Jim Doe and Barbara Doe, Individually, and as Natural Parents of A. D. a Minor v. Jameson Inn, Inc., Kitchin Hospitality, LLC and Erica Covington
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CA-00722-SCT
JIM DOE AND BARBARA DOE, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND AS NATURAL PARENTS OF A.D. A MINOR
v.
JAMESON INN, INC., KITCHIN HOSPITALITY,
LLC AND ERICA COVINGTON
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
04/20/2009
HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
WAYNE E. FERRELL, JR.
JANICE T. JACKSON
BRIAN K. HERRINGTON
B. STEVENS HAZARD
AARON REESE EDWARDS
CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
AFFIRMED - 01/13/2011
BEFORE CARLSON, P.J., LAMAR AND PIERCE, JJ.
PIERCE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This case comes before the Court on appeal from the Rankin County Circuit Court,
Hon. William E. Chapman presiding. Jim and Barbara Doe,1 individually and as natural
parents of Ann Doe, appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of Jameson Inn, Inc.,
Kitchin Hospitality LLC, and Erica Covington (defendants). Because no genuine issue of
1
identity.
On appeal, the names of the appellants have been changed to protect the minor’s
material fact exists as to the status of Ann Doe at the time she entered upon the premises of
Jameson Inn, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
¶2.
On approximately March 1, 2003, Kelvin Washington rented a room at the Jameson
Inn, located in Pearl, Mississippi. At some point, Washington turned over the keys to the
room to several teenage boys so they could celebrate the birthday of one of them. The group
eventually made its way to Tinseltown, a local movie theater located directly across the street
from the Jameson Inn. On the same evening, Ann Doe and her friend were dropped off at
Tinseltown. At the time in question, Ann was thirteen years old, and her friend was twelve
years old.
¶3.
According to Ann, her friend approached a man in the game room of the theater and
asked him for a smoke. The man told the girls he did not have a cigarette, but that he had
“something else.” The girls then left the theater and accompanied the man to the Jameson
Inn. The teenage boys also joined the group and headed back with the girls to the Jameson
Inn. Ann admitted that she and her friend had left the theater to smoke marijuana at the
Jameson Inn.
¶4.
The group entered the Jameson Inn through the side door, which could be opened only
with a working key. Erica Covington, the front-desk clerk, did not see the group enter the
hotel.2 While in the room, the group passed around a marijuana cigarette. But Ann stated
2
Additionally, two other employees of Jameson Inn claim they saw two white girls
together with several African-American boys leave the hotel. But neither employee could
provide further details of the group other than race. Specifically, one of those employees
claimed she saw “a group” get off of the elevator in the front lobby and exit through the front
2
she took only one puff and did not inhale. After smoking marijuana, Ann was raped by one
of the young men in the bathroom of the hotel room. Ann’s friend also had sexual
intercourse with more than one of the teenage boys.
¶5.
Ann and her friend left the Jameson Inn and walked back to the movie theater. The
girls were picked up by the grandfather of Ann’s friend. Ann did not report the incident
immediately. The next day, the girls were caught stealing pregnancy tests from a nearby
drugstore. The girls advised the police officer of what had taken place the night before at the
Jameson Inn. Ann’s attacker pleaded guilty to statutory rape.
¶6.
On December 22, 2003, Jim and Barbara Doe filed a complaint against Jameson Inn,
Kitchin Hospitality LLC, and Erica Covington in the Hinds County Circuit Court. Venue
was transferred to the Rankin County Circuit Court. On November 26, 2007, defendants
filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. Because it was undisputed that Ann had been on
the premises of the Jameson Inn to smoke marijuana, the trial court determined Ann Doe’s
status to be that of a “licensee.” 3 The trial court further found that none of the defendants had
breached any duty to Ann, and granted summary judgment in favor of Jameson Inn, Inc.,
Kitchin Hospitality LLC, and Erica Covington.
¶7.
