STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DANIEL MEJIA-VINCENTE

Annotate this Case

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DANIEL MEJIA-VINCENTE, a/k/a

MEJIA-VINCENTE DANIEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

November 19, 2015

 

Before Judges Alvarez and Haas.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 11-03-00469.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Alicia J. Hubbard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Brian D. Gillet, Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief; David M. Liston, Special Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his residence and his motion to exclude an out-of-court identification, defendant Daniel Mejia-Vincente pled guilty to one count of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.1 In accordance with the negotiated plea, the judge sentenced defendant to a ten-year prison term, subject to the 85% parole ineligibility provisions of the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and imposed appropriate fines and penalties. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions

POINT I

THERE WAS NO CONSENT TO SEARCH THE BUILDING OR [DEFENDANT'S] SEPARATE LIVING QUARTERS AND, THEREFORE, THE FRUITS OF THE UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE MUST BE SUPPRESSED (U.S. CONST., AMENDS. IV AND XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ARTICLE I, PAR. 7).

A. THE STATE FAILED TO SHOW THERE WAS

CONSENT TO ENTER THE BUILDING.

B. THE POLICE FAILED TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS CONSENT TO ENTER [DEFENDANT'S] PRIVATE LIVING AREA.

POINT II

BECAUSE THE POLICE EXECUTED AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT PROPER CONSENT, THE FRUITS OF THAT SEARCH MUST BE SUPPRESSED (Not Raised Below).

POINT III

THE IDENTIFICATION WAS UNRELIABLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV).

Based upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the search of defendant's residence was unconstitutional and, therefore, we reverse his conviction and sentence.

I.

The State developed the following proofs at the suppression hearing. The victim, Carlos Salazar, worked as a taxi driver. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on October 30, 2010, Salazar picked up two men at a bar in New Brunswick. Salazar described the men as "two Hispanic males wearing dark-colored clothing with ski caps." One of the men sat in the front passenger seat and the other, who Salazar later identified as defendant, sat in the back seat behind Salazar. The men asked to be driven to the Metropark Train Station in Edison.

Along the way, the man in the front seat asked Salazar to drop him off at a residence near the border of Edison and Woodbridge so that the man could borrow money from his sister for the $35 fare. Salazar agreed to do so. After the man got out of the taxi, defendant remained in the back seat. During the next ten minutes, Salazar had the opportunity to observe defendant's "eyes, his face and his hat" in the rearview mirror.

When the other man returned to the taxi, he told Salazar that his sister had no money and that he only had $18. Salazar insisted on being paid the full amount of the fare. Salazar testified that defendant then grabbed him "around [his] neck[,]" put a knife to his neck, and began threatening him. "Salazar tried to defend himself by pushing the knife away and received a laceration on his right hand and right side of his face." During the attack, the other man took Salazar's wallet and Samsung cell phone from the dashboard of the taxi. The two men then ran away "up the hill."

Salazar went to a nearby gas station and called the Woodbridge Police Department. The dispatcher told Salazar that the incident had occurred in Edison and, therefore, officers from the Edison Police Department would be dispatched to the scene. Officer Andrew Roy was the first officer to respond and met Salazar at the gas station.

Because the men had stolen Salazar's cell phone, Roy testified that the police contacted the cell phone provider, AT&T, "to get a ping which is, basically, a GPS location on the phone . . . ." At 5:09 a.m., AT&T reported that the phone was "in the area of Oak Tree Road and Plymouth Avenue in Woodbridge." However, AT&T did not identify a specific residence where the phone was located.

Roy testified that a K-9 unit from the Union County Sheriff's Office arrived at the scene. After the dog "went inside the cab to get a scent[,]" it "took off" toward North Wood Avenue. Roy followed the K-9 unit on foot. The dog went through an apartment complex until it got to Oak Tree Road in Woodbridge. About fifteen minutes after it began its search, the dog walked up the front steps of a residence. The lights in the home were on.

Roy testified that, by this time, other Edison police officers had arrived at the Oak Tree Road location and they took up positions in the front and back of the house. The officer also stated that the Woodbridge Police Department "was notified . . . [j]ust to let them know that [the Edison police were] in their town in the event that something . . . occur[ed]."

Roy, Sergeant Andrew Chupela, and another officer knocked on the front door of the house. About five seconds later, two Hispanic males answered the door. Roy told the men that the police were "investigating a crime" and asked, "'[i]s there anybody else inside of the residence?'" One of the men, who Roy described as an adult male "in his mid-thirties[,]" replied, "'[y]eah[,]'" and stated that there were people "[u]pstairs, downstairs" in the house. Roy testified that the man said, "'[c]ome in[,]'" and "[i]nvited [him] to come in" the house. Once inside, the officer saw "over a dozen people, people sleeping on the floor in the living room as soon as [he] walked in. People coming out of the rooms, because [he] guess[ed] they heard us inside the house." The officer stated that some of the individuals were "intoxicated" and that the scene was "kind of chaotic."

