MERIC ADRIANSEN v. WAYNE DODGE, INC.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4434-03T3

MERIC ADRIANSEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WAYNE DODGE, INC., a New

Jersey Corporation,

Defendant-Respondent.

 

Argued: October 6, 2005 - Decided:

Before Judges Stern and Fall.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket Number HUD-L-2462-02.

William Z. Shulman argued the cause for appellant.

No brief was filed by respondent.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Meric Adriansen appeals from the grant of a directed verdict during trial in favor of defendant Wayne Dodge, Inc., at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, dismissing his claims for damages resulting from defendant's repair of his motor vehicle. The following factual and procedural history is relevant to our consideration of the arguments advanced on appeal.

During the early morning hours of April 8, 2000, after making an appointment, plaintiff filled out a "Self Service Repair Order" envelope, placed the key to his 1991 Dodge Stealth vehicle inside the envelope, slid the envelope under the door of the service department of the Wayne Dodge, Inc. dealership, and left his car there for servicing. At that point, the vehicle's odometer read 121,101 miles.

On the repair order, plaintiff requested defendant's service department to perform an oil and filter change; tune engine; check fluids; inspect the right front rim because it was bent, fix it, and seal the tire; replace the driver-side low-beam headlight; fix the back-up lights, which "don't go out[],]" and repair; and check the struts and shocks. Plaintiff signed the repair order, authorizing work up to a limit of $500. Plaintiff was on a business trip during the week of April 10, 2000.

On or about April 11 or 12, 2000, Mark Ostrosky, one of defendant's service representatives, contacted plaintiff by telephone, informed plaintiff that the service department had, at no cost, performed a forty-point, bumper-to-bumper check of the vehicle, and inquired as to whether plaintiff wanted them to perform a tune-up; after determining the cost, plaintiff declined.

Plaintiff admitted that based on the repair order and his conversation with Ostrosky, he duly authorized an oil and filter change; repair of the right front wheel rim; replacement of the headlight; repair of the back-up lights; replacement of the front strut and mount; repair of the front hub and bearing on the axle; and replacement of the front and rear brakes. After that discussion with Ostrosky, plaintiff also authorized a Bilstein engine flush. Plaintiff testified that he had thereby initially authorized defendant to perform services and repairs that would cost approximately $2,000.

After plaintiff returned from his business trip, he received a telephone call from Ostrosky stating that after they performed the Bilstein engine flush, the vehicle would not start. Ostrosky informed plaintiff that "they took the covers off the engine, they did some troubleshooting and they found out that indeed the top part of the engine had seized, that the valve springs had come off and that the engine had suffered major damage." Plaintiff further testified that Ostrosky

said he would have to get the manufacturer of the flush machine which he said at that time that was the first time I actually found out about the flush machine that they were using that he had to have the Bilstein representatives come by and take a look at the damage that was caused and advise them further and he also told [me to] go ahead, rent a car and the responsible party in this matter, their insurance company, will pick up the tab of that[.] . . .

Based on that conversation, plaintiff rented a vehicle from Enterprise rent-a-car.

After that conversation with Ostrosky, up until June 2000, plaintiff contacted defendant's service department every few weeks to determine the status of the vehicle. After the Bilstein representative inspected their engine flush machine and plaintiff's vehicle, Bilstein denied any responsibility for the damage to plaintiff's vehicle. Although plaintiff requested it, defendant never provided him with a copy of any report issued by Bilstein concerning that inspection.

In a subsequent conversation, Ostrosky informed plaintiff that defendant had agreed to pay for one-half of the cost of repairing the top portion of the engine, but that the other half would have to be borne by plaintiff at a cost to him of approximately $3,000. Ostrosky also told plaintiff that defendant would continue to attempt to get Bilstein to agree to pay for a portion of the repair cost. Plaintiff testified that he felt that he had no choice, and authorized defendant to proceed with the repair of the top part of the engine on that basis. Therefore, plaintiff authorized that repair work.

After repairing the top portion of the engine, a testing of the vehicle disclosed that its engine turbos were leaking oil, and that the vehicle was unusable unless the turbos were repaired. Ostrosky informed plaintiff that the cost to repair the turbos would be $3,000, which cost would have to be borne by plaintiff. Complaining about having to assume the repair costs, plaintiff spoke with Steve Brandt, defendant's service manager, who told plaintiff "there was nothing he could do." Plaintiff told the service department to complete the repair of the turbos quickly, stating "I authorized them to go ahead with repairing the turbos." In his testimony, plaintiff explained:

I gathered that there was no reason to really further pursue this with them, that I had to take this action later after the car was finished and at that point my key . . . objective was to get the car repaired and out of there as quickly as possible because I was still paying for the rental of the car and he had indicated to me that they weren't going to pay for the rental of the car as well so I had by now another $4,000 of car rental charges[.] . . .