The Does now appeal and raise five issues for this Court’s review. In the interest of
brevity, the issues have been consolidated into the following three issues:
door. The other employee claimed she saw “a group” talking and laughing outside the door
to the side entrance of the hotel. Ann claims the group she was with entered through the side
door of the Jameson Inn, and that she and her friend exited the Jameson Inn alone.
3
As a licensee, the defendants owed Ann Doe a “duty to refrain from willfully or
wantonly injuring” her. Little v. Bell, 719 So. 2d 757, 760 (Miss. 1998).
3
I.
Whether the trial court erred in considering the Does’ claims as a
single cause of action for premises liability.
II.
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
the basis that Ann Doe was a licensee.
III.
Whether the Court should abandon the common-law distinctions
between invitees, licensees, and trespassers when determining a
landowner’s duty, or, in the alternative, exempt minors from such
distinctions.
DISCUSSION
¶8.
On appeal, this Court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.4
The motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” 5
I.
¶9.
Whether the trial court erred in considering the Does’ claims as a
single cause of action for premises liability.
The Does contend that the instant case is not only one of premises liability, but also
a case of simple negligence. They cite Keith v. Peterson 6 and Presswood v. Cook 7 for the
proposition that not all causes of action that arise on one’s property are governed by the law
which encompasses premises liability. Both Presswood and Keith relied on this Court’s
4
Duckworth v. Warren, 10 So. 3d 433, 436 (Miss. 2009) (citing One South, Inc. v.
Hollowell, 963 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Miss. 2007)).
5
Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
6
Keith v. Peterson, 922 So. 2d 4, 10 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
7
Presswood v. Cook, 658 So. 2d 859, 861-62 (Miss. 1995).
4
holding in Hoffman v. Planters Gin Co., in which the Court carved out an exception to the
general standard of care owed to a licensee.8
¶10.
The Hoffman exception has no place in determining whether a cause of action falls
within the realm of premises liability versus that of simple negligence. Rather, the Hoffman
exception is applicable only in premises liability cases where, by a finding of certain factors,
the duty of care owed to a licensee should be elevated from “willful and wanton injury” to
a “reasonable standard of care.” 9 Thus, whether Ann’s cause of action falls under the general
theory of negligence or a specific type of negligence warrants a review of the facts that gave
rise to Ann’s claim.
¶11.
The injury of Ann, i.e., the rape, took place in a private room on the premises of the
Jameson Inn. And the Does allege that Ann’s injury resulted from the dangerous condition
of the Jameson Inn. Since premises liability is a theory of negligence that establishes the
duty owed to someone injured on a landowner’s premises as a result of “conditions or
activities” 10 on the land, we find the trial court properly treated the Does’ claim as one of
pure premises liability. As such, we cannot hold the trial court in error on this point.
II.
8
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
the basis that Ann Doe was a licensee.
See Hoffman v. Planters Gin Co., 358 So. 2d 1008, 1013 (1978).
9
See Little v. Bell, 719 So. 2d 757, 761 (Miss. 1998); Hughes v. Star Homes, Inc.,
379 So. 2d 301, 304 (Miss. 1980); Hoffman v. Planters Gin Co., 358 So. 2d 1008, 1011-12
(Miss. 1978).
10
Black’s Law Dictionary 961 (7th ed. 2000).
5
¶12.
Ann claims she was an invitee at the time she entered the premises of the Jameson Inn
and was raped. But the trial court determined Ann’s status to be that of a licensee. In order
for this Court to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendants, we must first address whether the issue of Ann’s status was one for
the trial court or the jury.
¶13.
