DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL v. MAYNARDS, INC.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5571-04T55571-04T5

DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE

CONTROL,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MAYNARDS INC., t/a MAYNARDS CAF ,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________

 

Submitted January 30, 2006 - Decided February 22, 2006

Before Judges Lintner and Holston, Jr.

On appeal from a decision of the Alcoholic Beverage Control, S-02-25111.

Jacobs & Barbone, attorneys for appellant (Edwin J. Jacobs, Jr., Louis M. Barbone, and Stephen F. Funk, on the brief).

Nancy Kaplen, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lorinda Lasus, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel; Richard D. Nasca, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Maynards Inc., trading as Maynards Caf (Maynards), appeals from a May 27, 2005, Final Conclusion and Order Imposing Penalty issued by Jerry Fischer, Director (Director) of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Division). The Director suspended Maynards' plenary retail consumption license to serve alcoholic beverages for a total of 390 days, 130 days of which had to be served, with 240 days held in abeyance for a period of two years conditioned on no further violations of N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.5(b), prohibiting unlawful possession or activities pertaining to Controlled Dangerous Substances (CDS) on licensed premises. An additional twenty days were also held in abeyance pending the two-year period conditioned on no further violations of N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(a), prohibiting the sale of alcohol to underage patrons. We granted Maynards' application for an emergent stay pending disposition of this appeal. We now vacate that stay and affirm the Director's May 27, 2005, order.

Maynards is a restaurant/bar located in Margate. Its owners, Al Troiano and his son, Stephen, have held a liquor license on various premises since 1954 and at Maynards since 1966. On October 10, 2002, Maynards was charged by the Division with three violations of serving alcoholic beverages to a person under the legal age, N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(a). Seven days later, the Division charged Maynards with six violations of allowing unlawful activity on its premises pertaining to CDS, N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.5(b). Maynards pled not guilty and the matters were transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a contested hearing.

The following undisputed facts were asserted in the charges. From April 2002 through June 2002, the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office Narcotics Strike Force Unit conducted an undercover investigation of the sale of cocaine by Peter Barone, a cook employed by Maynards. Prior to hiring Barone, Maynards conducted a background check. On six different occasions, Barone sold cocaine to an undercover police officer at Maynards. The first occurred on April 17, 2002, when Investigator Keith A. Carmack contacted Barone, who asked Carmack how many bags of cocaine he wished to buy. Carmack asked for two bags. Approximately forty-five minutes later, Barone waived Carmack into the men's room where he told Carmack to give him the money. Carmack asked for more than the two bags and Barone responded he could buy three. Carmack handed him $300 and exited the bathroom to return to the bar. Barone then told him that his take-out order was ready and he could pick it up at the food counter. Barone gave him the cocaine in a take-out container and Carmack left the bar.

The next transaction occurred on April 24, 2002. Barone met Carmack at the bar, exchanged $500 in the men's room, and Carmack left with five bags of cocaine in a take-out container. On May 1, 2002, Carmack entered Maynards and asked Barone if he could buy four bags of cocaine. Barone responded that he could get twenty for Carmack if he wanted them. Carmack gave Barone $400 in the men's room and returned to his seat at the bar. Barone asked Carmack to come to the kitchen counter, at which point he handed Carmack four small bags of a white rocky substance. On May 9, 2002, at 5:17 p.m., Carmack called Maynards to speak with Barone concerning twelve $100 bags of cocaine. Later that evening, Carmack entered Maynards and accompanied Barone to the kitchen area where he gave Barone $1200. Carmack then sat at the bar to wait for the cocaine. Later, at the kitchen counter, Barone handed Carmack a white Styrofoam take-out container and Carmack left with the cocaine in the container.

On May 15, 2002, Carmack asked Barone to buy four bags of cocaine. An hour and fifteen minutes later, Barone waived Carmack into the bathroom where Carmack gave him $400. As usual, Carmack waited at the bar. This time, however, Barone motioned for Carmack to meet him in the men's room, where he handed Carmack four bags of cocaine.

