STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. VERNON W. EVANS, II

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

VERNON W. EVANS, II, a/k/a

CHARLES KING, a/k/a JOHN SCOTT

THAYER, a/k/a BRYAN SWEATT,

a/k/a VERNON WALTER EVANS,

a/k/a VERNON WALTER EVANS JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

July 31, 2014

 

Submitted December 3, 2013 Decided

 

Before Judges Alvarez and Ostrer.

 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 11-04-0323.

 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michael Confusione, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

 

Fredric M. Knapp, Acting Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paula Jordao, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Vernon Evans appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, of second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), and from his sentence to a ten-year term of incarceration, with a five-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant argues that as a result of the State's failure to disclose allegedly exculpatory 911 tapes, he was entitled to a new trial, or at least a negative inference charge. Among other points, he also argues that the admission of a pre-arrest statement violated his Miranda1 rights; and the court erred in allowing use of allegedly remote convictions as impeachment under N.J.R.E. 609. Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, we affirm.

I.

We will first review the evidence pertaining to the offense; and then consider the evidence regarding the failure to disclose 911 tapes.

A.

The State presented its case through the testimony of three law enforcement officers; two motorists; and a resident whom defendant visited immediately after the incident.

On September 28, 2010, at around 1:30 p.m., New Jersey State Trooper Michael Gould was patrolling Route 80 in Mount Olive Township. From a fixed position, Gould observed a green Jeep Cherokee traveling westbound at a speed of 80 m.p.h., according to his laser speed detector. It was raining lightly. Gould activated his emergency lights and sirens, and pursued the vehicle to effectuate a motor vehicle stop. The driver increased speed. According to Gould, the driver was "going in [a]nd out of traffic, not using his directional, [and] driving very unsafely." The driver also passed traffic by traveling in the shoulder. Both vehicles' speeds exceeded 100 m.p.h. Gould said he reached 116 m.p.h.

Although the Jeep had tinted windows, Gould could see the silhouette of the driver, who appeared to be alone. On cross-examination, Gould asserted that the lone driver could be seen on the mobile video recording (MVR).2 He told dispatch that the driver appeared to be a twenty-year-old male, although Gould conceded that defendant appeared older in court.3 Gould also reported the vehicle's New Hampshire tag numbers to dispatch. The prosecution established the vehicle was registered to defendant.

After roughly five miles of pursuit, Gould lost control of his vehicle on the slick road and crashed into the guardrail near mile-marker twenty-one, disabling his vehicle and briefly knocking him unconscious. Gould suffered a concussion, and experienced blurred vision and light-headedness for about two weeks.

Mr. Wilcox,4 a truck driver, observed the pursuit from a truck pull-off east of mile-marker 20.9, where he was inspecting his vehicle. Wilcox identified himself and his truck on the MVR. He saw only one person in the Jeep as it passed. Curious, he drove west and, about a half-mile down the road, he came upon Gould's crashed vehicle. After determining that Gould did not need his assistance, Wilcox continued westbound, until he saw the crashed Jeep near the ramp for Exit 19, which was then unoccupied.

Another eyewitness, Mr. Rankin, observed the chase, confirmed that Gould was operating his sirens and lights, and saw Gould crash into the guardrail. Rankin was unable to see how many people were in the Jeep, which he saw crashed off an exit down the road. Rankin called 911, but the recording of the call was not produced before trial.

State Police Sergeant Richard J. Wambold assisted Gould, and observed the crashed Jeep. The Jeep's passenger-side door was jammed shut, the passenger-side and center consoles were heavily damaged, but the driver's side was not. He agreed the passenger seat was in a reclining position, but he stated that the crash may have thrown the seat back.

Around 1:45 p.m., defendant approached Ms. Ross's home on a residential street in Allamuchy Township, located off Exit 19 and a short distance from the highway. He knocked on Ross's door. She testified that defendant said, "['][L]et me in. I want to wash off. I want to use your bathroom.['] And he said [']I smashed my car on Route 80, [a]nd I just want to come in [a]nd wash off.[']"

Defendant was "scratched, bloody, [and] had no shirt on." He appeared to be about five-foot-six-inches tall. Ross locked her door and refused to let the stranger in. Defendant assured her he would not hurt her. They spoke through the door and a slightly open window. Ross called 911.

She testified that when they heard the police sirens, defendant "seemed like he wanted to run," but then "he just turned around [a]nd he put his hands up, [a]nd he said [']I'm done, call the police.[']" Ross was already on the line with 911.