Roy testified that he did not ask the man for his consent to search the residence. After Roy went inside, other officers and the dog followed him into the house. Roy "told" the man, "'[c]an you show me some of the rooms inside the residence,'" and the man then "led [him] into different rooms inside the residence." Roy testified that his "purpose in having [the man] lead [him] through areas of the house" was "[t]o locate suspects, evidence, and also for our safety, to gather everyone inside the residence and try to contain them in one location . . . ." The officers had the individuals who were on the first floor of the home go to the living room and "line up against the wall" so that pat-down searches could be conducted.

After the officers secured the first floor of the home, the man took Roy to the basement of the home. The officer did not recall whether there was a door at the top of the stairs leading down to the basement.2 In the basement, the officer saw a man, later identified as defendant, asleep in a bed. Defendant was wearing a ski cap and there was a Samsung cell phone "right next to him." At 5:48 a.m., Roy called the number Salazar had given him for his phone, and "the phone which was laying right next to [defendant] began to ring."

Roy woke defendant up and patted him down for weapons. Defendant was not armed. The officer then asked defendant for identification and defendant gave him a wallet. The wallet contained "Salazar's driver's license along with various items like a Visa card and some cash . . . [that was] consistent with what the victim had reported stolen[.]"

Roy and Sergeant Chupela decided to bring Salazar to the home to attempt to identify defendant. Chupela went back to the gas station where Salazar was waiting with other officers. The sergeant told Salazar that he was going "to look at some individuals who possibly might be involved in the robbery." The sergeant did not tell Salazar that his phone and personal items had been found in the home.

Chupela had Salazar sit in the back of a patrol car and parked it in front of the house, about twenty feet away from the front door. A spotlight was used to illuminate the area near the door. Roy brought out three men one by one. All of the men were Hispanic, had medium builds, and were similarly dressed. None of the men were handcuffed.

Roy brought out the first man and Salazar "stated no, that wasn't the person." Roy then brought out a second man and Salazar said the individual was not one of the men who robbed him.

Roy then brought defendant out of the house. Salazar "stated yes, that . . . was the person who was involved in the robbery" and that he was "80[%] sure" that defendant was the man who put the knife to his neck. Defendant was not wearing his ski cap at the time Salazar identified him, but Salazar saw that defendant had a ski cap in his pocket and asked Roy to have defendant put it on. Defendant complied and Salazar testified that, "[a]s soon as [defendant] put on the hat, I was [100%] sure that that was him." The police then arrested defendant.

Defendant testified that he lived "by [him]self" in the basement of the home and paid $300 a month in rent. Other individuals had previously lived in the basement with him, "but they left" about a month before. A closed door separated the basement from the rest of the house. Defendant also testified there was a bathroom in the basement and that, "from time-to-time . . . [e]verybody upstairs used it."

The police never located the second suspect. The knife used in the attack was found in Salazar's cab during the period of time the officers were in the residence.

After hearing oral argument, the trial judge denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence the police seized from him and to exclude Salazar's identification of defendant outside the house. In an oral opinion, the judge explained that the police entered the house with the consent of the man who opened the door and invited them to come inside.

Once they were in the home, the judge found that the officers did not search for evidence. He found they conducted a "lawful protective sweep of the residence" based upon their "reasonable and articulable suspicion that the area to be swept harbored the suspect they were seeking to apprehend." Additionally, the judge noted that "the officers that had entered the residence were clearly outnumbered by the occupants in the residence. So, a protective sweep was not only lawful and proper, but appropriate under the circumstances."

The judge stated that, once the man who invited Roy into the house took him to the basement, the officer saw defendant's ski cap and Salazar's cell phone in plain view. The judge found that Roy "did not engage in any type of search of [the] room, rather his discovery of these items [was] inadvertent and occurred during the course of his protective sweep." Therefore, the judge found that Roy's seizure of the cell phone and ski cap "was lawful." In addition, defendant turned over a wallet containing Salazar's personal items in response to Roy's request for defendant's identification after the officer felt it during his pat-down. Thus, the judge found that the seizure of the items in the wallet was also permissible.

The judge also denied defendant's motion to exclude Salazar's identification of him during the show-up outside the house. The judge explained that Roy brought each individual out separately and that the area was properly illuminated. In addition to driving defendant from New Brunswick to Edison, Salazar had been sitting in the taxi with defendant for ten minutes and he had ample opportunity to observe defendant and his features. Therefore, the judge concluded that "the circumstances here did not create such a compulsive environment for the victim to identify someone as reflected in the fact that Salazar denied that the first two people shown to him were involved in the crime."

