NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. J.B.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5371-04T45371-04T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.B.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

T.F.,

Defendant,

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF P.N.L.B.,

a Minor.

 

Submitted: January 11, 2006 - Decided January 30, 2006

Before Judges Fall and Grall.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket Number FG-07-321-04.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brett L. Carrick, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law Guardian for the minor P.N.L.B. (Noel Christian Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this guardianship matter, J.B. appeals from an amended order entered in the Family Part on June 13, 2005, terminating his parental rights to his daughter P.N.L.B., and vesting care, custody and guardianship of the child with the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS or Division) for all purposes, including placement for adoption. The following factual and procedural history is relevant to our consideration of the arguments advanced on appeal.

T.F. gave birth to P.N.L.B. on February 6, 2003 at University Hospital in Newark. The June 13, 2005 amended order also terminates the parental rights of T.F.; she voluntarily surrendered her parental rights, and has not appealed.

On January 7, 2003, DYFS received a referral from a social worker at University Hospital, indicating that T.F. had a long history of substance abuse and had been non-compliant with her pre-natal care. However, an investigation by DYFS caseworkers disclosed that the referral had been misconstrued. The hospital social worker informed DYFS that the referral had been made based on hospital policy to report to the Division cases of pregnancy where there had been a prior history of substance abuse. However, the social worker informed the Division that T.F. had been compliant with her pre-natal care, was participating in a substance abuse program at Essex Substance Abuse Treatment Center, Inc., and had been free of illicit substances for two months.

However, upon giving birth to P.N.L.B. on February 6, 2003, T.F. tested positive for cocaine, methadone and heroin; P.N.L.B. tested positive for cocaine and was suffering from withdrawal symptoms. DYFS caseworkers responded to a referral from University Hospital that was based on the results of the drug tests, and interviewed both T.F. and J.B. The initial investigation disclosed that J.B. had a history of drug addiction and suffered from depression that required medication. M.S., the child's maternal aunt, was interviewed on February 10, 2003, after expressing an interest in caring for P.N.L.B. M.S. reported that J.B. had been physically abusive to T.F. in the past, "and that she knows that [J.B.] just used crack last week according to a source that she knows of who does know him well."

Upon substantiating neglect, on February 21, 2003, DYFS filed a Title 9 child abuse and neglect complaint in the Family Part against T.F. and J.B., Docket Number FN-07-379-03, seeking custody of P.N.L.B. The Family Part entered an order on that date, granting temporary custody of P.N.L.B. to the Division, and scheduled a hearing for March 25, 2003. P.N.L.B. remained hospitalized, and DYFS began its investigation for relative placement. Substance abuse evaluations and testing were ordered and arranged by DYFS, as well as mental health evaluations.

On March 25, 2003, a fact-finding hearing was conducted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.44, resulting in entry of an order finding that P.N.L.B had been subjected to abuse or neglect by T.F. and J.B. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21c. A separate dispositional order, see N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.55, was also entered continuing custody of P.N.L.B. with the Division and directing further substance abuse and psychological evaluations of T.F. and J.B. At the March 25, 2003 hearing, both T.F. and J.B. admitted they would test positive for cocaine if tested that day. P.N.L.B., who was still suffering from drug withdrawal symptoms, remained hospitalized.

On April 15, 2003, Dr. Diane W. McCabe, a psychologist, conducted an evaluation of J.B. In her evaluative report, Dr. McCabe stated, in pertinent part:

In spite of the cognitive and emotional testing, [J.B.'s] persona remains somewhat perplexing -- and this without even considering his obsession with religious matters. There were abrupt changes in topic, as when he suddenly began talking about "Mutual of Omaha", or when he abruptly interjected that he had "left home at age 32". On occasion he would open his bible and begin to read and would have to be asked to desist. He was often unable to sustain a focus on the subject. During the course of the two hour evaluation he made three trips to the bathroom. He remained in a generally mellow state for the duration of the testing, suggesting that drug monitoring might be warranted.

[J.B.] verbalized his desire to raise his child a number of times. His ability to parent, however, is uncertain because his emotional status is difficult to establish and that inherently creates risk. While he does not meet the criteria for a specific disorder, there is no doubt that he is an unusual personality. His uniqueness may include some cognitive slippage and an inability to consistently attend to the tasks required to parent effectively.

