GLADIS RODRIGUEZ v. MICHAEL CRANE

Annotate this Case

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3828-04T53828-04T5

GLADIS RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL CRANE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________

 

Argued November 16, 2005 - Decided January 12, 2006

Before Judges Wefing and Graves.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen

County, No. FM-2-1378-99.

Phyllis Klein O'Brien argued the cause for

appellant (Donahue, Hagan, Klein, Newsome &

O'Donnell, attorneys; Ms. O'Brien, of counsel

and on the brief; David R. Tawil, on the brief).

Respondent submitted a pro se brief but did not

argue.

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals to this court from the terms of a post-judgment order entered by the trial court on February 18, 2005. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The parties were married on February 13, 1996. The marriage produced one child, Daniel, born on August 2, 1996. The parties separated in November 1998 and were divorced pursuant to a judgment of divorce entered on June 2, 1999. Annexed to the judgment of divorce was a property settlement agreement the parties had executed the previous month. Within that agreement, the parties agreed they would share joint legal custody of Daniel and that plaintiff would have primary residential custody. This agreement spelled out their understanding that Daniel would be reared in the Jewish faith, and it included detailed provisions on visitation. It also provided that defendant was to pay $155 per week in child support.

Unfortunately, the acrimony between the parties did not end with their divorce. Within the year, each filed various complaints against the other. Defendant became unhappy with the nature of the care plaintiff was providing for Daniel, and he filed an application for primary residential custody of Daniel. This led to a contested plenary hearing. After days of hearings, but before completion, plaintiff, who had by then remarried, acceded to defendant's request and decided to relocate to Florida with her new husband and their child, a daughter. A consent order was entered in July 2004 that continued the status of joint legal custody but declared defendant the parent of primary residence and plaintiff the parent of alternate residence. The order also provided for the appointment of a parenting coordinator.

Two subsequent orders were entered in connection with this change in physical custody, both entered on August 9, 2004. The first appointed Mary Ann Stokes, Esq., as the Parent Coordinator, to "serve in a directive role to resolve conflicts related to parenting issues." This order provided that the Parent Coordinator was "permitted and encouraged to facilitate communication and agreement by the parties whenever possible." It also authorized the Parent Coordinator to make recommendations on a variety of parenting issues.

The second order dealt with plaintiff's having vacation time with Daniel in August 2004, terminated defendant's obligation to pay child support and provided that plaintiff pay child support of $29 per week. It also provided that the parties would exchange copies of their 2003 income tax returns after plaintiff relocated to Florida and obtained three pay stubs for three pay periods. In addition, it provided for the recalculation of plaintiff's child support obligation.

Again, unfortunately, the acrimony between the parties did not end. In January 2005, only five months after entry of the prior order, defendant filed a motion seeking sole legal custody of Daniel. He also sought a variety of other relief, including permission to relocate to Toronto with the boy, directing plaintiff to produce her pay stubs and exchange copies of income tax returns so as to permit recalculation of her child support obligation, compelling her to pay fifty percent of the cost of Hebrew school, directing that Daniel spend twelve specific Jewish holidays with him, and removing the Parent Coordinator. Defendant submitted a detailed certification in support of his motion and requested oral argument.

Plaintiff filed a detailed pro se certification in opposition to defendant's motion. She explained that, for financial reasons, she was unable to appear or to retain an attorney to represent her.

Ms. Stokes, the attorney previously appointed as Parent Coordinator, also filed a certification. She disputed defendant's assertion that she was biased in plaintiff's favor. She stated in her certification:

There is no question that this case is one with high conflict parents. Under the statute and case law it probably should be a sole custody case.

The trial court did not grant defendant's request for oral argument. Although it had received sharply divergent certifications, it did not hold a hearing to resolve the disputed questions of fact. Rather, it entered an order that continued the status of joint legal custody, with defendant having residential custody. It named a new Parent Coordinator and authorized that person "in cases where issues cannot be resolved via this negotiation process . . . to make definitive decisions over these irreconcilable issues." The order provided defendant would be responsible for one hundred percent of the cost of Daniel's Hebrew school but that Daniel would alternate the Jewish holidays with both parents. The order also stated that Daniel would attend summer camp in Florida; it specified that he would leave for Florida one day after the last day of school and return to his father two weeks before school resumed in the fall. The order also appointed two psychologists, at defendant's expense, to serve as joint experts, "with the hope that [they] can come to a joint recommendation as to which parent should have sole custody . . . . If conference . . . does not resolve the issue, a trial date will be set and plaintiff will participate via phone conference and defendant will pay for plaintiff's attorney." It is from that order that defendant has appealed.

We do not address the merits of the various provisions of that order. Indeed, we are unable to do so because the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law and provided no statement of reasons why it reached the particular determinations that it did.

The court's failure in this regard breached the requirements of R. 1:7-4(a). According to R. 1:7-4(a), "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right . . . ." A failure to comply with this requirement constitutes a disservice by the trial court to the litigants and to this court. Italiano v. Rudkin, 294 N.J. Super. 502, 505 (App. Div. 1996).

The trial court also failed to observe R. 5:5-4(a), which provides that a court hearing motions in family actions "shall ordinarily grant requests for oral argument on substantive and non-routine discovery motions . . . ." Defendant's motion seeking sole custody was a substantive motion, and defendant, absent special or unusual circumstances, was entitled to oral argument. Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 306 (App. Div. 1997). The trial court here gave no reasons why, in its judgment, defendant was not entitled to oral argument.

We recognize the burdens under which trial judges labor. We also recognize those burdens may be particularly heavy in the Family Division. Compliance with the rules, however, is essential.

There are instances in which, in order to avoid the necessity of a remand, an appellate court may make the necessary findings of fact "pursuant to the constitutional grant of necessary original jurisdiction and R. 2:10-5." Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2006). In light of the sharply divergent certifications presented to the trial court, however, we are unable to do so.

Because we are remanding this matter, we are not addressing the substantive merits of this order, as we have noted. We are, however, concerned about the apparent delegation of ultimate decision-making authority to the Parent Coordinator, as well as the award of counsel fees in advance to plaintiff. If the trial court deems such provisions to be warranted, they should be carefully supported by reasons and authority.

Within his reply brief, defendant has sought to suppress plaintiff's brief and appendix as not in compliance with the rules of appellate practice. We do not address the question in light of our disposition of this matter.

 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.

(continued)

(continued)

7

A-3828-04T5

January 12, 2006

 


Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.