II.

We first consider whether the officers' entry into the residence violated defendant's constitutional rights. Our review of a trial judge's decision on a motion to suppress is limited. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). "Appellate courts reviewing a grant or denial of a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014) (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). "Deference to these factual findings is required because those findings 'are substantially influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Id. at 424-25 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). "A trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 162).

"A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014) (citing State v. K.W., 214 N.J. 499, 507 (2013)). "Therefore, a trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Ibid. (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)).

A warrantless search of a residence is "presumptively invalid." Id. at 315 (citing State v. Brown, 216 N.J. 508, 527 (2014)). However, where valid consent is given, a search may be conducted without a warrant and without probable cause. State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 303-05 (2006). For consent to be valid, it must be voluntary, "'an essential element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse consent.'" Id. at 307. (quoting State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975)). Thus, "[t]o determine whether a person voluntarily consented to a search, the focus of the analysis is 'whether a person has knowingly waived [his or her] right to refuse to consent to the search.'" Lamb, supra, 218 N.J. at 315 (alteration in original) (quoting Domicz, supra, 188 N.J. at 308). "The State has the burden of proving consent was given freely and voluntarily." Ibid. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 875 (1973)).

Valid consent to search may be obtained from someone other than the suspect. Ibid.; State v. Suazo, 133 N.J. 315, 320 (1993) (citing State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 215 (1990)). Consent to search may be obtained from a third party who possesses a common authority over the property to be searched, "or from a third party whom the police reasonably believe has authority to consent . . . ." State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 305 (1993). Whether a third party possesses the authority over property to consent depends on the "appearances of control" at the time of the search. State v. Farmer, 366 N.J. Super. 307, 313 (App. Div.) (holding it was reasonable for the officers to believe that the female who answered the door and advised the officers that her mother and children were present in the apartment was a resident with authority to consent to a search), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 456 (2004); see also State v. Miller, 159 N.J. Super. 552, 558-59 (App. Div.) (third-party consent was valid where the third party told the police she resided in the room in question and possessed keys to the room), certif. denied, 78 N.J. 329 (1978).

"In assessing an officer's reliance on a third party's consent, [courts] consider whether the officer's belief that the third party had the authority to consent was objectively reasonable in view of the facts and circumstances known at the time of the search." Suazo, supra, 133 N.J. at 320 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2801, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 161 (1990)). "[I]f a law-enforcement officer at the time of the search erroneously, but reasonably, believed that a third party possessed common authority over the property to be searched, a warrantless search based on that third party's consent is permissible under the Fourth Amendment." Ibid. (citing Rodriguez, supra, 497 U.S. at 186, 110 S. Ct. at 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 160).

In summary, the consent exception to the warrant requirement requires that the State prove: (1) the consent was voluntary, and (2) the person who granted the consent had the authority to do so. Applying these principles here, we are constrained to hold that the State did not meet its burden of proof and, therefore, the judge's fact-finding on this issue does not command our deference.

Here, Roy knocked on the door of the residence and two men answered it. He did not ask either of the men if he and the other officers could enter the home to look for suspects or evidence. Moreover, Roy did not advise the men that they had the right to refuse to consent to the entry and search. Instead, the officer told them they were "investigating a crime" and asked, "'Is there anybody else inside of the residence?'" The officer stated that one of the men responded that there were other people inside the home and said, "'[c]ome in.'"

Roy never asked the man for identification. There is also nothing in the record suggesting that the officer ever asked the man if he was a resident of the home or simply a guest. The officer just assumed that because of the lateness of the hour, the man must be a resident who had the authority to permit the officers to enter the home.

Under the circumstances presented in this case, this assumption was unreasonable and, therefore, that State failed to demonstrate that the man had common authority over the residence such that he could permit the police to enter the home. Unlike the situations involved in Farmer and Miller where the individuals who granted entry to the officers told the police they also resided in the residence, Officer Roy did not ask the man for any information concerning his connection to the home. Because the officer could have easily obtained information concerning the man's status, but inexplicably failed to do so, we conclude it was not objectively reasonable for the officer to presume the man had the authority to allow the police to enter the residence.

Even if we could agree with the State's position that the man who answered the door had the apparent authority to permit the police to enter the residence, the evidence seized during the search of defendant's room in the basement would still have to be suppressed because the police never asked the man for his consent to search the house. They also never advised him that he had the right to refuse to consent to such a search.