Dr. McCabe conducted a psychological evaluation of T.F. on April 17, 2003, concluding that she "has limited ability to cope effectively with stress and is at significant risk for resubmitting to drug use[,]" and "has many unresolved issues which he recognizes but has not yet addressed in therapy."

Investigations by DYFS disclosed that relative placement was not possible because two proposed relative resources were not interested in providing long-term care for P.N.L.B. On May 13, 2003, P.N.L.B. was discharged from University Hospital and placed by DYFS into foster care through the Catholic Charities Treatment Home Program. Attempts by DYFS to monitor J.B.'s substance abuse problem with the assistance of a home visitor through the DYFS Child Protection Substance Abuse Initiative were unsuccessful, and J.B. tested positive for cocaine on June 3, 2003.

The Family Part issued a compliance review order on June 3, 2003, continuing custody of P.N.L.B. with the Division, and requiring T.F. and J.B. to submit to psychiatric evaluations, substance abuse treatment, and periodic urine screening. On June 20, 2003, Dr. Ambrose O. Mgbaka, a psychiatrist, conducted an evaluation of J.B. Dr. Mgbaka diagnosed J.B. as suffering from a Bipolar II Disorder, and having "settled in a state of chronic disability. Significant changes in his overall functioning are not expected in the foreseeable future." Dr. Mgbaka found that J.B.'s "current symptoms are characterized by loquacity, flight of ideas, grandiosity and excessive religiosity." Dr. Mgbaka recommended that J.B. be referred to substance abuse counseling and be subjected to random drug testing for a period of six months; that he be evaluated for ongoing medication management; that he attend and complete parenting classes; that he be allowed ongoing parental visits with P.N.L.B.; and that P.N.L.B. "should not be returned to his care until [T.F.] has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation treatment and is off drugs for at least twelve months."

J.B. did not consistently attend the supervised visitation sessions with P.N.L.B. that were arranged by DYFS, and did not complete the parent education program that he had been attending. After P.N.L.B. had been in out-of-home placement for a year, DYFS conducted a permanency review pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-61.2a(2), and concluded that she could not be placed in the care of her parents. DYFS then changed its permanency plan for P.N.L.B. from parent reunification to guardianship and placement for adoption.

On May 14, 2004, DYFS filed a guardianship complaint in the Family Part against T.F. and J.B., seeking an order terminating their parental rights and committing P.N.L.B. to the care and guardianship of the Division. An order was entered on that date, requiring T.F. and J.B. to show cause on June 15, 2004, why the requested relief should not be granted. On the return date, the Family Part ordered psychiatric, psychological, and bonding evaluations.

Dr. Alexander Iofin, a psychiatrist, conducted an evaluation of T.F. on September 10, 2004. Dr. Iofin noted that T.F. had an extensive history of inpatient psychiatric admissions. He diagnosed her as suffering from a post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from being a victim of physical and sexual abuse and neglect; a depressive disorder, NOS; drug dependency; a learning disability; a history of oppositional defiant disorder; a personality disorder NOS, with narcissistic traits, and borderline and antisocial personality features. Dr. Iofin concluded that T.F. would need ongoing psychiatric services for many years, and was a fairly high risk for relapsing on illicit substances. Dr. Iofin stated that he would not consider T.F. "currently or any time in the future as being capable to take care of the child, and be a minimally adequate mother."

Dr. Iofin conducted a psychiatric evaluation of J.B. on January 5, 2005. He noted that J.B. had "a long lasting history of psychiatric problems[,] with "a history of inpatient psychiatric treatment[,]" and "a history of treatment in intensive outpatient programs through the years." Dr. Iofin concluded that J.B. "continues to function marginally, and is required to be engaged in significant utilization of psychiatric services that consist of utilization of psychotropic medications and individual and group therapy, as well as a significant amount of social support that is provided through an intensive outpatient program."

Dr. Iofin diagnosed J.B. as suffering from a schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; a learning disability; cannabis and cocaine abuse in self-reported remission; and borderline intellectual functioning. Dr. Iofin recommended termination of his parental rights because J.B.'s problems "will not change significantly and will not improve significantly in any foreseeable future."

