NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. S.R IN THE MATTER OF A.R.-O a minor October 1, 2014

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

S.R.,

Defendant-Appellant.

IN THE MATTER OF A.R.-O.,

a minor.

October 1, 2014

Submitted September 17, 2014 - Decided

Before Judges Alvarez, Maven and Carroll.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FN-11-55-12.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant S.R. (Marina Ginzburg, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Angela Melchionna, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor A.R.-O. (Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant S.R. appeals the Family Part's order of February 15, 2012 concluding, after a fact-finding hearing, that she abused and neglected her fifteen-year-old son, A.R.-O., in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). The trial court concluded that S.R. had unremediated substance abuse issues, hit and yelled at A.R.-O. while intoxicated, and neglected his emotional, mental and physical health care needs. We affirm the finding of abuse and neglect, but narrow somewhat the basis of the finding.

I.

We glean the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal.

The Division originally became involved with the family on October 17, 1996, when it received a referral stating that S.R. was using crack cocaine in front of her infant son A.R.-O. S.R. received a substance abuse assessment, which yielded negative results. The allegations were eventually unsubstantiated and the case closed at the intake level.

The Division had no further involvement with the family until January 27, 2011, when it received a referral from A.R.-O.'s maternal aunt E.F. (S.R.'s sister), translating on behalf of their mother, A.A. E.F. reported that A.R.-O., who was then fourteen years old, had been kicked out of S.R.'s home and had been staying with his grandparents for eight days. He did not wish to return home due to the physical abuse he often received, as well as his mother's abuse of crack cocaine and alcohol.

On January 28, 2011, the Division sent an investigator to the grandparents' home to investigate the claims. The grandparents told the investigator that A.R.-O. occasionally flees to their home, but this was the first time he had run away for eight days. They also told the investigator that A.R.-O. had been very depressed since the death of his step-father, L.L. A.R.-O.'s grandfather believed S.R.'s life had changed for the better once she met L.L., but following his death, she began to go out at night and neglect A.R.-O.

The Division also interviewed A.R.-O. He stated that he left the house because he was angry, and that his mother often yelled and cursed at him for "no reason." However, A.R.-O. told the investigator that he was not fully kicked out of his home, as S.R. had tried to bribe him to return. He also said that he knew his mother had a crack pipe and was a prostitute.

S.R. denied the allegations. She claimed that her problems with her son stemmed from his truancy in school. When the Division worker suggested a Family Team Meeting, S.R. dismissed the idea. She did, however, agree to complete a substance abuse evaluation.

On February 21, 2011, the Division received another referral indicating that S.R. was drunk and threw two boots at A.R.-O., one of which struck him in the head, causing him to cry. This referral, which again came from E.F., also noted that S.R. abuses crack cocaine and is a drug addict. Again the Division investigated. E.F. reported that the "whole family knows" that S.R. has substance abuse problems. She also said that S.R. was probably prostituting herself, although she lacked further details regarding the alleged prostitution.

While the investigation was ongoing, the Division received another referral in the early morning hours of April 1, 2011. This referral, which came directly from the Helene Fuld Medical Center in Trenton, advised that A.R.-O. was taken there after he held a knife to his neck during a physical altercation with S.R. earlier that evening, while she was under the influence of crack.

According to A.R.-O., S.R. became angry with him for "no reason," and punched him with a closed fist in the face, grabbed his right arm and scratched him. As a result, he grabbed a knife, held it to his neck and threatened to harm himself. A.R.-O. later denied being suicidal, and explained that he only held the knife up to his neck for attention, and that he wanted to see his mother's reaction since he did not think she cared about him. In response, S.R. called the police and A.R.-O. was taken to the Helene Fuld Hospital Crisis Center in an ambulance.