Defendant then sat down on Ross's front steps. At the behest of the 911 operator, Ross elicited a description of his vehicle. Defendant also repeated, "[']I smashed my car on Route 80.[']" Defendant said nothing to indicate there had been another person in the Jeep. The police arrived at Ross's residence and defendant stood up and said, "I'm right here."

On cross-examination, Ross admitted that she did not include certain details of her interaction with defendant in a handwritten statement she prepared immediately after the incident, before her child returned from school. After the defense moved it into evidence, the State asked that she read it.

This afternoon approximately 1:45 p.m. bleeding man without a shirt loud [sic] knock [on] my door [a]nd wanted to use bathroom to wash off. I didn't let him in [a]nd asked what happened. He said he smashed his car on Route 80 [a]nd ran away because police is [sic] on the way. I asked what happened [a]nd he said to call police, which I did right away.5

 

State Police Trooper Louis Crisafulli arrested defendant at Ross's home. The court conducted a brief N.J.R.E. 104 hearing in response to defense counsel's Miranda objection to defendant's statement to Crisafulli. The trooper testified that he said nothing to defendant and his firearm was holstered as he approached. Defendant placed his hands in the air and stated "[I]t's me, I'm done running." The court held that defendant was not yet in custody and, in any event, the statement was spontaneous and not made in the course of interrogation. Crisafulli essentially repeated his testimony before the jury.

Crisafulli also testified that defendant, when arrested, was bleeding in his right forearm, and had blood on the right side of his pants. Through Crisafulli, the State also introduced into evidence, without objection, defendant's New Hampshire driver's abstract, and a photograph of defendant from the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles. The documents listed his height as five-foot-six-inches. However, the court sustained an objection to cross-examination intended to elicit that defendant had no prior driving infractions.

Defendant did not testify in his own defense. At a pre-trial Sands hearing, the court considered defendant's prior criminal record. In February 1982, defendant was convicted in New Hampshire of a felony murder committed in September 1980, and a subsequent escape. He was a juvenile when he committed the crimes, but was tried as an adult. He was sentenced to eighteen years to life imprisonment. After his release on parole for life, he violated parole in February 1987 by leaving New Hampshire. In 1988, defendant was arrested and charged with felony robbery and burglary, and misdemeanor unlawful imprisonment in New York, but he initially avoided prosecution by fleeing the state. He was arrested in California in August 1989.6 He was extradited to New York, where he was convicted in 1991 of the pending charges, and sentenced to eight to sixteen years. However, he served his sentence while in custody in New Hampshire on his parole violation. He was released on parole again on September 30, 2002, and discharged from New York parole on June 6, 2007. However, he remained on New Hampshire parole.

The court rejected defendant's remoteness objection, based on the continual nature of defendant's record of offenses. The judge noted that there was only an eight-year period during which defendant was conviction-free. The court held that the jury could be advised that defendant was convicted of an indictable offense in New Hampshire, sentenced to a period of incarceration, and released on parole; and similarly, was convicted of indictable offenses in New York, sentenced to incarceration, and released on parole. The court also held that the State could "indicate that he was on parole at the time" he committed the New York crimes. However, the nature of the offenses, their degree, and the length of incarceration could not be disclosed.

The defense called one witness, Mr. Burns, the division manager of Warren County's 911 communications center. He testified that a phone call for Allamuchy would have been directed to his center. On the other hand, "a cell phone call from . . . around the Allamuchy exit, . . . [e]xit 19" could have been routed to his center, a center in Northampton County in Pennsylvania, the State Police in Totowa, or a center in Sussex County. He testified that his center routinely erased 911 tapes after sixty days, which exceeded the state mandatory retention period of thirty-one days. He identified a CAD report,7 which indicated that the center received Rankin's 911 call.

In the summations, there was no dispute that the Jeep's driver led Gould on a dangerous high-speed chase. The principal disputed issue was whether defendant was the driver. The State highlighted that Gould and Wilcox saw only one occupant; the vehicle was registered to defendant; defendant admitted to Ross that he smashed the Jeep and police were looking for him; and defendant told Crisafulli, "It's me."

The defense focused on: Gould identified the driver as a man in his twenties; the witnesses failed to identify defendant as the driver; and defendant was injured on his right side, and the Jeep was damaged most on the right side. The defense also argued that at five-foot-six-inches, defendant was not tall enough to cast a silhouette in the driver's seat, and would have been unseen while reclining in the passenger seat.

B.

