refusing to address defendants' conduct in refusing to record a "deed," a "certified copy of deed[,]" and a "lien" submitted for recording; (8) defendants' actions demonstrated unfair partiality, which was an abuse of discretion and denied him his right to equal protection under the law; (9) the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring plaintiff's "slander of title" claim; and (10) the judge abused his discretion and denied plaintiff his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law by refusing to recuse himself.

We are convinced from our review of the record that plaintiff's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). However, we add the following brief comments.

Here, defendants sought dismissal of plaintiff's complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), for failure to set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering the motion, the court must determine "whether a cause of action is 'suggested' by the facts." Printing Mart Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)).

The court must examine the "legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint." Ibid. (citing Rieder v. Dept. of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987)). The court "searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary." Ibid. (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).

As noted, plaintiff claimed that defendants improperly failed to accept nine documents for recording in the Office of the County Clerk. The motion judge noted that the recording of documents is governed by N.J.S.A. 46:26A-2, which provides that certain documents affecting real property may be recorded. Here, plaintiff claimed that his documents are recordable under N.J.S.A. 46:26A-2(a). The statute permits the recording of certain specified documents, including documents "that affect[s] title to any interest in real property in any way or contains any agreement in relation to real property, or grants any right or interest in real property or grants any lien on real property[.]" N.J.S.A. 46:26A-2(a), (p).

In his oral decision of August 1, 2014, the motion judge noted that mortgages apparently have been recorded against plaintiff's property, and the documents at issue set forth plaintiff's position that the mortgages are invalid and should not affect the title to his property. The judge noted that the documents merely reflect plaintiff's statement that the particular filing or action by another person is improper. The judge correctly found that such documents do not affect title or an interest in real property, and they are not documents that may be recorded pursuant to N.J.S.A. 46:26A-2(a), (p).

We are therefore convinced that the motion judge correctly determined that defendants did not have a duty under N.J.S.A. 46:2A-2 to accept and record the documents that plaintiff had presented for recording. Since plaintiff's claims were all based on this fundamental misunderstanding of the law, the motion judge correctly determined that the complaint failed to set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Affirmed.