STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RAHKEEM BYRD

Annotate this Case

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0658-03T40658-03T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RAHKEEM BYRD,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

 

Submitted December 14, 2005 - Decided February 10, 2006

Before Judges Wefing, Wecker and Graves.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Camden County, Nos. 1388-04-02

and 3703-12-01.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Diane Toscano, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney

for respondent (Johanna Barba Jones, Deputy

Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter, amended from murder, under Indictment 3703-12-10, and one count of first-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute under Indictment 1388-04-02. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a custodial term of sixteen years in prison, with an eight-year period of parole ineligibility, for the narcotics conviction and a concurrent ten-year term for aggravated manslaughter. The latter sentence was imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, "No Early Release Act" or "NERA." Defendant has appealed. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm.

Shortly after midnight on December 20, 2000, Camden police responded to a reported shooting on Norris Street. The victim, who had multiple gunshot wounds to the chest and head, was transported to the hospital, where he was declared dead. Several days later, an individual who had witnessed the shooting contacted the police and identified defendant as the shooter. Based upon that information, the police obtained a warrant for defendant's arrest upon a charge of murder.

On the morning of January 25, 2001, the police went to 1509 Princess Avenue in Camden to execute this arrest warrant. According to the record, a number of officers were involved in executing the arrest warrant, and officers were stationed at several points around the premises in case defendant attempted to flee. When they knocked on the door, the occupant told them that defendant was not at 1509 but at the next house, 1511 Princess Avenue. Based upon that information, the officers went to 1511 and knocked on the door. When they received no response after several minutes, they returned to 1509 for further information. While speaking to the occupant of 1509, a man (later identified as defendant) opened the door of 1511 Princess Avenue and looked outside; police posted in the front for security alerted the other officers, who then drew their weapons and informed defendant he was under arrest. Defendant began to back into 1511, and the officers followed him. Once inside, they saw a .40 caliber handgun protruding from a purse and two packages they recognized as most likely containing crack cocaine. When informed that he was under arrest, defendant asked to put on a coat before leaving and gestured toward a black jacket. When one of the officers retrieved the jacket, he felt a heavy object in a pocket and discovered two loaded .40 caliber magazines. Based upon these discoveries, the police sought a warrant to search the premises at 1511. Based upon the affidavit of two of the officers involved in the initial arrest and entry, a search warrant was issued and promptly executed. A search of 1511 led to the discovery of additional drugs, drug paraphernalia and more weapons.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the items uncovered during this search, contending that the entry into 1511 had been a pretext to gain information to justify issuance of a search warrant for the premises. The trial court conducted a hearing at which three witnesses testified--Yvette Campbell and Anthony Newman for defendant, and Sergeant Marty Devlin, of the Camden County Prosecutor's Office. Sergeant Devlin, who was one of the two officers who signed the affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant, testified essentially along the lines we have set forth earlier.

Ms. Campbell's testimony was contrary, however. She told the court that she lived at 1505 Princess Avenue and observed defendant's arrest from her front porch. She said that she saw defendant leave 1511 and walk up to 1509. She said the police arrested defendant while he was on the steps of 1509 and placed him in a squad car parked on the street. She continued that the police then entered 1511 where they remained for a period of time. She said that she saw police on the porch of 1511 with a big trash bag and that she observed that they had taken apart an air conditioner. She also said that later in the afternoon, another officer arrived and delivered a white piece of paper to an officer standing in the doorway of 1511.

Anthony Newman testified that he lived at 1509 Princess Avenue and was home when the police came to arrest defendant. He said he was placed in handcuffs while the police went through 1509 looking for defendant. He said he heard defendant being arrested but did not see what occurred at the time.

Following the conclusion of the hearing, defendant argued that this testimony demonstrated that the police had no authority to enter 1511 Princess Avenue when they did and that all of the items subsequently seized should, in consequence, be suppressed. The trial court rejected defendant's argument and the motion to suppress. Defendant thereafter entered his negotiated plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. R. 3:9-3(f).

On appeal, defendant makes the following contentions:

POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE DEFENDANT PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS NOT INSIDE THE HOUSE, WHERE OFFICERS CLAIMED TO OBSERVE CONTRABAND AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST, AND ABSENT PLAIN VIEW JUSTIFICATION, NO PROBABLE CAUSE SUPPORTED THE WARRANT.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL WHEN IT SENTENCED HIM TO TERMS GREATER THAN THE PRESUMPTIVE TERM, BASED UPON FACTS NEITHER ADMITTED BY DEFENDANT NOR FOUND BY THE JURY. (NOT RAISED BELOW).

A. Pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, Defendant's Sentence Must be Reduced.

B. The Court's Erroneous Application of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Requires a Sentence Reduction.

As part of his initial contention on appeal, defendant contends, as he did below, that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled, in certain limited instances, to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the truthfulness of the affidavits submitted to establish probable cause in support of an application for a search warrant. Id. at 155-56, 98 S. Ct. at 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 672. The Court, however, intentionally restricted the scope of its holding, requiring that a defendant make "a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit." Ibid. New Jersey follows the standards enunciated in Franks and has declined to adopt a more expansive approach. State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 568, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994, 100 S. Ct. 527, 62 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1979); State v. Chaney, 318 N.J. Super. 217, 222 n.1 (App. Div. 1999).

Here, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court in its oral opinion specifically noted that, in its view, the testimony of Sergeant Devlin "[rang] truer" and that the affidavit signed by Devlin and submitted in support of the warrant application was "significantly accurate." We are not free to disregard these credibility findings and assessments. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).

We note, moreover, that it is unclear what further relief defendant would seek at this point under the principles enunciated in Franks. Defendant received, in connection with his motion to suppress, an evidentiary hearing as to circumstances surrounding the entry into 1511 Princess Avenue. He has, in effect, received the relief to which he would be entitled under Franks, but the trial court rejected the testimony proffered on his behalf.

Defendant's remaining argument is directed to his sentence, which he contends violates the principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and our own Supreme Court in State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005), and State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497 (2005). We note at the outset that the only portion of defendant's sentence to which he may present an argument under that line of cases is the sixteen-year term, with an eight-year period of parole ineligibility, for first degree possession of narcotics with intent to distribute. That sentence is one year beyond the presumptive term for first-degree crimes that was employed in the sentencing calculus prior to the Court's announcement of its decisions in Natale and Abdullah. Defendant's sentence of ten years for aggravated manslaughter, together with its NERA components, is unassailable.

 
We have reviewed the record presented to us and we decline, at this juncture, to interfere with defendant's sentence. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. At the time defendant entered his plea of guilty, he was, in light of his past criminal record, subject both to a mandatory extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f and a discretionary extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3a. Defendant's plea of guilty to first-degree possession of narcotics with intent to distribute thus exposed him to a potential sentence between twenty years and life. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(2). Defendant's sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum authorized by the facts admitted by his guilty plea. State v. Natale, 184 N.J. at 487.

Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

8

A-0658-03T4

February 10, 2006

 


Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.