This Court has held that, where the facts of the case are not largely in dispute, the
classification of a plaintiff becomes a question of law for the trial judge.11 Here, the only
fact pertinent to the determination of Ann’s status is her reason for leaving Tinseltown and
entering the Jameson Inn property. The dissent attempts to show that Ann’s reason for
leaving Tinseltown is in dispute. But the record reveals that, while Ann’s attacker denied
that he had smoked marijuana in the hotel room, he admitted that he could not remember
whether anyone else had smoked marijuana. Ann, however, admitted that she had left the
movie theater to smoke marijuana and, in fact, had taken one puff off a marijuana cigarette
while in the hotel room.12 Since Ann’s attacker does not confirm or contest whether Ann left
11
Leffler v. Sharp, 891 So. 2d 152, 156 (Miss. 2004) (citing Adams v. Fred’s Dollar
Store of Batesville, 497 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Miss. 1986); Little v. Bell, 719 So. 2d 757, 761
(Miss. 1998); Graves v. Massey, 87 So. 2d 270, 271 (Miss. 1956)).
12
The following exchange concerns Ann’s written statement to the police:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
“Then we asked if he had a cig to smoke and he was like, no, but I have
some weed.” Is that true?
Yes, sir.
“And [Rachel Roe] was like really, well, come on let’s go smoke it and
I thought for a second and like, okay, whatever.” Is that true?
Yes, sir.
And again in the following colloquy:
6
the movie theater to smoke marijuana, Ann’s reason for leaving Tinseltown remains
undisputed. Therefore, the determination of Ann’s status was properly a question of law to
be decided by the trial judge.
¶14.
Next, we must address the Hoffman exception. As mentioned previously, under the
Hoffman exception, this Court has held that “the ordinary and reasonable standard of care
has application and ‘the premises owner is liable for injury proximately caused by his
affirmative or active negligence in the operation or control of a business which subjects
either a licensee or invitee to unusual danger, or increases the hazard to him, when his
presence is known.’” 13 This exception, however, applies only to cases involving the
operation or control of a business, and where injury results from “active conduct [of the
landowners] as distinguished from conditions of the premises, or passive negligence.” 14
Q.
Q.
A.
Did you call your parents or anyone to tell them that this man had
invited you over to a hotel room to smoke marijuana?
No, sir.
Why not?
I didn’t want anybody to know.
Why not? Didn’t want them to know you were smoking marijuana or
didn’t want them to know you were going to a room with a guy that
you didn’t know?
I didn’t want them to know I was going [with Rachel Roe] to a room
with people I didn’t know.
To smoke marijuana?
Yes, sir.
Q.
A.
So how many puffs did you take off this marijuana cigarillo?
Just one.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
...
13
Little, 719 So. 2d at 761(quoting Hoffman, 358 So. 2d at 1013) (emphasis added).
14
Id. at 761.
7
¶15.
Ann claims that she, her friend, and the group of boys entered the Jameson Inn
through the side entrance. But Jessica Donahue, a cleaning attendant at the Jameson Inn,
claimed in her deposition that she saw “a group” enter and exit through the front door of the
hotel. This disputed fact15 calls into question whether the Jameson Inn had knowledge of
Ann’s presence on the night of the rape. But the Hoffman exception requires more than
mere knowledge. Even if Jameson Inn knew of Ann’s presence at the hotel, the record lacks
any evidence to suggest that the defendants engaged in any “active negligence” that
somehow caused injury to Ann. Additionally, no evidence was presented of an “unusual
danger” on the premises or an “increase in hazard” to Ann.16 Thus, the Hoffman exception
does not apply.
¶16.
Since the Hoffman exception is inapplicable to the present facts, we must determine
Ann’s status under the guidance of the common-law distinctions of trespasser, licensee, and
invitee. “A licensee is one who enters upon the property of another for his [or her] own
convenience, pleasure or benefit, pursuant to the license or implied permission of the
owner.” 17 An invitee is a person who “goes upon the premises of another in answer to the
express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual benefit or
15
Again, Jessica Donahue claimed she saw “a group” get off of the elevator in the
front lobby and exit through the front door. The other employee claims she saw “a group”
talking and laughing outside the door to the side entrance of the hotel. Ann claims the group
she was with entered through the side door of the Jameson Inn, and that she and her friend
exited the Jameson Inn alone.