Crisis center worker Rita Smith told the Division workers that A.R.-O. stated that S.R. uses crack cocaine, is a prostitute, and brings different men into their home. Smith also reported that A.R.-O. denied putting the knife to his neck, but admitted that he "could have hurt himself a while ago if he had really wanted to." Smith stated that she did not believe that A.R.-O. needed to be hospitalized or sent to the crisis unit. A.R.-O., however, refused to return home with S.R., and the Division made arrangements for him to return to his grandmother's home, where A.R.-O. reported he had done his homework the evening before.

The investigators also interviewed S.R. She again denied A.R.-O.'s allegations, including any current drug use, but admitted to drinking a pint of gin out of frustration. She explained that on the previous night, after A.R.-O. returned home from school, she permitted him to go to a friend's house. When he returned, he asked to go to his grandmother's house, and she objected. A.R.-O. left anyway, but returned at 10 p.m., saying he wanted to go back out. S.R. refused to let him leave again. She then reported that A.R.-O. began to break things around the home and started to hit her. She further stated that A.R.-O. put a knife to his own neck and threatened to hurt himself and her, at which point she called the police.

Another Division worker spoke to A.R.-O. in the emergency room that morning. When asked, A.R.-O. said he did not feel safe living with his mother, although he denied being afraid of her. He explained that he knew S.R. was on crack the previous night during their altercation because she was pulling her hair, had a strange look on her face, and was hearing voices that were not there. He said his mother punched him with a "closed fist in the face" and that she was "grabbing" and "pushing" him that evening before the police were called.1 A.R.-O. also generally reported that his mother drinks daily and abuses crack cocaine. He again stated that he saw a crack pipe in their house the previous summer. He also reported that S.R. was a prostitute because she had three different men who visited the home to have sex and give her money, and that he had witnessed his mother having sex. He denied being suicidal or homicidal.

After completing these interviews, the Division investigators left the hospital and arrived at the grandmother's home around 5:45 a.m. A.R.-O.'s grandmother reported that she knew her daughter S.R. had abused drugs for a very long time. She also said that she could not raise A.R.-O., as she already raised S.R.'s first child, J.V., and she could not raise another child since she was sixty-three years old and her husband was eighty-three years old.

Later that day, the Division advised S.R. that it wanted her to undergo a substance abuse evaluation. However, S.R.'s initial urinalysis was deemed incomplete because she did not provide enough urine.

On April 11, 2011, a Division caseworker returned to S.R.'s home. S.R. told the worker that her family was planting the drug abuse accusations in A.R.-O.'s head, causing him to "act out." She admitted that A.R.-O. was affected by the loss of her husband, who he looked to as a father. The worker provided S.R. with contact information for PerformCare to provide grief and loss counseling for A.R.-O.

The worker also spoke to A.R.-O., who said that things would be "okay" if his mother would stop smoking crack cocaine. He again reported that he observed that S.R. had a crack pipe in the house the previous summer. He reiterated that his mother pulls her hair and hears phantom voices when she appears to be on crack.

On April 12, 2011, a Substance Abuse Initiative counselor went to the home to request another urine sample. Again S.R. provided an insufficient sample for testing. A few hours later, the substance abuse counselor returned, and S.R. was able to provide a sufficient sample which tested positive for cocaine.

On April 19, 2011, Division workers confronted S.R. with the positive test results. She then admitted that she had smoked marijuana earlier, and surmised that it must have been laced with cocaine. The Division worker told her that the test results had not revealed any traces of marijuana. S.R. then further admitted she used cocaine at the beginning of the month, but denied ever doing so in front of A.R.-O. The Division worker suggested having a Family Team Meeting; however, S.R. declined to participate. Additionally, the Division recommended that S.R. attend an outpatient drug rehabilitation program, but she later missed all three intake appointments.

On September 15, 2011, Division workers visited the grandparents again to meet with A.R.-O. A.R.-O. informed the workers that he and his mother had moved to a rooming house with his mother's paramour, R.B. A.R.-O. reported that S.R. was unable to buy him clothes for school or pay the household bills.