In August 2000, Ostrosky informed plaintiff that the turbos had been replaced and worked fine, but that the engine block itself was now leaking, and it would cost an additional $6,000 to rebuild the bottom part of the engine. Ostrosky stated to plaintiff, "the car won't hold pressure, . . . do you want your car or you don't want your car." Plaintiff explained:

At that point I was already into this up to my neck deep into these continuous expenses to get my car out of there. I wanted my car back out of there as quickly as possible and I pretty much felt that if I didn't get this done, that I pretty much would have no car and I would have a lawsuit at least. At that point I said, you know, let's get it finished, done with so I can get the car out of here and then we'll take the matter through legal proceedings.

Plaintiff then sent defendant a letter dated August 22, 2000, by facsimile transmission, stating in pertinent part:

Based on your latest discovery that the engine on my Dodge Stealth is now, after the top rebuild and the turbo replacement, exhibiting low oil pressure and knocking. Based on your opinion, there is no other remedy but to rebuild the bottom of the engine which leaves me no choice but to proceed with that option.

As I indicated earlier, time is of an essence, as we are now approaching the six-month mark that my car has been in your shop, and the car rental fees have surpassed $5,500. I hope you will complete these current repairs in the approximated two week time frame you have estimated.

Please have Steve give me a call when he gets back from vacation on Monday to see if he can do better on the price of the bottom rebuild you estimated to be around $7,500 as the complete cost to me of this "saga" (originally was just supposed to be a simple oil change and brake and shock maintenance) appears to be over $15,000.

At some point after August 22, 2000, defendant informed plaintiff the repairs had been completed, and the vehicle was ready to be picked up upon payment of $17,133.87 by certified check. Although plaintiff protested some of the items on the bill as not being authorized including a $105 towing charge incurred on August 17, 2000 plaintiff paid defendant the amount of its bill by certified check on or about September 1, 2000, and picked up his vehicle.

On April 10, 2002, plaintiff filed a five-count complaint against defendant in the Law Division, seeking compensatory and consumer-fraud damages. The first count alleged that defendant had solicited and convinced plaintiff that an engine flush was needed on his car, and that defendant had negligently performed the engine flush, causing damage to the vehicle costing plaintiff over $15,000 for the repair and rebuilding of the engine, and $5,500 in car rental costs.

The second count alleged that defendant had acted deceitfully, unconscionably and tortiously in undertaking the engine flush, advising plaintiff that it would cost him $102.45, when in fact the engine flush resulted in costs to plaintiff of over $15,000, plus $5,500 in car rental costs. Plaintiff contended defendant had failed to obtain his authorization for those costs, and therefore violated the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -106.

The third count of the complaint alleged that defendant had committed acts constituting consumer fraud because defendant knew that the engine flush was not necessary, and against established procedure for plaintiff's vehicle.

The fourth count alleged that defendant told plaintiff to rent a vehicle from Enterprise, and that defendant would pay for the car rental costs while plaintiff's car was being repaired, thereby causing plaintiff to incur $5,500 in car rental costs, for which defendant should be responsible.

The fifth count alleged that the misrepresentations by defendant concerning the rental car were deceitful acts that violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.

On May 6, 2002, defendant filed an answer, denying the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, and demanding judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety, along with assessment of reasonable attorneys fees.

The matter was tried to a jury beginning on February 18, 2004. In addition to his own testimony, plaintiff presented the expert testimony of Vincent Ciulla. Ciulla testified that he has worked in the auto mechanics field for more than thirty years. He explained that he has been factory-trained by various car manufacturers; has been a trainer and instructor of auto technicians from basic auto mechanics right up to advanced diagnostics; has taught auto technicians how to use diagnostic equipment "such as scan tools, oscilloscopes, code readers and such[;"] has held positions "as a line mechanic, service writer, service advisor, service manager and just [about] every aspect of dealer operation[;"] has owned his own auto repair shop; is a certified master auto technician; has "built and/or rebuilt engines[;"] and has worked on "ten, fifteen thousand cars in [his] career, probably more." Ciulla explained that he was also an editor and publisher of an auto repair website.

After hearing initial testimony from Ciulla the judge excused the witness and jury, and initiated a discussion with counsel concerning the scope of Ciulla's testimony, followed by voir dire examination of Ciulla outside the presence of the jury. Upon inquiry by the trial judge concerning his familiarity with worn engines, Ciulla testified he "learned about worn engines by taking apart engines with a lot of miles on them, by physically examining the parts, the moving parts, basing the wear versus the amount of mileage on the car." He explained that there is no formal training, as such, available on the topic of "worn engines," nor are there any manuals that specifically deal with worn engines.

