STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SHRAVAN A. PARIKH

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHRAVAN A. PARIKH,

Defendant-Appellant.

-

May 6, 2014

 

 

Before Judges Lihotz and Hoffman.

 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Municipal Appeal No. 06-12.

 

Peter J. Bronzino, attorney for appellant.

 

Warren W. Faulk, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Shravan A. Parikh appeals from the June 13, 2012 Law Division order, which denied his motion to dismiss and affirmed his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI), contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

3 On November 27, 2011, State Trooper P.M. Ryan observed defendant's vehicle failing to maintain a lane on I-76, by straddling the dashed line and changing lanes from left to right. This observation took place in Gloucester City as defendant's vehicle approached the Walt Whitman Bridge heading into Philadelphia.1 Because the trooper was unable to safely stop defendant's vehicle before the bridge, the actual stop of defendant's vehicle occurred on the Pennsylvania side of the bridge.

Upon stopping defendant's vehicle, Trooper Ryan detected an odor of alcohol and noticed defendant appeared sleepy, with bloodshot and watery eyes. Based on these observations and defendant's erratic driving, Trooper Ryan administered three field sobriety tests, which defendant failed to adequately perform. At this point, Trooper Ryan believed defendant was under the influence of alcohol and placed him under arrest and transported him to the Bellmawr State Police Barracks. There, defendant submitted to an Alcotest breath examination, which produced a reading of 0.13% blood alcohol content. Based on his observations and the results of the Alcotest, Trooper Ryan charged defendant with DWI and failure to maintain his traffic lane, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b).

On February 2, 2012, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him in the Gloucester City Municipal Court. He claimed the State Police lacked jurisdiction to make a motor vehicle stop on the Pennsylvania side of the bridge, thereby rendering defendant's arrest "wrongful" and the charges against him "improper." Following oral argument on March 13, 2012, Judge William Golden denied defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding Trooper Ryan had authority to make the motor vehicle stop because he observed a traffic violation in New Jersey, even though the actual stop of defendant's vehicle did not occur until it reached the Pennsylvania side of the bridge

On April 17, 2012, defendant entered a guilty plea to the DWI charge,2reserving his right to challenge the jurisdiction issue on appeal. Judge Golden then accepted defendant's guilty plea and sentenced him to a seven-month driver's license suspension, twelve hours in the Intoxicated Driver's Resource Center, as well as minimum mandatory fines and costs.

Thereafter, defendant filed a timely de novo appeal of his conviction and sentence to the Law Division, challenging the municipal court's denial of his motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. On June 13, 2012, Judge Michael Kassel heard oral argument on the appeal and then issued an oral decision rejecting defendant's arguments, finding defendant guilty, and imposing the same sentence as the municipal court. This appeal followed.

I.

Municipal DWI convictions are first appealed to the Law Division. R.7:13-1; R.3:23-1; State v. Golin, 363 N.J. Super. 474, 481 (App. Div. 2003). The standard of review of such appeal is de novo, Rule3:23-8, and the Law Division decides the case anew, deferring only to the credibility findings of the municipal court. SeeState v. Locurto, 157 N.J.463, 472-74 (1999). On appeal to this court, we review whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to uphold the findings of the Law Division, not the municipal court. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J.146, 162 (1964). On issues of law, our review is de novo. SeeState v. Brown, 118 N.J.595, 604 (1990).

"A municipal court may hear a case involving a violation of the motor vehicle or traffic laws 'within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.'" State v. Sylvia, 424 N.J. Super. 151, 156 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17(b)). Defendant does not challenge the credibility of Trooper Ryan, and accepts the facts set forth in his report, including his observation of defendant improperly changing lanes on I-76 in Gloucester City, and the results of the Alcotest. Rather, defendant's entire defense rests upon the fact that the motor vehicle stop and defendant's subsequent arrest all occurred on the Pennsylvania side of the Walt Whitman Bridge. As framed by Judge Kassel, this case presents "[t]he narrow issue . . . whether or not the State Police exceeded [its] authority by making the stop on the bridge as opposed to having the DRPA [police] make the stop."