On October 7, 2011, the Division filed a complaint for care, custody and supervision of A.R.-O. pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12. The court granted the application, and ordered A.R.-O.'s removal from the home. When the Division caseworkers arrived at the rooming house to conduct the removal, they observed that the family was living in a rented room with no furniture. Caseworker Martha Smaw noted in her report that there was a blanket and pillow on the floor, which S.R. stated were used by herself, A.R.-O., and her paramour, R.B. A.R.-O. was then placed in a foster home.

S.R. disputed the basis for the removal and denied using drugs except for occasional marijuana. The workers questioned her regarding the positive drug test in April, and S.R. denied using crack cocaine, but stated that she once tried powdered cocaine.

On October 17, 2011, a Division nurse assessed A.R.-O. and reviewed his medical records. The nurse determined that he was delayed in receiving his immunizations and required a dental appointment. On October 25, 2011, A.R.-O. underwent a comprehensive medical examination, and the doctor noted that he required multiple cavity fillings.

At a January 19, 2012 case management conference, A.R.-O.'s Law Guardian reported that he was doing well in the foster home and had no desire to visit with S.R. The judge also noted that he had received a letter from A.R.-O. expressing similar sentiments, citing his mother's drug use, which caused her to hit, grab, or curse at him for no reason, as well as the lack of food and sufficient housing.

Smaw was the only witness to testify at the February 15, 2012 fact-finding hearing. S.R. did not testify, or present any evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge William Anklowitz issued a nineteen-page written decision in which he found Smaw credible and "place[d] great weight on her testimony," which he accepted "in its entirety." Finding that S.R. had abused and neglected A.R.-O., the judge reasoned

The court finds that [S.R.] had a substance abuse problem and engaged in behavior that debauches the morals and welfare of her child. She would get high and hit and yell at [A.R.-O.]. She would not let him come home so that she could prostitute herself. Although [S.R.] denied or minimized her substance abuse, she has tested positive for cocaine and admitted to using marijuana.

When [A.R.-O.] needed love and support due to the death of his stepfather [S.R.] was not there for him. She did not care about [A.R.-O.]. . . .

[A.R.-O.] became suicidal and self[-] injurious. He held a knife to himself and was in the crisis center at the hospital for that on April 1, 2011.

As corroborative evidence of her lack of meaningful parenting and proper supervision, [A.R.-O.] needed to catch up on a number of dental appointments after the removal occurred, rather than spending money on food it was spent on substance abuse, and there was a lack of clean clothing. [A.R.-O.] could recognize when his mother was high. She would go in the bathroom and tell him to go away. That is very hurtful to a child.

Her poverty is not the issue here. Spending money on drugs to get high is mutually exclusive to good parenting. She was not involved in his life. She did not have an open and cooperative dialogue with her child. She did not give him appropriate expressions of love and care. She did not understand his needs. She did not make accurate observations of her own and her child's behavior. While she promoted independence it was only because she forced him to have to take care of his own needs so often. However, she did not promote social responsibility or self-confidence. She did not promote self-esteem. In fact, she promoted depression and suicide by her selfishness and drug abuse. She did not recognize her child's strengths and weaknesses.

The evidence here shows by [the] clear and convincing standard that she abused drugs, engaged in prostitution and nearly totally ignored and neglected her child, [A.R.-O.]. She did so to the point that his behavior became out of control, self-injurious and suicidal. The harm for her lack of proper supervision is evident due the impairment of his mental and emotional condition and that resulted in imminent danger to his physical condition. This was a life and death situation. This is abuse and neglect under Title 9. In that [A.R.-O.] is [fifteen-]years old and needs to be taken care of, and since [S.R.] is too self-absorbed to take care of him, the Division must step in to strengthen and support this family. That is the need for jurisdiction under Title 30. That has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.