Dr. Leslie J. Williams, a clinical psychologist, performed a psychological evaluation of J.B. on December 16, 2004. In his report, Dr. Williams stated, in pertinent part:

While [J.B.] was very defensive on the psychological testing, his behavior during the interview suggests that he is very expansive and somewhat disorganized. he kept up a rambling conversation throughout the interview and often had to be redirected back to the topic. While he was not overly psychotic and denied hallucinations and delusions, [J.B.] did appear to be rather labile and unfocused. It is difficult to imagine [J.B.] being able to actually focus on the needs of a young child and to adequately meet those needs. As was noted in my bonding evaluation with [J.B.] and [P.N.L.B.], I did not see a particular bond between them and that [J.B.] did not demonstrate particularly good parenting skills at the time of that evaluation.

In my professional opinion, within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, [J.B.] is not capable of providing adequate parenting of [P.N.L.B.] I believe that he needs psychological treatment and perhaps psychotropic medication. [J.B.] may be experiencing a mood disorder such as Bipolar Disorder and this should be evaluated and, if necessary, treated. He is not employed and does not have his own apartment and, again, is not capable of independently caring for [P.N.L.B.]

At a conference held in the Family Part on April 4, 2005, prior to the scheduled commencement of trial, T.F. voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to P.N.L.B., memorialized by an order entered on that date.

The allegations in the guardianship complaint against J.B. were tried in the Family Part before Judge R. Benjamin Cohen on April 5, 2005, and May 2, 2005. Dr. Williams and Dr. Iofin gave testimony substantially similar to the information provided in their evaluative reports. Ebony Pittman, a DYFS caseworker, testified to the involvement of the Division with this family. J.B. produced no witnesses.

On May 5, 2005, Judge Cohen issued an oral opinion, and then entered an order for guardianship terminating the parental rights of J.B., and placing the care and custody of P.N.L.B. with the Division for all purposes, including placement for adoption. In so concluding, the judge stated, in pertinent part:

In the testimony before the court, Dr. Williams testified that [J.B.] could not remediate the harm that [P.N.L.B.] would suffer if she were removed from her foster parents, the only parents she has ever known. She has lived with them since her discharge from the hospital on [May 13, 2003] at three months after her birth.

Dr. Williams also conducted a subsequent psychological evaluation of [J.B.] on December 16th, 2004 and [his] report . . . regarding same is P-87 in evidence[.] . . .

* * * *

The testing that Dr. Williams conducted on [J.B.] indicated to Dr. Williams that [J.B.] was then currently experiencing a mild to moderate mental disorder.

* * * *

In his testimony before this court, Dr. Iofin added that, in his opinion, [J.B.] is not capable of being the primary caretaker for a small child. He can barely take care of himself.

* * * *

[A]ccording to the credible testimony of Division caseworker Ebony Pittman, the court finds that . . . [P.N.L.B.] is happy in her foster home where she has lived continuously for the last two years since she was discharged from the hospital in May of 2003 at the age of three months. [P.N.L.B.] is close to her foster parents and gets upset when she is taken out of the foster home for a visit. [P.N.L.B.] is one of five children in the foster home and is close with her foster siblings.

[P.N.L.B.] has special needs. She has asthma for which she takes medication, she has an eye condition for which she needs surgery, and three, she's developmentally delayed, secondary to her being born addicted to drugs and her extended withdrawal and she needs early intervention and speech therapy.

[T]he Division has provided [J.B.] with numerous services over the last two years[.] . . .

* * * *

[J.B.] still has no job, he receives social security disability, he still has no stable home for [P.N.L.B.], he lives with a roommate and . . . the Division's plans for [P.N.L.B.'s] foster home adoption with current foster parents who want to adopt her.

With regard to the court's conclusions of law, the court notes the four-prong standard known locally as the best interest of the child standard for termination of parental rights indicated in the DYFS v. A.W. decision, 103 N.J. 591 (1986), and substantially incorporated into statute N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a . . . [and] each of those statutory prongs and elements must be established by the Division by clear and convincing evidence[.] . . .

With regard to the first prong, the court concludes from the above findings and facts that have been noted in the entire record in this matter that the Division has established by clear and convincing evidence that the safety, health, and welfare of the child . . . had been and would continue to be endangered by [J.B.] as follows:

Number one, [P.N.L.B.] was born on February 6th, 2003. She tested positive for cocaine and opiates at birth, underwent a lengthy period of withdrawal from those drugs and was not medically cleared for discharge until approximately May 13, 2003, over four months later. . . .