On May 29, 2002, Investigators Carmack and Recchuiti entered Maynards. They waited at the outside bar. Later, a bartender told Carmack that Barone wished to see him. Carmack and Barone entered the men's room where Carmack handed Barone $500 and then returned to the outside bar area. At the inside bar Barone subsequently handed Carmack a take-out container concealing the cocaine, stating that his chicken wings order was ready. On all but two occasions, Barone's source, William J. Foglio, delivered the cocaine to Maynards prior to Barone giving it to Carmack. On August 20, 2002, Barone was arrested. He pled guilty to second-degree manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1), and second-degree conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, and was sentenced to five years of probation.

On July 3, 2002, the New Jersey State Police ABC Enforcement Unit conducted an undercover operation at Maynards to determine whether underage patrons were purchasing and consuming alcohol. Three undercover officers, Detective Sergeant Timothy Witkowski, Detective Susan Kamish, and Detective Michael LaRosa, entered Maynards where they observed two doormen "occasionally" checking identification, as well as several people at the entrance circumventing the doormen. The officers walked throughout the premises, whereupon they observed three patrons who appeared underage, drinking beer from bottles. The officers identified themselves and asked the patrons for identification.

One female patron stated that she was twenty-three years old, but did not have any identification. After further conversation, she disclosed her true identity as twenty year-old Alexis Santone. The officers arrested her, read her Miranda rights, searched her, and did not find any identification in her possession. She stated that she had a fictitious identification card when she entered the bar, but after purposely circumventing the bouncers at the entrance, she discarded it. She told the officers that a male patron sitting at the bar purchased the beer for her and her friend where they remained seated while drinking it.

The second female patron identified herself as eighteen year-old Jade Charokopos and stated that she did not have any identification. As with Santone, the officers arrested her, read her Miranda rights and searched her, finding no identification in her possession. She corroborated Santone's statement that they entered the bar by circumventing the bouncers at the door, that a man at the bar bought them beer and that they remained seated at the bar. Their beer bottles were seized as evidence.

The third underage patron, Michael Tripician, produced a duplicate New Jersey photo driver's license bearing the name of Charles Tripician and a birth date of August 2, 1978. Michael admitted his true identity and that he was nineteen years old. He too was arrested, read his Miranda rights, and searched. The officers did not find any additional identification in Tripician's possession. He walked past the bouncers at the door without being asked for identification and denied knowing any employees who may have let him in. He admitted to ordering, purchasing, and consuming three bottles of beer prior to being arrested. His beer bottle was also seized as evidence.

The officers identified themselves to the manager and notified him of the violations. The patrons were charged with entering a licensed premises with intent to consume an alcoholic beverage, N.J.S.A. 33:1-81(a), and consumption of an alcoholic beverage by an underage person, N.J.S.A. 33:1-81(b). On August 12, 2002, all three patrons pled guilty to possession of an alcoholic beverage while under the legal age, Local Ordinance 67-12.

The Division moved for summary decision and requested an adjournment to allow the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to consider its motion prior to the start of the hearing. Maynards filed a brief opposing the motion. The ALJ denied the adjournment, but agreed to consider the motion on the pleadings and submissions of the parties. The hearing commenced on June 24, 2003. On February 5, 2004, the ALJ issued an order denying the Division's motion for summary decision. Although he agreed with the Division's position that the lack of knowledge on the part of Maynards is not a defense, he concluded that the measures taken by Maynards to prevent unlawful activity on its premises may be relevant to both the issue of liability and the appropriateness of the penalty.

The Division sought interlocutory review from the Director. N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.10. On March 29, 2004, the Director issued an order reversing the ALJ and granting summary decision on liability for the violations charged. He remanded the case to the OAL for a penalty hearing. In reaching his determination, the Director found that the ALJ mistakenly relied upon Ishmal v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 58 N.J. 347 (1971), and concluded that, unlike the facts in Ishmal, the violations involved illegal activity by an employee. He noted that Maynards' opposing papers did not contradict or dispute the charges from the various officers, but merely stated that it was not conceding them. Finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact involving the drug charges, he remanded the matter to permit the ALJ to consider the actions taken by Maynards to avoid illegal activity in assessing the appropriate penalty.