The judge continued A.R.-O. under the custody, care and supervision of the Division, where he has remained, by virtue of subsequent court orders. On October 31, 2013, the court approved the Division's permanent plan of independent living, during which period A.R.-O. would remain in the Division's custody, and entered an order terminating litigation. This appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, S.R. argues that the Division failed to produce sufficient evidence that she abused or neglected A.R.-O., that A.R.-O.'s allegations of abuse and neglect were not adequately corroborated, and that the trial judge erred in relying on hearsay documentary evidence. Both the Division and the law guardian disagree and urge us to affirm the order.

A.

We briefly address the hearsay issue raised by S.R., which we find to be without merit and not requiring extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The documents at issue include a referral summary prepared by a Division screener, investigation summaries prepared by a Division investigator, urine screen result reports generated by the Division's drug assessment program, contact sheets prepared by Division caseworkers, and nursing medical records prepared by the Division's nursing unit.

Contrary to S.R.'s contentions, the Division's evidence qualified as business records under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(3). "[The Division] is permitted to submit into evidence, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) and 801(d), reports by staff personnel or professional consultants." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 32 (2011).

Moreover, pursuant to Rule 5:12-4(d), "[c]onclusions drawn from the facts stated therein shall be treated as prima facie evidence, subject to rebuttal." Rule 5:12-4(d) "recognizes the Division's need to secure the services of a range of professionals [including treating physicians] when investigating a claim of child abuse." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 348 (2010). "'Reports of this type, prepared by the qualified personnel of a state agency charged with the responsibility for overseeing the welfare of children in the State, supply a reasonably high degree of reliability as to the accuracy of the facts contained therein.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 595 n.1 (1986) (quoting In re Guardianship of Cope, 106 N.J. Super. 336, 344 (App. Div. 1969)).

Smaw, the Division caseworker, laid the necessary and proper foundation for each document at the fact-finding hearing. We thus conclude that the evidence was properly admitted.

B.

We now turn to the substantive issues raised by S.R., as to which we first outline our limited standard of review.

On appeal from orders issued in Title 9 and Title 30 cases, we accord considerable deference to the trial court's credibility determinations and findings of fact, so long as those findings are supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278-79 (2007). We maintain that deference "unless the trial court's findings went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." Id. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we do not readily second-guess the factual findings of the Family Part in general, given that court's special expertise in matters concerning children. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (analogously noting that "matrimonial courts possess special expertise in the field of domestic relations").

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) defines various circumstances that can comprise the abuse or neglect of a child. Among other things, the statute specifically covers

[A] child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a minimum degree of care (a) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medical or surgical care though financially able to do so or though offered financial or other reasonable means to do so, or (b) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court[.]

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).]

As the Supreme Court recently underscored, the purpose of Title 9 is "to protect children 'who have had serious injury inflicted upon them' and make sure they are 'immediately safeguarded from further injury and possible death.'" Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 18 (2013) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a)). "The law's paramount concern is the safety of the children, and not the culpability of parental conduct." Ibid. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The focus in abuse and neglect matters . . . is on promptly protecting a child who has suffered harm or faces imminent danger." Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)).

A court's finding of abuse or neglect must be based on a preponderance of the evidence when the proof is considered in its totality. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(1); Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.H., 414 N.J. Super. 472, 481 (App. Div. 2010) ("[I]n child abuse and neglect cases the elements of proof are synergistically related. Each proven act of neglect has some effect on the [child]. One act may be substantial or the sum of many acts may be substantial." (Internal quotation marks omitted)), certif. denied, 207 N.J. 188 (2011). Notably, the Title 9 proof standard is less stringent than in guardianship cases for the termination of parental rights, which must instead be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).2

Guided by these standards, we proceed to analyze S.R.'s arguments. S.R. first contends that the one positive urine screen for cocaine that was admitted into evidence at the fact-finding hearing does not constitute abuse or neglect as a matter of law, or prove that she had an unremediated substance abuse problem.3 However this argument ignores the additional evidence which adequately supports the judge's finding that S.R. had unremediated substance abuse issues which caused her to abuse or neglect her son.