The judge concluded that the officers did not need to obtain the consent of anyone to conduct a search of the residence because "there was no testimony elicited during the hearing that suggested the officers were engaged in a search. Hence[,] the officers were not obligated to inform the people answering the door of their right to refuse a consent to search." However, the record does not support this finding. Roy specifically stated that his purpose in entering the home was "[t]o locate suspects, evidence, and also for our safety, to gather everyone inside the residence and try to contain them in one location, which we did." Because the police intended to "search" for "suspects" and "evidence," they were required to ask the man for his consent to the search and to advise him that he had the right to refuse. Because they did not, the evidence seized during the search that followed must be suppressed.

In addition, even if the man had the apparent authority to let the police enter the home, there is absolutely nothing in the record to support a finding that the man "possesse[d] common authority" over defendant's room in the basement sufficient to enable him to give his consent for Roy to enter the room or search it. Lamb, supra, 218 N.J. at 315. Defendant lived by himself in the basement, which was separated from the rest of the home by a door. Although Roy did not recall whether there was a door, defendant testified that the door was closed when the police entered the room. Roy did not knock on the door before entering, and he clearly did not ask defendant for permission to enter his room before doing so. Thus, Roy's entry into defendant's room was improper and, therefore, he was not "lawfully in the viewing area" when he observed the victim's cell phone. State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010). Therefore, contrary to the trial judge's finding, the plain view exception to the warrant requirement does not justify the officer's seizure of the phone or the items subsequently found in defendant's wallet following the pat down search.

In its appellate brief, the State argues that "[e]ven in the absence of consent, [the] police would have been justified in entering the home due to the exigent circumstances present at the time." We disagree. By the time the officers approached the residence, two hours had elapsed since the time of the robbery. The police had the home surrounded. As Roy conceded during cross-examination, the police could have sought a warrant prior to entering the home. Thus, there was plainly no emergency which permitted the officers to enter the residence without a warrant.

The trial judge found that Roy's entry into defendant's room was justified as a "protective sweep of a dwelling."3 Again, we disagree. In State v. Davila, the Supreme Court held

A protective sweep may only occur when (1) police officers are lawfully within private premises for a legitimate purpose, which may include consent to enter; and (2) the officers on the scene have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger. Where those substantive conditions are met, as a matter of procedure, the sweep will be upheld only if (1) it is conducted quickly; and (2) it is restricted to places or areas where the person posing a danger could hide.

[ 203 N.J. 97, 102 (2010).]

The Court also observed

Importantly, when an arrest is not the basis for officer entry, the legitimacy of the police presence must be carefully examined as well as the asserted reasons for the protective sweep. Enhanced precautions are necessary to stem the possibility that a protective sweep is nothing more than an unconstitutional warrantless search. The police cannot create the danger that becomes the basis for a protective sweep, but rather must be able to point to dangerous circumstances that developed once the officers were at the scene. Where police are present in a home in a non-arrest context, there is too great a potential for the pretextual use of a protective sweep to turn an important tool for officer safety into an opportunity for an impermissible law enforcement raid.

[Id. at 103.]

As discussed above, the police failed to secure the consent of either the man who opened the door to enter the home or of defendant to conduct a search of his room. Thus, the officers were not "lawfully within [the] private premises" at the time the "protective sweep" began. Id. at 102. Moreover, Officer Roy stated that the officers were looking for "suspects" and "evidence." Thus, it appears that the primary motivation for the "sweep" was to conduct a search rather than to protect the officers. While the duration of the search is not readily apparent from the record, it cannot reasonably be described as "cursory" in nature. Id. at 113. Therefore, the search of defendant's room cannot be justified under the protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement.

In sum, we conclude that the officer's entry into defendant's room was unlawful and, therefore, the evidence seized during the search that followed must be suppressed. Similarly, Salazar's identification of defendant must also be suppressed as the fruit of the unlawful search. State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 286-87 (1990) (taped confession inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine because it arose from an oral confession tainted by constitutional violations).4 Therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction and sentence.

Reversed.

1 Defendant also pled guilty to one count of fourth-degree participation in a riot, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-1, arising out of an unrelated incident that occurred on September 17, 2012. On that offense, the judge sentenced defendant to an eighteen-month term, concurrent to his sentence on the robbery charge. Although defendant mentions this charge in his notice of appeal, he makes no argument concerning it in his appellate brief and only asks that his robbery conviction be reversed. Therefore, we do not further address defendant's participation in a riot conviction in this opinion. See Grubb v. Borough of Hightstown, 353 N.J. Super. 333, 342 n.1 (App. Div. 2002).

2 However, as discussed below, defendant testified there was a door at the top of the stairs and that it was closed at the time Roy went into the basement.

3 Significantly, the State does not raise this argument in its appellate brief.

4 Defendant's argument that the police improperly "went outside of their jurisdiction" to conduct the search is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).


Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.