Fick v. Brown
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Plaintiff appealed from the order of the district court granting defendant's motion to dismiss where the suit arose out of a previous landlord/tenant action filed in district court. At issue was whether section 3-10-302, MCA, conferred jurisdiction on justices' and district courts for actions arising under the Montana Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1977. The court held that the clear terms of the Montana statute provided that justices' courts shared concurrent jurisdiction with district courts. The court also held that plaintiff's arguments were not made in good faith and sanctions were warranted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and remanded for a determination and assessment of costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal.
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June 7 2011
DA 10-0602
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2011 MT 127
RONALD N. FICK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
KEVIN S. BROWN,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM:
District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Park, Cause No. DV 10-152
Honorable Wm. Nels Swandal, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Ronald N. Fick, (self-represented); Livingston, Montana
For Appellee:
Kevin S. Brown, (self-represented); Livingston, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 26, 2011
Decided: June 7, 2011
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1
Ronald N. Fick (Fick) appeals from the order of the Sixth Judicial District Court
granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the District Court and remand for
imposition of sanctions. We consider the following issue on appeal:
¶2
Whether § 3-10-302, MCA, confers concurrent jurisdiction on justices’ and
district courts for actions arising under the Montana Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act of 1977 (the “Landlord and Tenant Act”).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3
This case arises out of a previous landlord/tenant action filed in the Sixth Judicial
District Court. Martyn v. Fick, No. DV 07-134 (Mont. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 25,
2008). Defendant Kevin S. Brown (Brown) is an attorney in Livingston, where plaintiff
Fick also resides. Fick is a landlord for several properties in the area. Brown filed the
previous suit in September 2007 on behalf of two tenants who alleged that Fick had
unlawfully evicted them from a unit he manages. The tenants claimed Fick changed the
locks on their unit without obtaining a valid eviction order, thereby depriving them of
personal property still in the unit. Fick retained an attorney, contested the allegations in
the complaint, and filed a counterclaim. After a bench trial, the District Court found for
Fick and entered judgment in his favor on September 26, 2008, in an amount representing
one month’s lost rent, transfer and storage fees for the personal property, and attorney’s
fees. The tenants did not appeal. Fick assigned the judgment to a collection service in
June 2010.
2
¶4
Fick filed the present action in August 2010. Fick’s chief contention in District
Court, which he now reasserts on appeal, was that Brown had fraudulently brought the
prior landlord/tenant action in District Court, rather than in Justice’s Court. He asserts a
number of other contentions which we do not reach on appeal as a result of our resolution
of Fick’s primary claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5
We review a district court’s interpretation of a statute for correctness. Stevens v.
Novartis Pharms. Corp., 2010 MT 282, ¶ 24, 358 Mont. 474, 247 P.3d 244.
DISCUSSION
¶6
Whether § 3-10-302, MCA, confers concurrent jurisdiction on justices’ and
district courts for actions arising under the Landlord and Tenant Act.
¶7
It is abundantly clear from Fick’s appellate briefs that he is convinced Brown’s
filing of the landlord/tenant action in District Court was designed to harass, intimidate,
and force Fick to incur unnecessary expenses.
Fick’s briefs contain all manner of
vituperation directed at Brown and Judge Swandal, who presided over the case, which
need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that Fick believes Montana law requires all
landlord/tenant actions to be brought in justices’ courts. Fick’s claim in the present case
was dismissed with prejudice by the District Court for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted.
The court observed that § 3-10-302, MCA, is “clear and
unambiguous,” and provides for concurrent jurisdiction in the justices’ and district courts
over actions arising under the Landlord and Tenant Act.
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¶8
Section 3-10-302, MCA, provides:
The justices’ courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts
within their respective counties in actions of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer and in actions brought under Title 70, chapter 24 [the Landlord and
Tenant Act].
Fick is either unable to comprehend the statutory language in § 3-10-302, MCA, or so
desirous of an opposite result that he willfully ignores it. Regardless of Fick’s personal
feelings on whether justices’ courts should have exclusive, original jurisdiction over
landlord/tenant actions, the clear terms of Montana law provide that they share
concurrent jurisdiction with district courts. Concurrent jurisdiction means that the action
may be brought in either justice’s court or district court, at the option of the party
bringing the suit. State v. Brockway, 2005 MT 179, ¶¶ 11-13, 328 Mont. 5, 116 P.3d 788;
Black’s Law Dictionary 928 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed., West 2009) (defining
concurrent jurisdiction as “[j]urisdiction that might be exercised simultaneously by more
than one court over the same subject matter and within the same territory, a litigant
having the right to choose the court in which to file the action.”). Whatever the motive
may be, a litigant is thus within his or her rights to bring a landlord/tenant action directly
in district court pursuant to the unambiguous statutory language of § 3-10-302, MCA, as
the District Court correctly concluded. E.g. Summers v. Crestview Apts., 2010 MT 164,
357 Mont. 123, 236 P.3d 586 (appeal of Landlord and Tenant Act case brought directly in
district court).
¶9
The reasoning behind awarding concurrent jurisdiction is sound: in complex or
highly contested landlord/tenant litigation, neither time nor expense is saved by going
4
through a justice’s court proceeding, only to appeal the result in a district court trial de
novo. The opposite is true. In the initial landlord/tenant action, it is entirely possible that
Brown saved Fick time and expense by bypassing the Justice’s Court, if he intended to
appeal a negative result to District Court.
¶10
Furthermore, we cannot help but observe that if either party is guilty of harassment
and putting the other through unnecessary time, expense, and anguish, it is undoubtedly
Fick. After failing to mention his present contentions even once during the prior suit,
Fick has now dragged Brown through both District Court and Supreme Court
proceedings on an entirely baseless claim. Moreover, the tone and content of his briefs
are outside the realm of acceptable language in court documents. In Fick’s desire to
prevail on his claims, he has refused to accept the plain language of the law. “Sometimes
the truth just ain’t enough/ Or is it too much in times like this.” Bruce Springsteen,
Worlds Apart, on The Rising (Columbia Recs. 2002).
¶11
Lastly, we consider Brown’s request to impose sanctions on Fick pursuant to
M. R. App. P. 19(5). The rule empowers this Court to “award sanctions to the prevailing
party in an appeal . . . determined to be frivolous, vexatious, filed for purposes of
harassment or delay, or taken without substantial or reasonable grounds.” The District
Court noted Fick’s claims appeared frivolous, explicitly warned Fick that further filings
on his part could result in sanctions, and clearly explained to Fick why his claims were
without substantial grounds. Fick nonetheless persisted in pursuing a clearly meritless
claim and used the opportunity to make unsupported accusations of wrongdoing against
those involved in the court process. We conclude his arguments are not made in good
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faith and sanctions are warranted. Hilten v. Bragg, 2010 MT 273, ¶ 30, 358 Mont. 407,
248 P.3d 282. Fick’s appeal is frivolous and vexatious, and was filed for purposes of
harassment.
¶12
We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Fick’s complaint and remand for a
determination and assessment of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.
/S/ BETH BAKER
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ JIM RICE
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