On more than one occasion, S.R. admitted abusing alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, and prescription medication. A Division worker spoke with S.R. at the crisis center the morning of A.R.-O.'s hospitalization on April 1, 2011. S.R. informed the worker that she had used crack cocaine a year ago. In spite of that statement, S.R. tested positive for cocaine on April 12, 2011. Additionally, S.R. told the worker that she drank a "pint of gin because she was frustrated" with her child's behavior. She denied any present drug use at the time, but stated that she had used drugs two months before, and that her drug of choice was marijuana.

At the hearing, Smaw also testified to A.R.-O.'s statements that his mother used crack cocaine while he was present in their family home. A.R.-O. told Smaw that he can tell when his mother is on drugs because she pulls at her hair, hears voices that are not there, and has an odd look in her eyes. A.R.-O. also stated, on multiple occasions, that he observed a crack pipe in the home. Smaw further testified that S.R.'s drug use had continued "for years," according to other family members. Due to this behavior, A.R.-O. frequently ran away to his grandparents' home to escape S.R. Judge Anklowitz properly assessed S.R.'s persistent inability to properly parent due to her unresolved and long-standing substance abuse issues, thereby recklessly leaving A.R.-O. exposed to a lack of proper oversight.

Moreover, after S.R. completed her substance abuse evaluation that revealed she tested positive for cocaine, the Division recommended that she participate in intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment. However, S.R. failed to obtain the treatment offered to her; hence, her abuse was unremediated.

S.R.'s reliance on N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320 (App. Div. 2011), is misplaced. In V.T. we determined that the Division had failed to prove abuse or neglect where a father tested positive for drugs at a supervised visit with his eleven-year-old daughter, during which he behaved appropriately at all times. Id. at 323, 331. Here, however, S.R. was a single mother and sole care-giver for her son in their home, not in a supervised setting. S.R.'s continued drug use was much more likely to result in harm to A.R.-O. in these circumstances. Indeed, A.R.-O. indicated that S.R.'s drug use caused her to strike, grab, and curse at him. Additionally, S.R. admitted to using drugs. Judge Anklowitz relied on her admissions, and the additional evidence of drug usage, rather than the single positive drug screen in properly concluding that S.R. engaged in drug abusive behavior.

S.R. next argues that the Division failed to produce any credible evidence to support the claim that she yelled at or physically abused A.R.-O. She maintains that on the night of April 1, 2011, she and her son were simply involved in a heated dispute over A.R.-O.'s school work which escalated to the point that she needed to call the police. However, the record, when viewed in its entirety, belies this claim.

Judge Anklowitz evaluated and weighed the competing evidence presented at the fact-finding trial and determined that S.R. hit and yelled at A.R.-O. As a result, A.R.-O suffered a six-inch laceration. See Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.A., 413 N.J. Super. 504, 511-12 (App. Div. 2011) (listing such harms as examples of what might evidence corporal punishment, including lacerations), certif. dismissed, 208 N.J. 355 (2011). A.R.-O. reported that S.R. punched him in the face and grabbed his arm, leaving the scratch.

The court also had additional substantial, credible evidence that S.R. physically abused A.R.-O. The Division's intake reports reflect that A.R.-O.'s extended family members called in multiple referrals reporting S.R.'s physical abuse of A.R.-O. On January 27, 2011, A.R.-O.'s grandmother, through her daughter E.F., contacted the Division to report that A.R.-O. was often physically abused by his mother. On February 21, 2011, E.F. again called the Division expressing concerns for her nephew, and that S.R. was a drug addict. On February 23, 2011, E.F. spoke with a Division case worker, on behalf of A.R.-O.'s grandmother, to report that S.R. had thrown a shoe at her son on February 20, 2011 and that A.R.-O. then went to his grandparents' home very upset after the incident.

