LILLIE WARD v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and RONCEL, INC.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3646-05T33646-05T3

LILLIE WARD,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR and RONCEL, INC.,

Respondents.

_________________________________________________

 

Submitted October 18, 2006 - Decide

Before Judges Parker and C.S. Fisher.

On appeal from a Final Decision of the Board of Review, Docket No. 86,577.

Lillie Ward, appellant pro se.

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; George N. Cohen, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this appeal, Lillie Ward contends that she was entitled to unemployment benefits. The Board of Review rejected her application and we affirm.

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) disqualifies a claimant "for the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works four weeks in employment . . . and has earned at least six times the individual's weekly benefit rate." An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden of proving that he or she did so with good cause attributable to the work. Morgan v. Board of Review, 77 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 1962). We have observed that "while the statute does not define 'good cause,' our courts have construed the statute to mean cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed." Domenico v. Board of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983). In defining those circumstances which meet that requirement, we have said:

In scrutinizing an employee's reason for leaving, the test is one of ordinary common sense and prudence. Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily. The decision to leave employ-ment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary trifling and whimsical ones. . . . [I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.

[Id. at 288 (citations omitted).]

Clearly, such a test is fact-sensitive. As a result, when its findings of fact are challenged on appeal, we will defer to the agency so long as there is credible evidence in the record to support them.

Here, the evidence adduced at the agency hearing revealed that Ward worked as an aide at a day care center. On July 22, 2005, someone in the workplace threw "some liquid of some kind" on Ward's back, causing her to shout out. Her inquiries among other workers seeking the identity of the culprit were, according to Ward, "totally ignored." An hour later, she said to the other employees, "I hate you and I hope you die." Ward later left the workplace and did not return until July 28, 2005.

On July 28, 2005, Ward met with the director of the day care center, who advised Ward that she was not going to be terminated, but was instead reprimanded for her outburst at the time of the incident. The director also testified that she "told [Ward] that I felt that her response to the situation had been way out of line and that she said some things that she should not have . . . said around the children," but "that was it." The director also testified that she reprimanded the employee who threw water on Ward.

The director also testified that Ward had removed her personal things from the workplace and, upon leaving the workplace after her discussion with the director on July 28, Ward obtained her paycheck and asked the director for a letter of recommendation. The director did not provide a letter of recommendation and Ward left the premises. The director testified that she never terminated Ward or said anything that could have been so understood. The Appeal Tribunal concluded that Ward's "separation was voluntary as she did not return to work as expected" and that N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) required a holding that Ward was disqualified for benefits.

The role of an appellate court in such a matter is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but to defer to the agency's findings when they find support in the credible evidence in the record and to defer to the agency's judgment so long as it is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Brady v. Board of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997); Mullarney v. Board of Review, 343 N.J. Super. 401, 406 (App. Div. 2001). We conclude that the agency's findings were fully supported by the record and that there was nothing arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable about the denial of benefits.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

4

A-3646-05T3

October 31, 2006