CHRISTINE YOUSSEF v. KATIE A. PROCOPIO et al.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0204-04T10204-04T1

CHRISTINE YOUSSEF,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KATIE A. PROCOPIO and

MICHAEL PROCOPIO,

Defendants-Respondents.

 

Submitted October 31, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Cuff and Holston, Jr.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, L-4112-03.

Segal & Burns, attorney for appellant (Danielle J. Walcoff, of counsel and on the brief).

Respondents did not file a brief.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Christine L. Youssef, appeals the Law Division's August 6, 2004 order granting summary judgment on behalf of defendants, Katie A. Procopio and Michael Procopio, dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice for failure to prove that she suffered an injury described in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)'s limitation on lawsuit threshold to recover non-economic damages based on her inability to meet the subjective standard that the injury resulted in a serious life impact. Plaintiff also appeals the September 24, 2004 denial of her motion for reconsideration.

The motion judge, in her oral decision denying reconsideration, clarified her earlier decision granting summary judgment. The court stated that plaintiff had shown sufficient objective evidence of injury to satisfy the first prong of the two-prong test, but plaintiff had failed to satisfy the second prong by her failure to show that her injuries had a serious impact on her life.

On May 10, 2002 plaintiff was the operator of a motor vehicle involved in an automobile accident on Crystal Lake Avenue in Haddon Township with an automobile being driven by defendant, Katie A. Procopio with the permission of defendant, Michael Procopio. Plaintiff sued defendants on July 18, 2003 seeking money damages for personal injuries proximately caused by the accident.

Plaintiff submitted the results of two MRI studies. The MRI of the lumbar spine showed mild central disc bulging at L5-S1 but no disc herniation or thecal sac effacement. The MRI study of the cervical spine disclosed a small central disc herniation at C3-4 and C7-T1 with effacement of the anterior thecal sac. It also displayed disc bulging at C4-5 through C6-7 but no central canal or neural foraminal stenosis. The MRI study of the cervical spine clearly provided objective credible medical evidence of injury consistent with plaintiff's subjective complaints of neck and back pain and restricted range of motion.

The motion judge, in denying reconsideration stated:

I found that I did not think that the injuries had had a serious impact on her life because she's doing the work that she trained for, that she works a second job --not a second job, but another job in the summer, that she still does her -- does things at home.

She has help from her husband. I can't imagine that she shouldn't have help from him doing things, since they both live in the household. But, she still said she did things as -- like her own laundry, she cleaned the bathtub -- the bathroom, including the bathtub.

She said that she has now difficulty sitting and reading for long periods of time, -- this is all out of her deposition -- that she is not doing the illustrating that she liked to do in the past, but she still performs all of her activities at work, true with some pain.

But, I did not think that her -- that what she had said could not do or does with more difficulty were a serious impact on her life, and I still don't think they are. Therefore, the motion is denied.

We reverse and remand to the trial court for trial in light of DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 481 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 (2005). DiProspero held that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) does not contain a serious life impact standard. DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 481-82. Serrano concluded that plaintiff need only prove through objective credible medical evidence and a physician's certificate that she suffered an injury described in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)'s limitation on lawsuit threshold to recover non-economic damages. Serrano, supra, 183 N.J. at 510. As in DiProspero, plaintiff must prove only that she suffers from a permanent injury to a body part or organ causally related to the accident in issue in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 519. See also Beltran v. DeLima, 379 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 2005); Pungitore v. Brown, 379 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 2005).

 
Reversed and remanded.

(continued)

(continued)

4

A-0204-04T1

November 7, 2005

 


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