Smaw's testimony at the fact-finding hearing on February 15, 2012, which the judge found credible and accepted in its entirety, also confirmed that S.R. physically and verbally abused A.R.-O. Smaw testified that A.R.-O. did not wish to return home because he doubted that his mother could quit her drug use or change her behavior toward him.

We also reject S.R.'s contention that her actions were appropriate exercises of parental autonomy, relying on P.W.R., supra, 205 N.J. 17, 36-37 (2011). There, the Court held that occasional physical discipline was not "excessive corporal punishment." Ibid. On appeal, S.R. argues that during the April 1, 2011 incident, A.R.-O. would not respect her wishes, as she instructed him to stay home and do his homework. She contends that a single slap was the "only means left" for her to "discipline her son." It is evident that S.R. did not inflict just a "single slap" to A.R.-O.'s face, but rather that pervasive violence existed in the home, to the extent that family members often had to step in to report it for A.R.-O.'s safety and well-being. S.R. also admitted to a Division investigator that she threw a shoe at her son for cursing at her when she refused to let him go out at night with his friends. Although S.R. attempts to argue that A.R.-O. is merely a child out of control, her own violent behavior contradicts this statement. Rather, the evidence supports the conclusion that when S.R. was under the influence, she would hit A.R.-O. without provocation, in a manner that transcended normal child discipline.

We next reject S.R.'s contention that the Division failed to prove that she ignored and neglected A.R.-O.'s needs to the point that he became self-injurious and suicidal. A.R.-O. held a knife up to his own neck on March 31, 2011, and threatened to kill himself following a physical argument with his mother, leading to his hospitalization. He stated that he wanted to see what his mother's reaction would be, as he believed that she did not care about him. To explain this disturbing behavior, Smaw testified that A.R.-O. told her

his mother doesn't listen to him. He accused his mother of doing drugs. He accused his mother of, for lack of a better word, prostituting. He had said she doesn t care about him. She will not take care of him. She doesn't care what happens to him. He and a big part of it was he was going through the loss of his, what he called, his stepfather.

S.R. claims that she did not ignore her son's grief after his stepfather died. A.R.-O. was very close to his stepfather and fell into a depression following his death. A.R.-O. continued to sleep with a picture of his stepfather for two years after his death. S.R. concedes that A.R.-O. had significant emotional issues that stemmed from the loss of his step-father. However, she made scant effort to find A.R.-O. the counseling he desperately needed. She admitted that she tried to get him counseling, but she stopped taking him because the center was too far away. Division workers spoke to S.R. and referred her for in-home counseling through PerformCare, but she did not call to arrange it, allegedly because she did not have the requisite minutes on her cell phone.

Judge Anklowitz found that, "When [A.R.-O.] needed love and support due to the death of his step[]father [S.R.] was not there for him. She did not care about [A.R.-O.]. [T]he step[]father raised [A.R.-O.] up to the time [he] passed away. [A.R.-O.] became suicidal and self-injurious." The judge elaborated, "She did not promote self-esteem. In fact, she promoted depression and suicide by her selfishness and drug abuse. She did not recognize her child's strengths and weaknesses." We find ample support in the record for the judge's conclusions.

S.R. also disputes the judge's finding that she failed to provide for her son's other basic needs. Again we disagree.

When A.R.-O. was removed from the home, the Division observed that S.R, her paramour, and A.R.-O. all lived in one room together in a boarding house. There was no furniture in the room and all three slept together on a single blanket and pillow on the floor. The Division also noted that A.R.-O. regularly went to school in dirty clothes as his mother did not wash them.

A.R.-O. wrote to the judge to inform him that S.R. regularly failed to provide food in the home. He often would go to his grandparents' home to eat or buy a sandwich at the corner store.

