ROSE CASANOVA v. BOARD OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

ROSE CASANOVA,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and

ACCU STAFFING SERVICES,

Respondents.

_____________________________

December 10, 2015

Submitted December 2, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Haas.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 00027901.

Rose Casanova, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H.Raksa, AssistantAttorney General, of counsel; Alan C. Stephens,Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Respondent ACCU Staffing Services has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Appellant Rose Casanova appeals from the October 1, 2014 final decision of the Board of Review (Board), requiring her to refund $2552 in unemployment benefits. We affirm.

Respondent ACCU Staffing Services employed appellant as a customer service representative from February 6, 2013 through September 13, 2013. In September 2013, appellant "became [too] ill to work" and began receiving disability benefits. On February 14, 2014, appellant was cleared to return to work, but did not do so.

On April 20, 2014, appellant applied for unemployment benefits and, pending consideration of her employer's appeal, received $2552 in benefits through July 5, 2014. In a decision mailed on July 16, 2014, the Appeal Tribunal found appellant disqualified for benefits on the ground that she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. The Appeal Tribunal also remanded the matter to the Director of the Division of Unemployment Insurance for a determination of appellant's liability for a refund of the $2552 in benefits to which she was not entitled. The Appeal Tribunal advised appellant that its decision would become final unless appellant filed a timely appeal to the Board.

As appellant acknowledged at the August 27, 2014 Appeal Tribunal hearing, she did not appeal the Appeal Tribunal's decision finding her disqualified for benefits and, therefore, that decision became final.1 On July 21, 2014, the Director determined that appellant was required to refund the $2552 in benefits previously paid to her. Appellant appealed the Director's determination to the Appeal Tribunal. Following an August 27, 2014 hearing, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Director's decision and ordered appellant to refund the benefits. Appellant appealed to the Board, which affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision on October 1, 2014. This appeal followed.

On appeal, appellant contends that the Board erred in requiring her to refund the benefits. We disagree.

The scope of our review of an appeal from a final determination of the Board is strictly limited. The Board's decision may not be disturbed unless it is shown to be "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We can only intervene "in those rare circumstances in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other State policy." Ibid. (quoting George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994)).

N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)(1) requires a claimant to repay benefits that he or she was not eligible to receive, whether those payments were made as a result of the recipient's misrepresentation or "for any other reason." Full repayment of benefits is required from anyone "who, for any reason, regardless of good faith, was not actually entitled to those benefits." Bannan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App. Div. 1997). Indeed, the recovery of monies improvidently paid to those found ineligible to receive benefits "furthers the purpose of the unemployment compensation laws" and "preserve[s] the Unemployment Trust Fund for the payment of benefits to those individuals entitled to receive them." Ibid.

Appellant argues that the Division of Unemployment Insurance should be estopped from seeking a refund. This argument lacks merit. As we observed in Bannan

The public interest clearly is not served when the Unemployment Trust Fund is depleted by the failure to recoup benefits erroneously paid to an unentitled recipient, however blameless he or she may have been.

It is in situations involving just such competing interests between the individual and society in general that the reluctance to apply estoppel against government agencies is most warranted. That the individual suffers a hardship is unfortunate, but it is necessary to preserve the ongoing integrity of the unemployment compensation system.

[Id. at 674-75.]

Because appellant was not eligible for benefits, we discern no basis to disturb the Board's determination requiring appellant to refund them.

Affirmed.

1 Appellant's notice of appeal also does not reference the Appeal Tribunal's July 16, 2014 decision. In her appellate brief, however, appellant has raised arguments concerning that decision. "It is a fundamental [principle] of appellate practice that we only have jurisdiction to review orders that have been appealed to us." State v. Rambo, 401 N.J. Super. 506, 520 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 197 N.J. 258 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1225, 129 S. Ct. 2165, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1162 (2009). Therefore, we will limit our review to the October 1, 2014 order listed in the notice of appeal. See 1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 456, 459 (App. Div. 2004) ("[O]nly the judgment or orders designated in the notice of appeal . . . are subject to the appeal process and review . . . .") (citation omitted).