DEWAYNE MANCE v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1456-05T31456-05T3

DEWAYNE MANCE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent-Respondent.

______________________________________________________________

 

Submitted October 31, 2006 - Decided November 14, 2006

Before Judges Weissbard and Graves.

On appeal from a Final Decision of the New

Jersey Department of Corrections.

Dewayne Mance, appellant pro se.

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for

respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney

General, of counsel; Sarah B. Campbell, Deputy

Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Dewayne Mance, a state prison inmate, appeals from a final administrative decision of the Department of Corrections (DOC). Mance was found guilty of making sexual proposals or threats to another, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a).052. The hearing officer imposed sanctions of fifteen days detention and sixty days loss of commutation time, and referred Mance to the Classification Committee for program and status review, transfer to another institution, and ninety days of administrative segregation. Mance's administrative appeal was denied.

Mance presents the following arguments for our consideration:

POINT I

MANCE'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY HEARING OFFICER BY NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

POINT II

HEARING OFFICER ERRED BY RENDERING A VERDICT OF GUILTY WITHOUT THE FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT HER DECISION.

After reviewing the record and the applicable law in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We add only these brief comments.

It is well settled that the scope of our review in matters such as this is limited. Karins v. City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998); Brady v. Dep't of Pers., 149 N.J. 244, 256-57 (1997). "Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the decision of [an] administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)); accord Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 203-04 (App. Div. 2000).

An inmate charged with a disciplinary infraction is entitled to certain limited rights, including receipt of written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours before the hearing, an impartial hearing officer, a limited right to call witnesses and present evidence, a limited right of confrontation, a written statement of reasons for the sanctions imposed and the evidence relied on and, in certain instances, the assistance of counsel substitute. McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 195-99 (1995); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525-533 (1975).

Mance was charged with making sexual proposals or threats to a female instructor, Dana Brooks, on September 2, 2005. The disciplinary report, which Mance received on September 3, 2005, contains the following description by Ms. Brooks of the alleged infraction:

On the above date, [Inmate] Mance 269478B/486078 followed me as I instructed other [inmates] on task. When questioned if he needs further clarification on mowing his area he said to me "No, I am looking for attention from you." I notified Ofc. Morgan [and] told [Inmate] Mance to wait on the curb [at] MFH for Ofc. Morgan. [Inmate] Mance's actions [were] of an alarming nature as he continued to follow directly behind me after he was questioned to have a seat on the curb until the arrival of Ofc. Morgan. Please note [Inmate] Jenkins 548725B/519924 approached me [and] stated that Mance talked to him [and] said "Ms. Brooks is having a relationship [with] some little white boy on the farm."

Mance claims that he was denied due process because he was not afforded counsel substitute. But paragraph eleven of the Adjudication of Disciplinary Charge form indicates that counsel substitute was not requested by Mance, and he acknowledged, by signing the form, that the information on it accurately reflected what occurred at his disciplinary hearing. Mance does not contend he was unable to prepare his defense because the charge was complex, or he is illiterate, and we note that Mance was not charged with committing an asterisk offense. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12(a) ("When an inmate has been charged with an asterisk offense, the inmate shall be afforded the right to request representation by a counsel substitute.").

Mance also claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the hearing officer's decision. A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing must be supported by "substantial evidence." Avant, supra, 67 N.J. at 530; N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). In this case, the hearing officer relied on a statement from Ms. Brooks, a corroborating statement from an inmate who witnessed the incident, and an investigative report. The hearing officer also considered but rejected Mance's statement that he did not know why Ms. Brooks would accuse him of making a sexual proposal or threat.

After reviewing the record in light of Mance's contentions, we conclude that he received all the procedural protections to which he was entitled. We are also satisfied that the final decision of the DOC is supported by substantial credible evidence.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-1456-05T3

November 14, 2006