STIFFARM v FUROIS
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No. 85-020 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1955 JOSEPH P. STIFFARM, Petitioner and Appellant, WILLIAM F. FUROIS, as Chief of the State of Montana, loo Department of Justice, l l t r Vehicle Division, et al., Respondents. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, In and for the County of Hill, The Honorable Chan Ettien, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Morrison, Barron Montana & Young; Robert C. Melcher, Havre, For Respondents: Barbara Claassen, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted on Briefs: Decided: Clerk May 3, 1985 August 15, 1985 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Joseph Stiffarm appeals from an order of the District Court affirming license by the the one-year revocation of Montana Motor Vehicle his Division driver ' s of the Department of Justice. On February 5, 1984, appellant was arrested for the offense of driving under the influence of a 1cohol. The appellant refused to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol concentration of his breath. Appellant had previously refused the chemical test in March of 1982. The Motor Vehicle Division invoked section 61-8-402, MCA which requires the revocation of a driver's license for one year upon a second or subsequent refusal to submit to a chemical test within five years of a previous refusal. On September 13, 1984, the appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus and claimed that the application of the mandatory revocation provision of section 61-8-402, MCA was improper because only one of the offenses upon which the revocation of his license was based, occurred effective date of the amendment. after the The District Court ordered the State to either return the appellant's driver's license or to appeal the determination. District Court affirmed the Following a hearing, the Motor Vehicle Division's application of section 61-8-402, MCA and the writ of mandamus was vacated. The dispositive section 61-8-402, issue before MCA, which this Court is whether requires revocation of a driver's license for one year upon a subsequent refusal to submit to a chemical test within five years of a previous refusal, was properly applied. S e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA p r o v i d e s : " (1) Any p e r s o n who o p e r a t e s a motor v e h i c l e upon ways o f t h i s s t a t e open t o t h e p u b l i c s h a l l b e deemed t o h a v e g i v e n consent, subject t o the provision of 61-8-401, t o a chemical test o f h i s blood, b r e a t h , o r u r i n e f o r t h e purpose o f determining t h e a l c o h o l i c content of h i s b l o o d i f a r r e s t e d by a p e a c e o f f i c e r for driving o r i n actual physical control of a motor v e h i c l e w h i l e under t h e influence of alcohol . " ( 3 ) I f a r e s i d e n t d r i v e r under a r r e s t r e f u s e s upon t h e r e q u e s t o f a p e a c e o f f i c e r t o submit t o a chemical t e s t d e s i g n a t e d by t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r a s provided in subsection (1) o f this s e c t i o n , none s h a l l b e g i v e n , b u t t h e o f f i c e r s h a l l , on b e h a l f o f t h e d i v i s i o n , immediately s e i z e h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . The p e a c e o f f i c e r s h a l l forward t h e license t o t h e division, along with a sworn r e p o r t t h a t h e had reasonable grounds t o b e l i e v e t h e a r r e s t e d person had been driving o r was in actual p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e upon ways o f t h i s s t a t e open t o t h e p u b l i c , w h i l e u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l and t h a t t h e p e r s o n had r e f u s e d t o s u b m i t t o t h e t e s t upon t h e r e q u e s t of t h e p e a c e officer. Upon r e c e i p t o f t h e r e p o r t , t h e d i v i s i o n s h a l l suspend t h e l i c e n s e f o r t h e period provided i n subsection ( 5 ) . The " (5) following s u s.p e n s i o n and . r e v o c a t i o n p e r i o d s a r e a p p l i c a b l e upon to to a r e f u s a l - submit - - chemical test: ~ - ( a ) upon - f i r s t r e f u s a l , - s u s p e n s i o n a a 9 0 d a y s -t h-no p r o v i s i o n - wi for a r e s t r i c t e d probationary license; " of - " ( b ) upon a second o r s u b s e q u e n t 5 years 0 a 7 revious refusal withic from th; r e f u s a l , a s d e t e r m i n e d -- r z c o r d o f the a o - d i v i s i o n , - r e v o c a t i o n -f-1 y e a r w i t h no provision for a restricted probationary license. " (Emphasis supplied.) P r i o r t o O c t o b e r 1, 1 9 8 3 , Montana sixty-day failure law p r o v i d e d for a suspension of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e f o r to take a chemical test. Section 61-8-402, MCA (1981). the I n 1983, s e c t i o n 61-8-402, sixty-day suspension 61-8-402 ( 5 ) ( a ) , period In MCA. MCA was amended, c h a n g i n g to ninety-days. addition, the Section amended version p r o v i d e d f o r mandatory r e v o c a t i o n o f t h e l i c e n s e o f a d r i v e r who h a s r e f u s e d t h e c h e m i c a l t e s t a second t i m e w i t h i n f i v e S e c t i o n 61-8-402 ( 5 ) ( b ) , MCA. years of t h e previous r e f u s a l . The appellant argues that section 61-8-402(5), MCA, s h o u l d n o t be a p p l i e d t o r e q u i r e a r e v o c a t i o n o f h i s l i c e n s e . The appellant refusal" argues that he must under t h e amended v e r s i o n o f MCA b e f o r e h i s allowed "final a 61-8-402 ( 5 ) , section l i c e n s e can be revoked based on a second o r s u b s e q u e n t r e f u s a 1. s e c t i o n 1-2-109, be Moreover, t h e a p p e l l a n t m a i n t a i n s t h a t MCA, which p r o v i d e s "no law c o n t a i n e d i n any o f t h e s t a t u t e s i n Montana i s r e t r o a c t i v e u n l e s s e x p r e s s l y s o declared," precludes r e t r o a c t i v e application. W e find language that which retroactively. section expresses 61-8-402, an i s void MCA, intent to of it have any applied However, we a l s o f i n d t h a t s e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA d o e s n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f a r e t r o a c t i v e law. N s a n c t i o n was imposed on t h e f i r s t r e f u s a l o c c u r r i n g o prior to the effective condition for imposing subsequent refusal. date. the The Rather, one-year statute it served revocation requires as for revocation a the of a p p e l l a n t ' s l i c e n s e i n response t o h i s r e f u s a l i n February of 1984 b e c a u s e S t a t e Dept. it was of Rev. a repetitive Motor Veh. refusal. (Colo.App. 779, a most s i m i l a r sequence o c c u r r e d . Appeals likewise upheld driver's l i c e n s e upon a the In Sanchez v . 1 9 8 3 ) , 667 P . 2 d The Colorado C o u r t o f mandatory revocation second c o n v i c t i o n o f of a driving while a b i l i t y impaired a s a p p l y i n g t o a c a s e i n which t h e second conviction occurred a f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e s t a t u t e , but the first offense occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. "This mode of statutory operation is not retroactive, nor does it constitute an ex post facto law in a criminal setting." Sanchez, supra, 667 P.2d at 780; see also Gryger v. Burke (1948), 334 U.S. 728, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.Ed. 1683. We are in accord with rulings from courts from other jurisdictions that an amended statute which is applied to a factual situation which occurred prior to the enactment of the amendment is not viewed as retroactive in application. See Nix v. Tice (Colo.App. 1980), 607 P.2d 399; McCartney v. West Adams County Fire Protection District (Colo.App. 1978) , 574 P.2d 516; Shoemaker v. Atchison (Ala.Civ.App. 1981), 406 So.2d 986. Accordingly, we hold that the one-year revocation of the appellant's driver's 61-8-402, MCA was proper. is affirmed. We concur: /I ; license as mandated by section The judgment of the District Court
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