A.R.-O. was also behind on his immunizations and was in need of dental care. At the fact-finding hearing, Smaw testified that A.R.-O.'s foster parent took him to get a root canal and a series of dental follow-ups. Judge Anklowitz wrote in his February 16, 2012 decision, "[a]s corroborative evidence of her lack of meaningful parenting and proper supervision, [A.R.-O.] needed to catch up on a number of dental appointments after the removal occurred, rather than spending money on food it went on substance abuse and there was a lack of clean clothing. [A.R.-O.] could recognize when his mother was high. She would go in the bathroom and tell him to go away. That is very hurtful to a child."

The judge was also careful to note that S.R.'s

poverty is not the issue here. Spending money on drugs to get high is mutually exclusive to good parenting. She was not involved in his life. She did not have an open and cooperative dialogue with her child. She did not give him appropriate expressions of love and care. She did not understand his needs. She did not make accurate observations of her own and her child's behavior.

We agree with these astute observations. The judge's findings were not predicated on S.R.'s impoverished condition. Rather, they were based on her failure to give her son's welfare appropriate priority and attention within these economic constraints.

Finally, S.R. argues that the trial court erred in relying on A.R.-O.'s uncorroborated, out-of-court statements as the basis for its abuse and neglect finding. With one exception, we disagree.

Although admissible in evidence, a child's uncorroborated statement is not alone "sufficient to make a fact finding of abuse or neglect." N.J.S.A.9:6-8.46(a)(4). Stated another way, "a child's hearsay statement may be admitted into evidence, but may not be the sole basis for a finding of abuse or neglect." P.W.R., supra, 205 N.J.at 33.

We conclude that A.R.-O.'s statements were more than sufficiently corroborated, except for his allegations regarding prostitution. In general, corroborative evidence need not be direct so long as it provides some support for the out-of-court statements. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2002); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.A., 357 N.J. Super. 155, 166 (App. Div. 2003).

A.R.-O.'s statements regarding S.R.'s substance abuse were corroborated by the positive drug screen, as well as S.R.'s own admissions, admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1). S.R. then failed to get drug treatment, though recommended by the Division. A.R.-O.'s allegations of physical abuse were corroborated by the caseworker's observation of a six-inch scratch on his arm. Moreover, the Division workers noted that A.R.-O. was sleeping on a blanket on the floor with S.R. and her paramour in an unfurnished room, confirming his allegations of inadequate housing. S.R. admitted that A.R.-O. needed counseling in the wake of his stepfather's death, but she failed to procure it, even after the Division offered to assist her. Finally, Smaw's testimony established that A.R.-O. required medical and dental attention following his removal from the home.

We do, however, find an insufficient basis for a finding of neglect based on S.R. allegedly engaging in prostitution, as the record before us lacks sufficient indicia of factual support corroborating those allegations.

III.

Summarizing, we affirm the finding of abuse and neglect based on S.R.'s substance abuse, her physical abuse of A.R.-O., and her neglect of A.R.-O.'s physical and emotional needs. We reverse the order on appeal to the extent it relies on S.R.'s engaging in prostitution as a basis for finding abuse or neglect. We remand to the Family Part for correction of the February 15, 2012 order, and to the extent necessary the central registry, to conform with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.

1 The Division noted that there was no evidence that A.R.-O. was punched in the face. Also, the scratch on his arm did not require medical attention at the hospital.

2 Although the judge in this Title 9 action was only required to make a finding by a preponderance of the evidence, he nevertheless found the abuse and neglect by clear and convincing evidence.

3 The Division actually proffered evidence of two other positive urine screens. These reports, dated November 14, 2011, and January 31, 2012, both indicate that S.R. tested positive for cocaine. The January 31, 2012 report reflects that S.R. tested positive for opiates as well. Upon S.R.'s objection, the Division was precluded from admitting these two reports at trial. The court found that the two drug tests and corresponding reports were considered subsequent remedial measures. The State disputes this characterization, but does not appeal the issue.