After extensive argument, and considering Ciulla's initial testimony, the trial judge ruled that Ciulla was an expert in the field of automotive mechanics, but not an expert on worn engines, stating that Ciulla had no formal training or certifications for work on worn engines, and had never performed a Bilstein engine flush. On further examination, Ciulla testified, however, that he had rebuilt over 200 engines during his career, and had experience in repairing engines that had been damaged because of engine flushes. He explained that over the last two years he had "replaced three engines that were damaged by engine flushing." He stated that after inspecting those vehicles, in his expert opinion the engine flushing had caused the engine damage. When asked how he came to those conclusions, Ciulla stated:

Because of the particular type of damage. A connecting rod bearing wears gradually over a period of time. Depending on how well the car is maintained, connecting rod bearings can be expected to last almost the life of the car. For them to suffer this kind of damage, there was a foreign material introduced in the space between the connecting rod bearing, . . . and the bearing surface that the connecting rod rides on, a . . . crank shaft. It's a very close tolerance and any gunk or garbage pushed back through into that area would tear up the bearing material in almost no time at all.

Ciulla testified there were three brands of engine-flush machines on the market. Although Ciulla stated he had once seen a Bilstein flush being performed, he had never performed one himself. He explained, however, that "there may be [subtle] differences [in each machine] but the basic theory and operation of the [engine flush] machines are all the same." With respect to the Bilstein machine, Ciculla stated:

Well, I've read the Bilstein manual. I know what's involved, I know the steps involved with the process of flushing an engine. I've seen it done and I've seen damage directly related to the use of this machine which is . . . one reason why I will never buy a machine.

Upon inquiry concerning the basis for his knowledge of the potential effects of engine flushing, Ciulla stated:

Rebuilding the engines, replacing the engines that have been damaged by these flush machines. . . . [B]asically the engines I got to fix were flushed, died and were brought to my shop in the space of hours. There was no days involved, there was no weeks. The second one that came in died within ten minutes of leaving the shop where the engine was flushed. I tore that engine down and I saw the damage -- you want an analogy, it's like a doctor who finds a clogged artery. He knows what caused that clogged artery. He knows that either your bad diet or whatever caused that clogged artery. If I see a clogged camshaft or if I see a clogged oil passage, I know what caused that clogged oil passage.

The judge first held that Ciulla

can't testify about the Bilstein machine because he has no training or experience in the use of the Bilstein machine. He cannot interpret what is meant in the Bilstein manual because he has no training and experience with the Bilstein machine.

Moreover, after extensive additional argument concerning the scope of Ciulla's testimony, the judge stated:

The problem in this [case] and where I keep coming back to the same thing, and I'm going to review these cases, and I may be changing my decision in this because [Ciulla] simply doesn't have sufficient training or experience to give that kind of opinion about an engine flush. He just doesn't have it.

The judge also expressed concern as to whether there were sufficient facts to causally connect the damage to plaintiff's vehicle to the engine flush performed.

When the trial resumed on the next trial day, the judge ruled, as follows:

This is . . . a case in which the court has barred the further testimony of the expert. If the jury were called back, the court would decertify the expert and strike all testimony by the expert given in the presence of the jury so we are left with no proximate cause. We are left with a net opinion which the court is barring. We're left with no cause.

We are left with no means of establishing any ascertainable loss, the result of something done by Wayne Dodge.

At that point, counsel for defendant moved for dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. The judge granted the motion, ruling that plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient, competent evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence or wrongdoing by defendant. In dismissing the consumer fraud claims, the judge concluded that plaintiff had failed to establish an ascertainable loss. The judge also found that defendant had substantially complied with all applicable consumer fraud administrative regulations, and there was no basis for a consumer fraud claim. A final judgment memorializing dismissal of the complaint was entered on March 5, 2004.

On appeal, plaintiff presents the following arguments for our consideration:

POINT I

THE COURT ERRED BY DECERTIFYING PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT AND BARRING PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT'S TESTIMONY.

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED BY BARRING PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT TESTIMONY AS NET OPINION.

POINT III

THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT IN THE FACE OF CLEAR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT BY FAILURE TO PROVIDE WRITTEN ESTIMATIONS AND FOR HAVING PERFORMED WORK WITHOUT ADVISING PLAINITFF.

I.

