NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. J.E.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-FG-11-45-044231-04T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.E.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF C.E.,

A minor.

____________________________________________

 

Submitted October 6, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Conley and Weissbard.

On appeal from Superior Court of New

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family

Part, Mercer County, FG-11-45-04.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

attorney for appellant (Michele A. Adubato, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney

for respondent Division of Youth and Family Services (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Leila Lawrence, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law

Guardian for minor C.E., (Noel Christian

Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant J.E., the natural father of C.E., appeals from a judgment terminating his parental rights to C.E. Both the plaintiff, Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), and the Law Guardian appointed to represent the interests of C.E., support the termination order.

The complaint seeking guardianship and termination was filed by DYFS on May 27, 2004. At that point, C.E. had been in the custody of DYFS, and in foster care, since February 27, 2001. Trial took place on December 13, 2004, and February 15 and 16, 2005. At the time of trial, defendant was serving a state prison sentence for carjacking, and was enrolled in an in-patient program for substance abuse. He believed that he would be deported to El Salvador, his native country, upon completion of his sentence. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Strelecki delivered an oral opinion, of which we quote only the concluding portion:

I am satisfied that the Division, by clear and convincing evidence, has met all of the requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). And you know -- before going a little further into that -- I point out that parents do have a fundamental, Constitutional right, to raise their children. However, the Constitutional protection, surrounding family rights, is tempered by the State's [parens patrie] responsibility to protect the welfare of the children.

And what the Division is asking the Court to do here today, is to protect this child from this father, who has placed him in situations which were incomprehensible to me -- incomprehensible. How a father could do what he did with this child; you know, when he wanted him, he used him. When he didn't want him, he just dumped him. And I say dump, in a meaningful way; just dumped him, on whoever he could find at the particular time.

So there's no security, no stability. Well, it's very difficult to characterize his feelings for this child as love. It's more like, well, he's mine. He belongs to me. And I'm going to say what happens to him. No looking, to see if the child's happy where he is, if it's a good environment for him. No I want him. And I'm going to send him back to El Salvador, where I don't want to live. But he can go, and live with my brother there.

As I've indicated, the Division has satisfied all the requirements of Title 30. And [C.E.]'s safety, health and development has been and would continue to be endangered by this parental relationship. The facts are on the record. This father is unwilling to eliminate the harm facing the child, and unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child. And the delay of permanent placement would only add to that harm.

Such harm could include separating this child from his foster parents, with whom he is doing very well, and would [cause] serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to this child. The Division has made many efforts to provide services, to help this father correct the circumstances, which led to the child's placement outside the home. And alternatives have not only been considered, but have been acted upon. And he's the one who then terminated the alternatives, by going up to Amityville and removing [C.E.] from that place.

Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. Quite the contrary. I therefore grant the application of the Division. I terminate the parental rights of [J.E.]. And I grant guardianship to the Division. I find that the plan that the Division has for him is in his best interest, and will provide him with the permanency, the security, the stability, the structure, and the emotional support, which are essential and the birthright of every child.

We fully concur and reject J.E.'s arguments on appeal that:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO TERMINATE J.E.'S PARENTAL RIGHTS TO HIS SON IS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.

A. THE CHILD'S HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT WAS NOT ENDANGERED BY THE PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP.

B. DEFENDANT WAS NOT UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ELIMINATE THE HARM TO HIS CHILD.

C. DYFS DID NOT PURSUE REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE TERMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS.

D. TERMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS WILL DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Strelecki in her thoughtful opinion of February 16, 2005.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-4231-04T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

November 3, 2005