At the penalty hearing, Maynards established that it has a security system, including fourteen cameras covering the entire premises except for the bathrooms. There are monitors in the owners' office showing each camera's perspective. Doormen are employed to check identification at the door between 8:00 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. during the week and also during the afternoons on weekends. The number of doormen varies depending on the time of year and day of the week. Additionally, bartenders and waitresses are trained to detect underage patrons. The owners also attend seminars offered by the Division. Maynards presented numerous witnesses who testified that it is not a drug hangout, but was a place where police officers, public officials, and families often congregate. It presented attorney Joel Mayer, a former assistant prosecutor, who qualified as a drug investigation expert. Mayer opined that the CDS investigation was conducted improperly, and that officers should have focused on Barone's supplier rather than continuing the investigation after the first or second transaction at Maynards. He also indicated that there was nothing in the evidence to indicate that any other employee or officer of Maynards was involved in the illegal activity.

At the conclusion of oral argument, both parties submitted written summations. The ALJ issued an initial decision on February 16, 2005, concluding that the appropriate penalty was a sixty-day suspension, and finding the following mitigating factors:

1. Al Troiano and Steve Troiano have held liquor licenses since 1954 and did not have a single violation on their record until the present matters.

2. There is no evidence of involvement, complicity or acquiescence by management in the activities of Mr. Barone. The undercover officer admitted that there was nothing to suggest that either Al or Steve Troiano were involved in or even knew of the violations; the prior actions and conduct of the Troianos in monitoring the premises and in employing security to prevent violations are such as to establish that they were in no way involved in the violations.

3. The violations involving the sales of CDS were committed by Mr. Barone in a careful and secretive manner, and these violations were virtually undetectable despite an extensive surveillance system on the premises and the extensive training and awareness of security personnel on the premises.

4. It was established without question that the Troianos and respondent Maynards are well-respected members of the community. Respondent operates a secure and well-policed establishment; it is family-oriented, and it is not a drug hangout. It is patronized by police officers, elected officials, and other reputable citizens and residents of the area. Its reputation in the community is that there is no toleration for illegal activities on the premises. Many of the public officials and other reputable citizens stated that they would not patronize Maynards if it did not have such an excellent reputation. Therefore, the character of the respondent is such as to indicate that the occurrence of another offense is unlikely.

5. The imposition of a lengthy period of suspension would entail excessive hardship to respondent and his employees and their dependents.

6. Respondent engaged in extraordinary efforts to detect and eradicate illegal activities of any kind on its premises, and such measures undertaken by a licensee to prevent unlawful activity on the licensed premises are relevant to determine the appropriateness of a penalty. This is the most significant mitigating factor for the reasons stated above.

The ALJ accepted Mayer's testimony that Barone conducted his drug activity in a manner which prevented Maynards from discovering it. He rejected Mayer's opinion, however, that the officers exacerbated the illegal activity by concentrating on Barone, instead of pursuing the supplier, thus supporting a conclusion that Maynards be required to pay a fine in lieu of suspension. In recommending the penalty, the ALJ determined that if Maynards' extraordinary efforts to detect and eradicate illegal activity were not recognized as mitigating factors, other licensees would be justified in thinking that there would be no reason to spend the time and money on security and detection. Written exceptions were filed by both parties.

On May 27, 2005, the Director issued his Final Conclusion and Order Imposing Penalty in which he accepted mitigating factors 1 and 6 but rejected factors 2, 3, 4, and 5. Respecting factor 2, he concluded that Maynards' lack of involvement in the violations "cannot be used to mitigate the lesser penalty of 90 days per violation when the drug violation involves an employee." As to mitigating factor 3, he found:

Knowledge or acquiescence of the licensee is not required for a violation to exist. In fact, a licensee may be charged even when an employee acts contrary to the licensee's specific instructions. In addition [Maynards'] monitoring and security efforts, as well as staff training, are recognized in mitigating factor [6]. (citation omitted).