* * * *

Both of her natural parents, [J.B.] and [T.F.], who surrendered her parental rights . . . were drug addicts with [a] long history of substance abuse. [J.B.'s] drug of choice was crack cocaine.

In addition, [J.B.] has a long documented history of mental health problems. [P.N.L.B.] has never been in the care or custody of [J.B.] or for that matter [T.F.], even for a minute, due in large part to her being born addicted to drugs[.] . . . [J.B.] has only visited [P.N.L.B.] sporadically.

Number two, after [P.N.L.B.'s] birth, [J.B.] did not remain drug free, admitted to using drugs on at least two separate occasions and tested positive for cocaine on at least one other occasion.

Number three, evaluations of [J.B.] by several mental health professionals indicate that [J.B.] continues to suffer from chronic mental illness and his prognosis for improvement is not good.

The court concludes from the overwhelming opinion of various experts that [J.B.] is not capable of providing adequate parenting for [P.N.L.B.] . . .

Indeed, [J.B.] is far from being able to be the primary caretaker for a small child, [he] can barely take care of himself.

Four, [J.B.] has no plan for [P.N.L.B.], nor does he even have the means to formulate a plan. He remains unemployed for at least the last five years. He does not have his own apartment and thus no safe stable housing for [P.N.L.B.] . . .

Number five, [P.N.L.B.] is not bonded to [J.B.] In fact, as Dr. Williams in his bonding evaluation stated "there are not even indications [P.N.L.B.] saw [J.B.] as . . . particularly familiar."

Six, [P.N.L.B.] is firmly and strongly bonded to the foster parents who are her psychological parents. [P.N.L.B.] would suffer severe and enduring psychological harm if she were removed from her foster parents.

With regard to the second prong of the best interest standard, the court concludes that the Division has established by clear and convincing evidence that [J.B.] is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm to [P.N.L.B.] or unwilling or unable to provide a safe stable home for [her], and that further delaying [P.N.L.B.'s] permanency will add to that harm. And this based on all of the same findings, same evidence, same factors, and same conclusions as noted above with regard to the first prong.

With regard to the third prong, the court concludes that the Division has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it has made reasonable efforts to help [J.B.] correct the circumstances which led to [P.N.L.B.'s] placement outside of the home[.] . . .

Moreover, the court has considered all other alternatives to termination of parental rights, including long-term foster care and [kinship] legal guardianship and found none to be appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

With regard to the fourth prong, the court concludes that that the Division has proven by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights would not do more harm than good, and this is, again, based on all the same findings, factors, conclusions, evidence as noted above.

In light of this entire record, the court concludes there is clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of [J.B.], considering the importance of permanency and stability from the perspective of the child's needs, . . . is appropriate. The statutory criteria delineated in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a have been satisfied, which is in the best interest of this child[.] . . .

On appeal, J.B. presents the following arguments for our consideration:

POINT I

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF N.J.S.A. 30:3C- 15 AND 30:4C-15.1.

POINT II

THE TERMINATION OF ALL PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, WITHOUT A FAIR AND ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OF LESS SEVERE RELIEF, WAS PUNITIVE AND UNREASONABLE.

We begin our inquiry by restating applicable legal principles. These principles bear replication in light of the remedy ordered by the Family Part judge.

The rights of parents to enjoy a relationship with their children is of constitutional dimension. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)); In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., Jr., 161 N.J. 396, 403-04 (1999); New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986)). Parents have a constitutionally protected, fundamental liberty interest in raising their biological children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982). The Federal and State Constitutions protect the inviolability of the family unit. Stanley, supra, 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S. Ct. at 121-13, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 558-59; A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 599.

"The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118 (1979). As is true of so many other legal presumptions, "experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point. . . ." Id. at 602, 99 S. Ct. at 2504, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 119. The incidence of child abuse and neglect cases attests to the fact that some parents may act against the interests of their children. Ibid.

Government "is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized." Id. at 603, 99 S. Ct. at 2504, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 119 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1540, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 33 (1972)). The State as parens patriae may act to protect children from serious physical and emotional harm. This may require a partial or complete severance of the parent-child relationship. However, "[f]ew forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible." Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at 759, 102 S. Ct. at 1398, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610.

