HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER v. EZINMA ONUIGBO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY

MEDICAL CENTER,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

EZINMA ONUIGBO,

Defendant-Appellant.

July 8, 2014

Before Judges Maven and Hoffman.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Passaic County, Docket No. DC-013315-11.

Anthony J. Van Zwaren, attorney for appellant.

Ragan & Ragan, P.C, attorneys for respondent (Thomas C. Kinney, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Ezinma Onuigbo appeals from the February 6, 2013 Special Civil Part order denying her Rule 4:50-1 motion to vacate a judgment in the amount of $11,086.36 for medical services entered in favor of plaintiff Hackensack University Medical Center. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

We derive the following facts from the motion record. Defendant was admitted to and received medical care at Hackensack University Medical Center on January 21, 2010. Prior to receiving medical treatment, on January 16, 2010, defendant signed a general admission consent form that read, in part: "When billed, I agree to make prompt payment to Hackensack University Medical Center for any and all charges not paid by insurance benefits." After providing defendant medical services totaling $11,086.36, plaintiff submitted a claim to defendant's health insurance carrier. The insurance company denied coverage, noting defendant was uninsured on the date of service.

On July 22, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant demanding payment for the outstanding medical expenses. On August 26, 2011, defendant filed an answer denying the allegations in their entirety, but without asserting any affirmative defenses nor naming her insurance company as a third-party defendant. On September 9, 2011, discovery requests were served upon defendant's attorney. On September 27, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, defense counsel ignored plaintiff's discovery demands and further failed to oppose plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. On October 17, 2011, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against defendant in the amount of $11,086.36, plus costs.

On October 21, 2011, a copy of the order and the court's opinion were both sent to defendant's original counsel. Plaintiff then proceeded with efforts to collect on the judgment. On February 9, 2012, a levy was placed on defendant's bank account at Bank of America, and on February 10, 2012, a notice to debtor was sent to defendant informing her of the levy placed on the account. On February 13, 2012, a levy was placed on defendant's bank account at PNC Bank and a notice to debtor was sent to defendant informing her of the levy. In March 2012, plaintiff filed a notice of motion for turnover of funds from both banks. The judge granted both motions, directing both banks to turn over the levied funds in April 2012; defendant subsequently received a copy of the order. On May 18, 2012, the sheriff's office issued a check to plaintiff's counsel in the amount of $5235.57, representing the levied upon amounts from both banks, minus sheriff's fees.

On September 6, 2012, defendant's newly retained counsel sent a letter to plaintiff's counsel requesting a copy of the file to determine whether or not to file a motion to vacate judgment due to previous counsel's failure to do more than just file an answer. Subsequently, on December 27, 2012, defendant filed a motion to vacate plaintiff's judgment.

On February 6, 2013, Judge Bruno Mongiardo denied defendant's motion to vacate judgment and provided the following explanation for his ruling:

A motion such as this filed pursuant to Rule 4:50 must be filed within a reasonable time. The one-year period referred to in certain subsections of the Rule represents an outermost time limit for the filing of such a motion. Here, the motion is filed fifteen months after the [o]rder. See Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431 (App. Div. 2011) This [c]ourt in the exercise of its sound discretion finds the delay in this case to be unreasonable, especially since [d]efendant realized what had occurred as early as April 2012. An [o]rder has already been entered to [t]urnover [f]unds.

. . . . [Defendant] had ample opportunity to challenge the order for summary judgment. Defendant's [c]ertification is strangely silent as to what communications, if any, she had with counsel and when those communications took place. Her [c]ertification is significantly silent as to what steps she took to ascertain from her attorney the status of her case and most importantly what was being done in regard to her purported defense.

Defendant now appeals and argues that she is entitled to relief under Rule 4:50-1(f), claiming she demonstrated "excusable neglect" and a meritorious defense.

II.

Well-established principles guide our review. "Courts should use Rule 4:50-1 sparingly, in exceptional situations[.]" Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 289 (1994). A movant has the burden of establishing the requirements of Rule 4:50-1. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.G., 414 N.J. Super. 423, 434 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 14 (2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2925, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1255 (2011). The Rule provides, in pertinent part:

On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons . . . (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party . . . (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.

[R. 4:50-1.]

The Rule "'requires proof of exceptional and compelling circumstances' as it is '[d]esigned to balance the interests of finality of judgments and judicial efficiency against the interest of equity and fairness.'" Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 222 (App. Div. 2004).

A trial judge's "decision granting or denying an application to open a judgment rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, exercised with equitable principles in mind, and will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of that discretion." Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 318 (App. Div.), aff'd, 43 N.J. 508 (1964); see also DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 261 (2009) ("On appellate review, the trial judge's determination will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). "[A]buse of discretion is demonstrated if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment." Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, our task is not "to decide whether the trial court took the wisest course, or even the better course, since to do so would merely be to substitute our judgment for that of the lower court. The question is only whether the trial judge pursued a manifestly unjust course." Gittleman v. Cent. Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 103 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 52 N.J. 503 (1968).

On appeal, defendant argues justice was not properly served and the motion judge should have vacated plaintiff's motion for judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f). Although a party seeking relief under subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 4:50 must do so within one year of the entry of the judgment, a motion filed pursuant to subsection (f) "has no such time limitation except that it must be made 'within a reasonable time.'" Palko v. Palko, 73 N.J. 395, 397-98 (1977) (quoting R. 4:50-2). Further, "a motion under (f) is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. That discretion is a broad one to be exercised according to equitable principles, and the decision reached by the trial court will be accepted by an appellate tribunal in the absence of an abuse of its discretion." Id. at 398 (quoting Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1966)).

Our review of the record confirms the complete absence of competent evidence that justice was not properly served by the denial of defendant's motion. Application of Rule 4:50-1(f) is restricted to "'exceptional situations.'" Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 336 (1993) (quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 395 (1984)). As the Court explained, "the very essence of (f) is its capacity for relief in exceptional situations. And in such exceptional cases its boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice." Perillo, supra, 48 N.J. at 341; see also Baumann, supra, 95 N.J. at 395 ("[E]ach case must be resolved on its own particular facts."). The purpose of subsection (f) is to afford relief when enforcement of a judgment would be unjust, oppressive, or inequitable. Quagliato v. Bodner, 115 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div. 1971).

We discern no basis for defendant's claim that enforcement of plaintiff's judgment would be unjust, oppressive or inequitable. As Judge Mongiardo concluded, defendant had "ample opportunity to challenge the order for summary judgment." Further, defendant's dispute with her insurance company over coverage does not present a defense to plaintiff's claim, but rather a third-party claim which she failed to pursue.

Based upon our review, we conclude Judge Mongiardo fully considered the issues raised and properly applied the law. Defendant failed to provide any compelling reasons to warrant relief under Rule 4:50-1(f). Therefore, the motion to vacate the final judgment was properly denied.

Affirmed.