Rejecting factor 4, he found:

[G]ood character and reputation of this licensee cannot be used to predict whether there will be another offense in the future . . . . This licensee's good character and reputation existed and the current violations occurred nevertheless. In addition, the fact that these are the Troianos' first violations since 1954 I recognized in mitigating factor [1].

Finally, he rejected factor 5, concluding, "hardship is a component of any suspension."

On appeal, Maynards contends: (1) the Director erred in granting summary disposition in favor of the Division on the issue of liability; and (2) the penalty imposed is excessive, arbitrary, and capricious without being based upon full consideration of all mitigating factors. Maynards first argues that the Director's failure to consider the "evidence as to the conduct of the licensee in preventing illegal activity" as relevant to the determination of liability was error. Maynards claims that its efforts to detect illegal activity are relevant, not only to determining the penalty, but also to deciding guilt or innocence. Maynards does not dispute that the drug transactions occurred, but argues that this court should follow the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Ishmal, supra, 58 N.J. 347, because it stands for the broad proposition that a licensee's good faith efforts may be relevant to the liability determination.

Maynards' reliance on Ishmal is misplaced. Moreover, its argument is not supported by the relevant Administrative Code provisions. N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.5(b) provides in relevant part:

(b) No licensee shall allow, permit or suffer in or upon the licensed premises any unlawful possession of or any unlawful activity pertaining to:

. . . .

2. Controlled dangerous substances as defined by the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act (N.J.S.A. 24:21-1 et seq.) . . . .

N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.28(c) provides:

In disciplinary proceedings brought pursuant to the alcoholic beverage law, it shall be sufficient, in order to establish the guilt of the licensee, to show that the violation was committed by an agent, servant, employee or patron or the licensee. The fact that the licensee did not participate in the violation or that his agent, servant or employee acted contrary to instructions given by him by the licensee or that the violation did not occur in the licensee's presence shall constitute no defense to the charges preferred in such disciplinary proceedings.

In Ishmal, the licensee, Mrs. Ishmal, conceded that her tavern located in Newark was the location of heavy drug activity involving addicts and pushers. Ishmal, supra, 58 N.J. at 348, 350. Indeed, to combat the problems, she made between 75 and 100 calls to the police department. Ibid. She also testified that she refused to serve and ejected patrons under the influence of drugs and instructed her bartenders to do the same. Id. at 350-56. Two Newark detectives confirmed that Mrs. Ishmal called at least fifty times, asked for assistance to get rid of the drug problem, and cooperated in the arrest of addicts and pushers. Id. at 351. They also conceded that, despite the good faith attempts on the part of Mrs. Ishmal and the police intervention, the drug activities continued unabated. Ibid.

Noting that the applicable rules at the time "impose on the licensee the responsibility, at the peril of its license, for precluding offensive and unlawful conduct in its establishment during the licensing year," the Court in Ishmal determined that the record demonstrated that Mrs. Ishmal met her responsibility, and held that she did not "allow, permit, or suffer" the drug problem on the premises. Id. at 351-52.

In Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Red Klotz Enterprises, Inc., t/a Red Klotz, 6 N.J.A.R. 13 (1982), the ALJ and the Division distinguished Ishmal, concluding that, where an employee is involved in drug trafficking, the licensee is strictly liable under N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.28 and, therefore, the licensee's attempts to eradicate the drug problem does not afford a defense to liability, but may be considered as a mitigating circumstance in the determination of the penalty. Here, in reaching his decision on liability, the Director relied in part on our unreported decision in 12 South, Inc. t/a 12 South v. Municipal Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control of Atlantic City, No. A-1057-98T3 (App. Div. Apr. 28, 2000). 12 South involved multiple drug transactions occurring on the licensee's premises, many of which involved employees of the licensee. We upheld the distinction made by the Director between the facts in Ishmal, in which the licensee made repeated calls to the police, and those in 12 South, where the licensee's lack of personal knowledge or intent did not alleviate the licensee's responsibility for its employees' or patrons' illegal acts. We also affirmed the Director's decision that the fact that the licensee ultimately called the police after realizing the illegal activity was taking place could be "considered as a mitigating factor in determining the penalty to be imposed . . . ."