When the child's biological parents resist termination of parental rights, our function is to decide whether the parent can raise the child without causing harm. In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). The cornerstone of our inquiry is not whether the parents are fit, but whether they can become fit to assume the parental role within time to meet the child's needs. Ibid. "The . . . analysis entails strict standards to protect the statutory and constitutional rights of the natural parents." Ibid. The burden rests on the party seeking to terminate parental rights "to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence" that risk of "serious and lasting [future] harm to the child" is sufficiently great as to require severance of parental ties. Ibid. This balance between fundamental parental rights and the State's parens patriae responsibility is achieved through the best interests of the child standard. K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347. Under that standard, parental rights may be severed when:

(1) The child's health and development have

been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to

eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his [or her] foster parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

These standards are neither discrete nor separate. They overlap to provide a composite picture of what may be necessary to advance the best interests of the children. K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348. The considerations involved in determining parental unfitness are "'extremely fact sensitive'" and require particularized evidence that addresses the specific circumstances of the specific case. Ibid. (quoting In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)).

In reviewing the factual findings and conclusions of a trial judge, we are obliged to accord deference to the trial court's credibility determinations and its "feel of the case" based upon the opportunity of the judge to see and hear the witnesses. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998); Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988). We are not to disturb the judge's findings unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).

After analyzing the record in the light of the arguments advanced by the parties, and applying these principles, we conclude that the issues presented by J.B. are without sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A) and (E), and we affirm substantially for the reasons articulated by Judge Cohen in his oral decision delivered on May 5, 2005. There is substantial credible evidence in the record supporting the conclusion of Judge Cohen that the Division has established, by clear and convincing evidence, the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a. We add the following brief comments.

J.B. argues that the Division failed to establish that he ever caused any harm to P.N.L.B., or that she will continue to be endangered by continuance of the parental relationship. This contention misconstrues the statutory requirement, and is without merit. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that "the child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship[.]" The harm here that was established by overwhelming evidence in the record is that J.B.'s substance abuse and mental health problems prevented the placement of P.N.L.B. in his care and custody. The evidence clearly and convincingly established that the placement of P.N.L.B. in the care of J.B. would expose the child to substantial risk, and that there was no reasonable likelihood that such risk would be reduced in the foreseeable future.

J.B. also argues that his willingness to assume care and custody of P.N.L.B. prevented the Division from establishing the second prong of the best interest test. Not so. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(2) required the Division to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that J.B. was "unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing [P.N.L.B.] or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for [P.N.L.B.] and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm." (Emphasis added). That provision goes on to state that "[s]uch harm may include evidence that separating [P.N.L.B.] from his [or her] resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child[.]" Here, regardless of J.B.'s professed "willingness," the evidence overwhelming established that he was "unable" to either eliminate the stated harm, or provide a safe and stable home. Moreover, the expert evidence found credible by Judge Cohen established that to separate P.N.L.B. from the only psychological parents she has ever known would, indeed, cause serious and enduring emotional and psychological harm to P.N.L.B.

The Division also provided substantial resources and services to both parents in an effort to correct the circumstances that led to P.N.L.B.'s placement outside the biological parental home. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(3). The record is replete with efforts by the Division to address substance abuse, mental health, and parenting skills issues, as well as seeking alternatives to termination.

Finally, P.N.L.B.'s right to permanency and stability clearly and convincingly dictated that the termination of the parental rights of her biological parents would "not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(4). See K.H.O, supra, 161 N.J. at 357.

 
Affirmed.

"NOS" means Not Otherwise Specified.

Dr. Williams conducted a bonding evaluation of J.B., T.F., P.N.L.B. and the foster parents on August 20, 2004, August 24, 2004, and October 6, 2004. In his report issued thereafter, Dr. Williams found that P.N.L.B. was "firmly and strongly bonded with her foster parents[,] and "sees her foster parents as her psychological parents, the people who have been stable in her life and to whom she looks for safety and security." Dr. Williams found that "[i]n contrast, [P.N.L.B.] demonstrated no bond with either [T.F.] or [J.B.]" Dr. Williams further opined that P.N.L.B. "would suffer severe and enduring psychological harm if she were removed from" her foster parents.

An amended order of guardianship was issued on June 13, 1005, clarifying that the parental rights of both J.B. and T.F. had been terminated.

(continued)

(continued)

22

A-5371-04T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

January 30, 2006