Shortly after he was assigned to represent defendant, trial counsel requested copies of Rankin's and Ross's 911 tapes in State possession. However, trial counsel was at least the third attorney assigned to defendant.8 The State responded that the tapes were destroyed, explaining the request was made long after the custodians were required to retain them. The court denied defendant's pre-trial request for a negative inference charge regarding the destruction of the 911 recordings. The court found that the defense had failed to show that the information was timely requested, or the State acted with the intent to destroy evidence; rather the destruction of the tapes was in the normal course of business, pursuant to the retention policies in effect at the time.

After resting, the defense renewed its request for an adverse inference charge. Counsel relied on an email he recently obtained, dated November 16, 2010, which defendant's first trial counsel allegedly sent to the assistant prosecutor not the trial prosecutor who was assigned to the case pre-indictment. The email generally sought 911 tapes.9 The court heard testimony from the defense attorney, who asserted he sent the email, and the assistant prosecutor, who denied receiving it. Testimony focused on the historic failings of the email system of the Office of the Public Defender (OPD). The judge found both attorneys credible, and concluded that the email was sent, but not received. As there was no proof that the State destroyed the 911 recordings in the face of a timely request to preserve them, the court again denied the defense request for an adverse inference charge.

After the verdict, defendant moved for a new trial based on the State's disclosure of recordings of Rankin's 911 call, and the 911 call of a previously undisclosed witness, Mr. Speer.10 The State Police transmitted the recordings on January 17, 2012 while the trial was ongoing however, the trial prosecutor asserted she did not receive them until February 2, 2012, less than two weeks after the verdict. The State provided uncertified transcripts, prepared by prosecutor's office staff, of the two recordings. Defense counsel initially conceded that neither recording included exculpatory evidence.

The court conducted a hearing on the motion, after briefing, in May 2012. The defense argued that the existence of the two recordings established that the defense made a prompt request to preserve recordings. Otherwise, defendant argued, the two tapes would not have been retained. Defendant asked the court to reconsider its prior ruling and conclude that an adverse inference charge was warranted, as the recording of Ross's 911 call must have been destroyed despite a timely preservation request. Defendant argued that the absence of the adverse inference charge denied him a fair trial.

According to the transcript of Rankin's call, he simply told the operator he was traveling behind the trooper before he crashed, and then he saw the vehicle that the trooper was pursuing "smashed" at the next exit. However, Speer's transcribed statement left some doubt as to whether he observed one or two occupants in defendant's vehicle. According to the transcript, Speer stated:

"[T]here's a uh SUV is just uh rolled over uh after trying to do the exit 19 West bound on Interstate 80. Uh he entered the uh exit and I seen [sic] I saw him swerve a couple times and then he hit the curb and rolled over . . . .

 

. . . .

 

I so anyway [sic] it's uh it[']s back on its wheels now I don't know if the uh occupants is injured or not there's half a dozen cars stopping to look at it . . . .

 

[(Emphasis added).]

 

The judge required the State to produce the recording. Whether Speer had said "occupants" was relevant in light of the defense's argument that the State had not proved that defendant was the driver, as opposed to a passenger. However, after listening to the tape in open court, the judge determined that the transcription was erroneous and the caller clearly stated "occupant." The judge rejected defense counsel's argument that the tape was unclear.11

The court ruled that defendant's due process rights were not violated because the two tapes were not material; defendant could not prove he was prejudiced; and the State did not act in bad faith because it was not on notice to request the recordings until after the end of the retention period. The court rejected as speculative the defense argument that the retention of the two recordings established that a general preservation request was received during the retention period. Although Burns testified his data center preserved 911 calls for sixty days, there was no testimony regarding how long other centers, including the State Police, preserved recordings. Consequently, the Rankin and Speer recordings may have been preserved without a preservation request. Ross's recording may have been erased because her call may have been routed to the Warren County center.12

Applying the three-prong test in State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 310-11 (1981), the court denied defendant's request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Although the State failed to disclose the evidence, satisfying prong one, defendant failed to establish that the evidence was favorable to the defense, prong two. The court also held that there was no Brady violation warranting a new trial, because the tapes were not exculpatory.

C.

The court denied the State's motion to sentence defendant to a discretionary extended term as a persistent offender. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3. However, the court found, clearly and convincingly, that aggravating factors three, six and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), -1(a)(6), and -1(a)(9), substantially outweighed non-existent mitigating factors. The court sentenced defendant to a ten-year term of imprisonment with a five-year period of parole ineligibility.

D.

Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

Point 1 The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for new trial on Brady grounds, for failure to have given a negative inference to the jury per defendant's request, or at least on ground of newly discovered evidence that the State previously represented did not exist.

 

Point 2 The trial court erred in permitting defendant's prior convictions to be admitted against him.

 

Point 3 Discovery violation by the State caused an unfair trial for defendant (partially raised below).