16
See Hoffman, 358 So. 2d at 1013.
17
Lucas v. Miss. Housing Authority # 8, 441 So. 2d 101, 103 (Miss. 1983).
8
advantage.” 18 “[A] trespasser is one who enters upon another’s premises without license,
invitation or other right.” 19
¶17.
According to Ann, she entered the premises of the Jameson Inn to perform the illegal
activity of smoking marijuana. Thus, Ann’s status on the night in question could not be that
of invitee, as the element of mutual benefit is lacking.20 Jameson Inn received no benefit by
virtue of Ann’s presence on the premises.21 The defendants owed no higher duty to Ann
other than to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring her.22 To constitute willful and
wanton injury, something more than mere inadvertence or lack of attention is required.23
Because the record lacks any evidence to suggest that the defendants intended willfully or
wantonly to injure Ann the night she was raped at the Jameson Inn, we cannot find that the
defendants violated any duty to Ann.
¶18.
Additionally, the Does’ argument appears to allege that the defendants were
“passively negligent” rather than “actively negligent,” since they allege that the defendants
“failed to take any action at all to prevent the minor girls from going to the hotel room with
the older boys.” Again, passive negligence is defined as “the failure to do something that
18
Hughes v. Star Homes, Inc., 379 So. 2d 301, 303 (Miss. 1980).
19
Hoffman, 358 So. 2d at 1011.
20
Little, 719 So. 2d at 761.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
9
should have been done.” 24 But even assuming, arguendo, that the defendants were liable for
any “passive negligence,” the duty owed to Ann would be to refrain from willfully or
wantonly injuring her. And we have stated previously that the record lacks any evidence that
the defendants intended willfully or wantonly to injure Ann.
¶19.
The dissent opines that Ann could have been found by a trier of fact to have been the
guest of a hotel guest, making her a invitee of the Jameson Inn, and, therefore, entitled to
receive a higher duty of care. It cites a case from the Florida Supreme Court to support this
proposition. But the case is easily distinguishable from the present facts, and adds no
instructional value to this Court’s analysis.
¶20.
In Steinberg v. Irwin Operating Co., the Florida Supreme Court held that the injured
party “enjoyed the status of an implied invitee when she entered the hotel lobby,” because
she was a friend of a registered hotel guest.25 But Ann would not qualify as a “guest of a
registered hotel guest,” because the room in which she visited was not registered to her
attacker. Rather, it was rented by and registered to Kelvin Washington. Thus, Kelvin
Washington was the only registered hotel guest. If anything, Ann was the guest of a guest
of a registered hotel guest. And even with this status, we find that Ann was, at most, a
licensee at the time she entered the Jameson Inn. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
III.
Whether the Court should abandon the common-law distinctions
between invitees, licensees, and trespassers when determining a
landowner’s duty.
24
Titus v. Williams, 844 So. 2d 459, 466 (Miss. 2003).
25
Steinberg v. Irwin Operating Co., 90 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 1956).
10
¶21.
On appeal, the Does request that this Court abandon the common-law distinctions of
trespasser, licensee, and invitee, and opt for a reasonable-care standard. Alternatively, the
Does argue that, if the Court should retain the common-law distinctions, it should exempt
minors from such classifications.
¶22.
As recently as 2003, this Court has declined to abandon the common-law distinctions
at issue today.26 The Court thoroughly has addressed this very argument, and has noted that,
over time, courts have “balanced the interests of persons injured by conditions of land against
the interests of possessors of land to enjoy and employ their land for the purposes they
wish.”27 And to abandon “the careful work of generations for an amorphous ‘reasonable care
under the circumstances’ standard seems . . . improvident.” 28 Further, the Court has held that
“the system of invitee, licensee, and trespasser, evolved to delineate very fine distinctions as
to when a duty was owed to an entrant on land,” and that these distinctions protect a
landowner from the “unfettered discretion of the juries.” 29 Because we find the foregoing
reasons persuasive, and we agree that the need to promote stability and predictability in the
law outweighs the justifications for abandoning the common-law distinctions, we decline to
abandon the trespasser, licensee, and invitee distinctions.