Plaintiff argues that the trial judge erred in decertifying plaintiff's expert, and in ruling that his testimony constituted a net opinion. We agree, and conclude that plaintiff's expert witness should have been permitted to testify as an expert concerning the appropriateness of performing an engine flush on plaintiff's vehicle, and whether the vehicle had been damaged by that engine flush.

The admission of expert evidence is governed by the New Jersey Rules of Evidence. See N.J.R.E. 702-705. Our standard of review applicable to evidentiary determinations at trial is whether the court misapplied its discretion, and we will reverse such decisions only where the trial court committed a clear error of judgment. State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001); Green v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999). Moreover, we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court's ruling was "'so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" Brown, supra, 170 N.J. at 147 (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 216 (1984)); accord, Green, supra, 160 N.J. at 492.

Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 703, an expert's opinion must be based on "facts, data, or another expert's opinion, either perceived or made known to the expert, at or before trial." Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 401 (App. Div. 2002). Specifically, N.J.R.E. 703 provides:

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.

Here, Ciulla had over thirty years of auto mechanic experience, had taught auto mechanics, was familiar with the engine flush process, and had rebuilt and replaced engines that had been damaged by engine flushing. Although Ciulla did not have specific training in using the Bilstein engine flush machine, his extensive experience as an auto mechanic and in rebuilding engines damaged by engine flushing was more than adequate to permit his expert testimony in this area. He was also fully familiar with the Bilstein manual, which stated that an engine flush should not be completed on a worn engine. Specifically, Appendix I thereof stated, "Engines Not Recommended: The Bilstein Engine Flush Service is not recommended for the following engines: D) Worn Engines." Ciulla concluded that plaintiff's engine was worn since it had over 121,000 miles on it; therefore, he opined, defendant should not have performed an engine flush on plaintiff's vehicle. Ciulla should have been permitted to testify to that opinion, and it was for the jury to weigh that testimony and determine whether it should be credited. See Molino v. BF Goodrch Co., 261 N.J. Super. 85, 96-98 (App. Div. 1992) (in a case involving the explosion of a tire and rim assembly during an attempt to affix an already-inflated tire to a truck wheel, we held the trial court had misapplied its discretion in refusing to permit expert testimony concerning the purpose and content of warnings to prevent accidental injuries from a witness who had thirty-eight years of experience in the tire industry, even though that expert had not completed any research regarding warnings or their effectiveness); Shatz v. Technical Adhesives, 174 N.J. Super. 135, 146 (App. Div. 1980) (ruling that expert witness' knowledge of the product was sufficient basis to permit him to testify as to the adequacy of warnings even though he had no special expertise in actual writing of warning labels). Here, Ciulla was fully familiar with engines, including worn engines, and with the process of engine flushing and its potential effect upon a worn engine. His lack of special expertise in the Biltein engine flush machine itself was not a basis to exclude his expert testimony on the issue of whether it was appropriate to conduct an engine flush on plaintiff's vehicle.

Moreover, Ciulla's opinion was not offered as a critique or an evaluation of the Bilstein machine, but rather to describe the process inherent in the reverse engine flush. Ciulla had examined all of the invoices, had been specifically advised of the condition of the vehicle before April 10, 2000, as well as its condition after the engine flush, and was told of the statements made by defendant's agents that after the engine flush had been completed the engine seized.

We also conclude that Ciulla's proffered expert opinion on the propriety of an engine flush was not a "net opinion." Net opinions are those that constitute bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence, and they are inadmissible. Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981); Jiminez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 374 (1996). Under the "net opinion" rule, an opinion lacking in such foundation and consisting of bare conclusions unsupported by factual evidence is inadmissible. Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91 (1984). The rule requires an expert "to give the why and wherefore" of his or her opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. Jiminez, supra, 286 N.J. Super. at 540. Further, expert testimony which does not relate to generally-accepted standards, but instead references a standard that is personal to the expert, is equivalent to a net opinion. Taylor v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1999).

Here, Ciulla's opinion concerning the engine flush performed by defendant was supported by factual evidence in the record, and not based on unfounded speculation or unqualified possibilities. Ciulla was an expert in auto mechanics and had extensive experience in the repair of worn engines. He testified to extensive familiarity with engine flushes, and was fully qualified to express an opinion as to the advisability of performing an engine flush on this particular vehicle. Moreover, Ciulla had a factual basis and foundation upon which he could base that opinion, in the form of specific knowledge about the mileage, the condition of plaintiff's vehicle, and the reasons for the specific work performed by defendant on plaintiff's vehicle.