Here, unlike the facts in Ishmal, an employee participated in the illegal activity. Moreover, unlike the facts in Ishmal, where the drug activity was prevalent, Maynards never discovered the illegal conduct, despite its security and detection systems, and thus there was no evidence that it affirmatively attempted to eradicate the problem by calling the police or otherwise interceding. The facts established that Maynards "suffered" the illegal activity. Indeed, Maynards concedes it did not have knowledge of the drug dealing by its employee.

Equally unavailing is Maynards' assertion that the Director erred in granting summary decision on liability because it lacked knowledge that CDS sales were being carried out by Barone because he purposefully and successfully hid his activities from view by using the men's room where there was no security camera. "'[T]he word 'suffer' . . . imposes responsibility on a licensee, regardless of knowledge . . . .'" N.J. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. H & H Wine & Spirit Shop, Inc., t/a Towne Liquors, 216 N.J. Super. 532, 536 (App. Div. 1987) (quoting Essex Holding Corp. v. Hock, 136 N.J.L. 28, 31 (Sup. Ct. 1947)). It is also well-established that "[i]t is not necessary . . . to establish actual or constructive notice on the part of the licensee, or circumstances imputing notice to it on principles of respondeat superior, of violation of the regulation by an agent or employee." F. & A. Distrib. Co. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 36 N.J. 34, 37 (1961); see also Mazza v. Cavicchia, 28 N.J. Super. 280, 284 (App. Div. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 15 N.J. 498, 509 (1954); Grenadier Foods, Inc. t/a J.C. Winstons v. Mun. Bd. of ABC of Jersey City, OAL Dkt. No. ABC-11884-99, at *3-4 (Final Conclusion and Order, Dec. 29, 2000). The licensee is responsible for an employee's illegal conduct regardless of notice, even where "the offending conduct had been engaged in contrary to the licensee's instructions." Nutley Twp. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Rockyn Juke Box, Inc., 95 N.J.A.R.2d (ABC) 81, at *16 (Final Agency Decision Sept. 6, 1994); see also F. & A. Distrib. Co., supra, 36 N.J. at 37.

Maynards' contention that the Director erred in granting summary decision on the charge of permitting the sale or delivery of alcoholic beverages to persons underage, in violation of N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1, likewise misses the mark. N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1 provides in relevant part:

(a) No licensee shall sell, serve or deliver or allow, permit or suffer the sale, service or delivery of any alcoholic beverage, directly or indirectly, to any person under the legal age to purchase or consume alcoholic beverages, or allow, permit or suffer the consumption of any alcoholic beverage by any such person in or upon the licensed premises.

Anyone who sells an alcoholic beverage to an underage person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense. N.J.S.A. 33:1-77. Sellers to underage persons, however, have a statutory defense if they prove all of the following:

(a) that the purchaser falsely represented in writing, or by producing a driver's license bearing a photograph of the licensee . . . that he or she was of legal age to make the purchase,

(b) that the appearance of the purchaser was such that an ordinary prudent person would believe him or her to be of legal age to make the purchase, and

(c) that the sale was made in good faith relying upon such written representation, or production of a driver's license bearing a photograph of the licensee . . . and appearance and in the reasonable belief that the purchaser was actually of legal age to make the purchase.

[Ibid.]

In Montville Enterprises, Inc., t/a Rusty Nail v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (ABC) 55, at *2-3 (1995), an underage patron snuck into a bar without showing identification, whereupon she was served an alcoholic beverage. At the time of her arrest, no false identification was found on the patron's person or in her car. Id. at *9-10. The Director found that the licensee could not prove the defense and was guilty of violating N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1. Ibid.

The undisputed facts here established that the two female underage patrons did not have written identification on their persons when they were arrested, nor did they present such identification to anyone, given that they snuck into the bar. Additionally, although Tripician possessed his brother's driver's license, he did not use it, instead he bypassed the doormen without being asked for identification. Moreover, the officers' observations corroborated that patrons were circumventing the doormen, who only occasionally requested identification. Maynards does not dispute those facts, but merely asserts that Tripician looked to be around 21 years of age from outward appearances.