As we noted in West v. Walker, 160 N.J. Super. 19, 20 (App. Div. 1978), "[t]he courts of both states are invested with concurrent jurisdiction over all offenses committed anywhere on the bridge[.]" (citing N.J.S.A. 32:4-6). We described this as "a procedural arrangement between the two states adopted as a practical necessity to provide concurrent jurisdiction and thus avoid making available to criminals and other offenders technical and jurisdictional defenses where the offenses were committed in disputed boundary territory . . . ." Ibid.

In State v. Holden, our Supreme Court reversed the Gloucester City Municipal Court's dismissal of complaints for DWI and careless driving for lack of jurisdiction where an accident occurred on the Pennsylvania side of the Walt Whitman Bridge. Holden, supra, 46 N.J. at 366. The Court stated "the legislative purpose to afford concurrent jurisdiction to New Jersey and Pennsylvania over all offenses committed anywhere on the bridge[] . . . is entirely evident." Id. at 363.

On appeal, defendant supports his argument that Trooper Ryan lacked authority to pursue defendant into Pennsylvania by relying on the uniform law on fresh pursuit, N.J.S.A. 2A:155-1 to 7, 42 Pa.C.S. 8921 to 8924. Both New Jersey and Pennsylvania have adopted similar statutes, which only authorize police officers in one other state to continue in fresh pursuit of a person believed to have committed a felony in that state, to continue police pursuit across state lines in order to effect an arrest of the suspected felon. Defendant's contention is that because DWI is not a felony in New Jersey or Pennsylvania, no statutory authority allowed continuation of pursuit for such an offense. This argument lacks merit as the statutes of both states specifically provide that the law "shall not be construed so as to make unlawful any arrest . . . which would otherwise be lawful." N.J.S.A. 2A:155-6; 42 Pa.C.S. 8924.

In light of the concurrent jurisdiction over all offenses committed anywhere on the Walt Whitman Bridge, the State Police clearly have the authority to stop and arrest an intoxicated driver proceeding over that bridge. See N.J.S.A. 53:2-1("The members of the State Police . . . . shall have power to prevent crime, to pursue and apprehend offenders . . . . and to make arrests without warrant for violations of the law committed in their presence[.]"). Additionally, as our Supreme Court aptly noted,

[t]he defendant whose alleged conduct was in violation of the laws of both states is hardly in a position to charge any basic unfairness or other offensiveness in a procedural arrangement which, while it allows either state to prosecute, contemplates that the first prosecution shall be exclusive and preclude further prosecution.

 

[Holden, supra, 46 N.J. at 366.]

 

Moreover, even if we were to accept defendant's argument of a statutory violation, "[t]he exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of a statute is justifiable only if the violation affects privacy rights that the Fourth Amendment and its New Jersey counterpart were designed to protect". State v. Nguyen, 419 N.J. Super. 413, 428 (App. Div. 2011). "Consistent with this view, our courts have held that evidence obtained by a police officer in a search conducted outside the boundaries of the officer's statutory jurisdiction is not subject to exclusion." Ibid.

Defendant additionally argues, for the first time on appeal, that all evidence relating to the stop should be excluded as "fruits of the poisonous tree"; however, defendant never moved to suppress any evidence in the municipal court or the Law Division. Pursuant to Rule 7:5-2(d), a motion to suppress must be made prior to trial. "[A] defendant must act expeditiously and must raise the suppression issue as soon as he becomes aware of same." State v Colapinto, 309 N.J. Super. 132, 137 (App. Div. 1998) (citing State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 384 (1969)). Here, before both the Municipal Court and the Law Division, defendant only challenged jurisdiction. Thus, defendant's suppression argument is not properly before us. See DiRienzo, supra, 53 N.J. at 384. Nevertheless, we fail to see where this claim has any substantive merit. See Nguyen, supra, 419 N.J. Super. at 428.

Judge Kassel reasonably and appropriately reviewed the record produced at the jurisdictional motion and reached an independent conclusion of the operative facts. We agree with Judge Kassel's determination Trooper Ryan had authority to stop defendant's vehicle in light of his observation of defendant's erratic driving in Gloucester City and New Jersey's concurrent jurisdiction over the Walt Whitman Bridge.

Affirmed.

1 "The Walt Whitman Bridge spans the Delaware River and connects New Jersey and Pennsylvania. It is owned and operated by the Delaware River Port Authority [DRPA], a body corporate of the State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and is policed by members of a force maintained by the Authority." State v. Holden, 46 N.J. 361, 362 (1966).

2 The State dismissed the N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) charge.