NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. N.V. and M.G.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2357-04T4 2357-04T4
2942-04T4

A-2942-04T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

N.V. and M.G.,

Defendants-Appellants,

___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF

J.N.V., J.M.V. and J.V.,

Minors.

___________________________

 

Submitted December 6, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Coburn and S.L. Reisner.

On appeal from the Superior Court of

New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family

Part, Union County, FG-20-19-04.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellants (Michael C. Kazer,

Designated Counsel and Christine B. Mowry, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General,

attorney for the respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General,

of counsel; Ledra H. Horowitz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

Law Guardian, attorney for the minor children J.N.V., J.M.V. and J.V. (Rebecca Miller, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants, M.G. and N.V., appeal from a trial court order terminating their parental rights to their three children, J.N.V., born January 10, 1997, J.M.V., born January 13, 2000, and J.V., born October 31, 2002. We affirm.

These are the most pertinent facts. Defendant N.V. is a convicted sex offender, having molested two little girls. He is also an admitted drug dealer. Defendant M.G. has persistent drug problems and emotional problems. At time of trial, the three children were ages seven, four and almost two. J.M.V. was born with traces of marijuana in her system and was born premature and medically fragile. She was placed in foster care soon after her birth. J.N.V. was placed in foster care in May 2001 when M.G. was found to be living with N.V., who had been charged with child molestation.

DYFS initially filed a guardianship action, which it dismissed in 2002. Thereafter, M.G. gave birth to J.V., her third child with N.V. In light of evidence that N.V. was using drugs and being abusive to M.G., and that neither parent was able to properly care for the children despite years of social services, DYFS filed a termination of parental rights complaint in July 2003, with respect to all three children.

At the time of trial, despite the provision of ample services from DYFS, defendants were still unable to parent their children. Two of the children, J.N.V and J.V., are now with foster parents who want to adopt them, and the middle child, J.M.V., is with a different foster parent who wants to adopt her.

Following a bench trial, Judge Spatola issued a comprehensive, 70-page opinion on December 14, 2004, making detailed factual findings and legal conclusions.

On this appeal, M.G. raises the following contentions:

POINT I: THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE "BEST INTERESTS" TESTS WERE PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

A. DYFS did not present sufficient credible evidence to meet the burden of proving that M.G. was unable or unwilling to eliminate the harm to her children, or that separating them from their foster parents would cause serious and enduring emotional harm. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2).

B. DYFS did not present sufficient credible evidence to meet the burden of proving that it made reasonable efforts to provide services, and the court did not consider all alternatives.

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).

C. DYFS did not present sufficient credible evidence to meet the burden of proving that termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4).

N.V. raises the following contentions in his brief:

POINT I: THE JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP TERMINATING THE DEFENDANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE DIVISION FAILED TO PROVE THE SECOND AND FOURTH PRONGS OF THE "BEST INTERESTS" TEST DESPITE THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR SECOND DEGREE SEXUAL ASSULT, A MEGAN'S LAW OFFENSE.

A. The defendant is willing and able to eliminate the harm to his children under the second prong despite being convicted of a Megan's Law offense.

B. If finding that termination of parental rights would not do more harm than good the trial court applied an improper "Better Interests" standard that was based on fitness rather than harm.

We conclude that all of defendants' arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and we affirm for the reasons stated in Judge Spatola's thorough and cogent opinion. We add the following comments.

We must defer to the findings of the trial court so long as they are supported by sufficient, credible evidence. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). We give particular deference to decisions of the family court, because of its "special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." Id. Those principles mandate affirmance here, where the judge presided over a lengthy trial, made scrupulously detailed findings of fact, and properly applied the law to her factual findings. Applying the appropriate legal standard, Matter of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-49 (1999), she correctly concluded on this record that termination of defendants' parental rights was in the children's best interests.

 
Affirmed.

For clarity, this child will be referred to as "J.V.", although her initials are also "J.M.V."

Another of M.G.'s children, C.F., was also placed in foster care. Legal custody of C.F. was later transferred to her biological father, E.F.

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-2357-04T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

December 15, 2005