 

Point 4 The trial court erred and violated defendant's Miranda rights by permitting defendant's statement to police before the jury below.

 

Point 5 The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for acquittal.

 

Point 6 Defendant's right to confront the State witnesses against him was infringed at trial.

 

Point 7 Defendant's sentence is improper and excessive.

 

II.

A.

We focus our discussion on defendant's arguments related to the late, and partial disclosure of 911 recordings. Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that (1) the failure to disclose the Speer recording violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); and (2) the Speer recording constitutes newly discovered evidence. To prevail in either argument, defendant must establish that the withheld recording was exculpatory or favorable. That, defendant has failed to do.

"In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material." State v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248, 268-69 (1999) (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706, 713 (1972)). Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial when it is "'(1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted.'" State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 549 (2013) (quoting Carter, supra, 85 N.J. at 314).

Defendant argues that the Speer recording supported the defense theory that defendant was a passenger of a missing driver who eluded police. However, the court found, after an evidentiary hearing, that Speer referred to a single "occupant" of the Jeep not "occupants" as erroneously transcribed. Consequently, rather than supporting the defense theory, the Speer recording supported the State's case that defendant was the Jeep's sole occupant and driver. Simply put, the Speer call was neither exculpatory, nor favorable. Also, defendant makes no effort to explain how the Rankin tape, which simply mirrored Rankin's trial testimony, would have been favorable as substantive evidence or as impeachment.

We have no basis to disturb the court's ruling. We defer to a trial court's fact findings when supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (deferring to trial court interpretation of videotape presented at testimonial hearing). While we need not defer to a trial court's findings based solely on the evaluation of a recording, see State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565-66 (2012), defendant tellingly has failed to provide us with the recording of the Speer 911 call to enable us to meaningfully review the trial court's finding. See R. 2:6-1(a)(1) (requiring an appellant's appendix to include "such . . . parts of the record . . . as are essential to the proper consideration of the issues"). Given the court's essentially unchallenged finding regarding the Speer recording, we need not address the other factors in the Brady and newly-discovered-evidence tests.

Alternatively, defendant renews his argument that the court should have granted his request for an adverse inference charge. We pause to note that we do not condone the State's late production of two 911 recordings after insisting before and during trial that no recordings existed. The State was obliged to disclose the preserved recordings. R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(G). The failure to do so undermines confidence in the discovery process, which depends in no small measure on the diligent and good faith compliance of the parties.

The delivery of an adverse inference charge is grounded in the court's power, under Rule 3:13-3(f), to remedy discovery violations. See State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114, 140 (2013) (granting a new trial where police destroyed notes of critical interview with defendant, and court abused its discretion by declining to deliver adverse inference charge). We review the court's determination for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 132.

We discern no mistaken exercise of discretion here. Before trial, defendant presented no evidence that the recordings were intentionally or even negligently destroyed in the face of a timely preservation request.13 After defendant renewed his request during trial, the trial court reasonably declined to infer from the evidence in the record that Ross's 911 call was erased intentionally or in bad faith. The court's decision was based on its credibility determinations of the two attorneys who initially handled defendant's case, and the evidence of shortcomings in the OPD's email system. After verdict, the court rejected defendant's two-step argument that (1) the newly discovered retention of the Rankin and Speer tapes proved that a timely preservation request was received; and (2) therefore, the Ross tape must have been destroyed intentionally or in bad faith. The defense presented no testimony from the custodians of the Rankin and Speer tapes as to why they happened to be preserved; and what retention policy governed the center that maintained those tapes. In the absence of such evidence, defendant's argument was founded in speculation.

Finally, we are not persuaded that even if an adverse inference charge were required, the failure to do so was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. The charge does not direct a jury to draw an adverse inference from the non-production of evidence. It permits it. The proofs were far from definitive about whether Ross made a cell or landline call; where the call was routed; whether the custodian of the call record actually received a timely retention request; and even if the custodian did, whether the record was destroyed negligently, as opposed to with the intent to shield damaging evidence. It is unlikely that the jury would have concluded with any confidence that a recording of Ross's call would have impeached her version of events particularly her report of defendant's admission that he was the driver which was bolstered by her largely consistent, and virtually contemporaneous writing that the defense introduced into evidence.

In sum, the failure of the State to produce a record of Ross's 911 call, and its late production of the record of Rankin's and Speer's calls, do not entitle defendant to a new trial.

B.