Defendant's admission that the results of its forty-point check found plaintiff's vehicle was in good condition when presented to its dealership, along with Ciulla's thirty years of experience in the automotive industry, provided a sufficient foundation for receipt of his testimony concerning the engine flush that had been performed. We agree, however, that the trial court properly barred Ciulla from testifying concerning whether defendant "strung plaintiff along" or had committed consumer fraud, as that was not a proper subject of expert testimony in this case, nor was there an adequate foundation for such an opinion.

II.

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims alleging violations of the Consumer Fraud Act. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant violated N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, which states:

The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice . . . .

An "unlawful practice" falls into three general categories: affirmative acts, knowing omissions, and regulatory violations. Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 17 (1994). When the alleged consumer fraud violation is an affirmative act, intent is not an essential element and the defendant need not prove that the defendant intended to commit an unlawful practice. Id. at 17-18. When the alleged consumer fraud consists of an omission, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with knowledge, and intent is an essential element. Id. at 18. A regulatory violation is a per se violation. Id. at 18-19. As remedial legislation, the Consumer Fraud Act should be liberally construed. Id. at 15. See Gross v. TJH Automotive Co., 380 N.J. 176, 189 (App. Div. 2005).

Plaintiff alleged that defendant had engaged in deceptive practices in violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. Deceptive practices in the conduct of the business of an automotive repair dealer are defined by regulation, in pertinent part, as follows:

1. Making or authorizing in any manner or by any means whatever any statement, written or oral, which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or by which the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.

2. Commencing work for compensation without securing one of the following:

i. Specific written authorization from the customer, signed by the customer, which states the nature of the repair requested or problem presented and the odometer reading of the vehicle; or

ii. If the customer's vehicle is presented to the automotive repair dealer during other than normal working hours or by one other than the customer, oral authorization from the customer to proceed with the requested repair or problem presented, evidenced by a notation on the repair order and/or invoice of the repairs requested or problem presented, date, time, name of person granting such authorization, and the telephone number, if any, at which said person was contacted.

3. Commencing work for compensation without either:

* * * *

ii. If the customer's vehicle is presented to the automotive repair dealer during other than normal working hours or by one other than the customer, obtaining from the customer either:

(1) A written authorization to proceed with repairs not in excess of a specific dollar amount. For the purposes of this subchapter, said dollar amount shall be deemed the estimated price of repairs; or

(2) Oral approval of an estimated price of repairs evidenced by a notation on the repair order or invoice of the estimated price of repairs, date, time, name of person approving such estimate, and the telephone number, if any, at which such person was contacted.

* * * *

5. Making deceptive or misleading statements or false promises of a character likely to influence, persuade or induce a customer to authorize the repair, service or maintenance of a motor vehicle.

* * * *

13. Any other unconscionable commercial practice prohibited pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et. seq.

[N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26C.2.]

Plaintiff contends that defendant clearly violated the written estimate and authorization provisions of the Act. We disagree.

We first note that plaintiff cited on appeal, and to the trial court, the wrong administrative regulation N.J.A.C. 13:21-21.11. That regulation concerns an "auto body repair facility" (emphasis added). The correct regulation is, as quoted above, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26C.2, which applies to "automotive repairs." Notwithstanding, both regulations are substantially similar in their requirements.

Our review of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26C.2, viewing plaintiff's proofs in their most favorable light, discloses no regulation-based violation, nor any other basis upon which consumer fraud could be found. Plaintiff was in weekly contact with defendant concerning the progress of the authorized repairs on his car, and authorized every repair undertaken by defendant. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff was not kept fully informed of the costs of such repairs, or that they were inflated. In addressing that issue, the trial judge found the following:

I found that the defendant was not in violation of that regulation, that there was at all phases of this repair work communication between and it was not just vague communications but there were telephonic communications, conversations between the plaintiff and the defendants.

The trial judge also found that there had been substantial compliance with regulatory scheme. We agree.

Plaintiff's contention that the $105 tow charge was without his specific authorization, and thereby constituted a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, is without merit. It is conceivable that plaintiff's authorization for engine repair would logically encompass authorization for repair-related actions, including replacing spark plugs and towing the car from the area where it was being stored to the location where the repairs would be completed.

III.

In summary, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's consumer fraud claims against defendant. We also affirm the trial court's ruling that plaintiff's expert may not testify as an expert in deceptive automotive repair practices. We reverse the decertification of plaintiff's expert, and hold that said expert should have been permitted to testify as an expert in automotive mechanics, more specifically, concerning the propriety of the use of an engine flush machine on plaintiff's vehicle, and whether, in his opinion, the engine flush caused the damages to that vehicle necessitating the repairs authorized, undertaken and completed by defendant.

 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-4434-03T3

December 8, 2005