The Director correctly concluded that the uncontroverted facts established that Maynards violated N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1 by allowing, permitting, or suffering the delivery of alcoholic beverage to persons under the legal age for consumption upon its premises. See H & H Wine & Spirit Shop, Inc., supra, 216 N.J. Super. at 537 (holding licensee responsible for open alcoholic beverages purchased by person of age being delivered on the licensed premises to a companion under age).

Finally, we address the penalty imposed. N.J.A.C. 13:2-19.11(i) provides that a first violation of N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.5(b) involving an employee carries a presumptive ninety-day suspension, while the first violation of N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(a) involving sale to a person under the legal age, but over age 18, carries a presumptive fifteen-day suspension. N.J.A.C. 13.2-19.11(d) provides, "[v]iolations by each . . . individual shall constitute a separate incident . . . ." "Successive violations" are those that occur outside the same twenty-four hour period. N.J.A.C. 13.2-19.11(f). Presumptive penalties may be increased or decreased due to the Director's finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. N.J.A.C. 13:2-19.13(a). Some mitigating factors are "previous history of compliance, good faith efforts to prevent a violation and extraordinary cooperation in the investigation demonstrating that the licensee is acting responsibly." N.J.A.C. 13:2-19.13(b). Thus, the presumptive penalty for the six successive violations of N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.5 total a 540-day suspension, and the presumptive term for the three violations of N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(a) carries a total suspension of forty-five days.

Maynards contends that the penalties were excessive, arbitrary, and capricious. We disagree. "The extent of the penalty to be imposed rests within the sound discretion of the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control." Butler Oak Tavern v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 36 N.J. Super. 512, 516 (App. Div. 1955), aff'd, 20 N.J. 373 (1956); see also Grant Lunch Corp. v. Driscoll, 129 N.J.L. 408, 411 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 130 N.J.L. 554 (E. & A. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 801, 64 S. Ct. 431, 88 L. Ed. 484 (1944); Benedetti v. Bd. of Comm's of Trenton, 35 N.J. Super. 30, 35 (App. Div. 1955); Mitchell v. Cavicchia, 29 N.J. Super. 11, 15 (App. Div. 1953); In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 573 (App. Div. 1952). "The burden of rebutting the presumption of validity and regularity of the administrative action rests upon the appellant." Butler Oak Tavern, supra, 36 N.J. Super. at 516; see also Carls v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 31 N.J. Super. 39, 44 (App. Div. 1954), aff'd, 17 N.J. 215 (1955); Welsh Farms, Inc. v. Bergsma, 16 N.J. Super. 295, 300 (App. Div. 1951).

The test for determining the adequacy of a civil penalty is whether it is reasonable in relation to the specific facts involved. Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 444 (1992). The Director provided his reasons for rejecting four of the mitigating factors found by the ALJ. Moreover, the suspension imposed is well within statutorily authorized administrative provisions. N.J.S.A. 33:1-31; see also N.J.A.C. 13:2-19.11(i); N.J.A.C. 13:2-19.13. Our courts have consistently recognized, "[t]he liquor business is one that must be carefully supervised and it should be conducted by reputable people in a reputable manner." Zicherman v. Driscoll, 133 N.J.L. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1946); see also Butler Oak Tavern, supra, 36 N.J. Super. at 520. Because "it is a business attended with danger to the community it may . . . be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils." Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91, 11 S. Ct. 13, 15, 34 L. Ed. 620, (1890); Eskridge, t/a Jimmy's Tavern v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 30 N.J. Super. 472, 475 (App. Div. 1954). We are satisfied that the stiffer penalties imposed by the Director were appropriate to protect the integrity of the system and safeguard the public against unsavory practices. We find no basis to disturb the Director's conclusions and we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by him in his May 27, 2005, Final Conclusion and Order Imposing Penalty.

 
Affirmed.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

(continued)

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A-5571-04T5

February 22, 2006