Defendant's remaining points warrant little comment. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

The trial court did not mistakenly exercise its discretion in determining that a sanitized version of defendant's criminal record could be used to impeach him under N.J.R.E. 609. We review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 144 (1978) (stating the decision whether to exclude prior convictions rests within the trial judge's "sound discretion"). A court may appropriately consider "intervening convictions between the past conviction and the crime for which the defendant is being tried." Id. at 145. See also State v. McBride, 213 N.J. Super. 255, 267-68 (App. Div. 1986) (allowing use of 1964 and 1971 convictions at trial for crimes committed in 1982 and 1983, where defendant was convicted of disorderly persons marijuana possession in 1978). The seriousness of the crime is also a factor countering the passage of time. Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 144 (stating that "[s]erious crimes . . . should be considered as having a weightier effect"); State v. Murphy, 412 N.J. Super. 553, 565 (App. Div.) (comparing a prior murder conviction to a prior CDS conviction, and stating, "[o]bviously, the more serious the prior conviction, the greater its probative value"), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 440 (2010). The continual nature of defendant's prior offenses, and the seriousness of the felony murder conviction, coupled with the extended intervening periods of incarceration and parole supervision, as well as periods when defendant was a fugitive, supported the court's decision.14

We also discern no merit to defendant's claim of a Miranda violation. Miranda is implicated only if a defendant is subjected to questioning or its functional equivalent. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 307-08 (1980). As the trial court observed, defendant's statement to the arresting trooper was spontaneous, and not in response to any interrogation, or any statement at all.

Nor was defendant's right of cross-examination unfairly curtailed when the court sustained an objection to a defense question designed to elicit the absence of any prior speeding convictions. "Courts have a broad discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination." State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 444 (1993). First, the trial court's ruling was harmless, as defendant's driver's abstract was admitted into evidence and presumably reflected the absence of speeding convictions. Second, the question would have opened the door to the State establishing that defendant was incarcerated for lengthy periods when he presumably had no opportunity to speed. The court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination.

Finally, we find no error in the court's exercise of its sentencing authority. The judge's findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors were based upon competent and credible evidence in the record, including defendant's record of serious convictions, some committed while on parole, and escapes. The judge correctly applied the sentencing guidelines set forth in the Code of Criminal Justice, and the sentence imposed is neither manifestly excessive nor unduly punitive and does not constitute a mistaken exercise of discretion. State v. Pierce, 188 N.J.155, 169 (2006); State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J.210, 215-16 (1989); State v. Roth, 95 N.J.334, 363-65 (1984).

 

Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

2 The jury viewed this video but it is not included in the record on appeal.

3 According to his presentence report, defendant was born in 1963.

4 The court elected to use only the last names of the witnesses to provide them some privacy on the internet.

5 The document was apparently redacted, although it is not in the record on appeal.

6 He was charged in California with providing false identification to a peace officer, a misdemeanor, and being a fugitive from justice, a felony. But the disposition of those charges was not disclosed.

7 "CAD" stands for computer-aided dispatch. See, e.g., Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 218 (2009).

8 Although the record does not reflect the precise date of trial counsel's request, it appears it was after indictment in April 2011.

9 Although the email was marked in evidence in the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, it was not included in the record on the appeal.

10 We note that the transcript of the 911 call spelled the witness's name as "Steer," but the trial judge determined after hearing the recording that the witness identified himself as "Speer."

11 The recording is not included in the record on appeal.

12 We note that the defense did not present to the court the fruits of any investigation during the three months between receiving the transcripts of the recordings and the hearing. Nor did the defense seek additional discovery regarding the production of the recordings, the reasons for the delay between the apparent transmittal on the eve of trial, and its disclosure after verdict.

13 After trial in this case, the Supreme Court held, prospectively, that police must retain contemporaneous interview notes. State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 607 (2011). Aside from the prospectiveness of the court's holding, we have found no published authority applying W.B. to 911 tapes, which apparently are already retained for a minimum of thirty-one days, enabling a party to request their preservation, and are, in many cases, not directly retained by police agencies. See N.J.S.A. 52:17C-5 (stating that county governing body must appoint a 911 coordinator, who "shall coordinate the 9-1-1 activities within the county"); N.J.A.C. 17:24-1.4 (New Jersey Office of Information Technology has oversight and enforcement powers over 911 centers).

14 We note that the court erred in holding that the State could also elicit that defendant was on parole when he committed the New York crimes. A violation of parole is not generally a crime, and therefore is not admissible under N.J.R.E. 609, and would be inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 608. Cf. State v. Jenkins, 299 N.J. Super. 61, 73-75 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that a probation violation does not constitute a criminal conviction that may be used to impeach under N.J.R.E. 609). However, defendant did not object to this aspect of the court's decision and does not raise it before us.