¶23.
Lastly, we will address the Does’ alternative argument of whether a minor should be
exempt from the common-law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee.
26
See Titus, 844 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 2003).
27
Little, 719 So. 2d at 763.
28
Id. at 763.
29
Id. at 764.
11
In
Mississippi, the question of a minor’s capacity to perceive danger has arisen in the context
of contributory negligence and the doctrine of attractive nuisance. Contributory negligence
is the “act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on part of the complaining party
which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of injury.” 30
Within this doctrine, there is a presumption that a minor between the ages of seven and
fourteen does not possess sufficient discretion to make him or her guilty of contributory
negligence.31 The doctrine of attractive nuisance is “the rule that a person who owns
property on which there is a dangerous thing or condition that will foreseeably lure children
to trespass has a duty to protect those children from the danger.” 32
¶24.
This Court has held that the attractive-nuisance doctrine does not apply to “obvious,
natural dangers,” and that an “occupant may assume that a child’s guardians will have
warned the child about readily apparent dangers.”33 And within the realm of contributory
negligence, the presumption that a minor cannot exercise judgment with regard to a
dangerous condition on the land may be rebutted by showing the minor was capable of
exercising judgment and discretion, i.e., exceptional capacity.34 Likewise, the doctrine of
30
Black’s Law Dictionary 716 (6th ed. 1991).
31
Glorioso v. YMCA, 556 So. 2d 293, 295 (Miss. 1989).
32
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
33
Skelton v. Twin County Rural Electric Ass’n, 611 So. 2d 931, 937 (Miss. 1992)
(citing McGill v. City of Laurel, 173 So. 2d 892, 898 (Miss. 1995)).
34
Skelton, 611 So. 2d at 937.
12
premises liability does not exempt a minor from the common-law classifications, where it can
be shown the minor was capable of recognizing an obvious and open danger.35
¶25.
Here, the Does would like this Court to consider the notion that Ann was not capable
of understanding the consequences of entering a private hotel room with strange men she did
not know and without an adult. Yet the facts uncontrovertedly show that Ann understood the
potential danger of going to the hotel room with strangers. In fact, Ann admitted in her
deposition that she was aware of the potential danger, but went to the hotel anyway. Since
Ann admittedly recognized the potential consequences of her actions, and the defendants
owed only a duty to refrain from willful and wanton injury to Ann, the Does’ argument on
this point must fail.
CONCLUSION
¶26.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is
affirmed.
¶27.
AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR.
GRAVES, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. KITCHENS, J., DISSENTS WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER, J. DICKINSON, J.,
NOT PARTICIPATING.
KITCHENS, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶28.
The majority employs the common law distinctions of trespasser, licensee, and invitee
and determines, incorrectly, that A.D. was a licensee, rather than an invitee, of Jameson Inn
when she was raped. Maj. Op. at ¶¶ 16-17. That assessment is premised on the majority’s
35
See id. at 938.
13
mistaken assertion that there is undisputed fact that A.D. “enter[ed] upon the property of [the
Jameson Inn] for her own convenience, pleasure or benefit . . . .” Maj. Op. at ¶ 16.
¶29.
Ordinarily, the determination of whether a person is an invitee, a licensee, or a
trespasser is a question for the jury’s decision; however, where the facts are not in dispute,
the classification becomes a question of law for the trial judge. Leffler v. Sharp, 891 So. 2d
152, 156 (Miss. 2004) (citing Adams v. Fred’s Dollar Store of Batesville, 497 So. 2d 1097,
1100 (Miss. 1986)). Because contradictory deposition testimony was before the trial judge
about the relevant facts, A.D.’s status is a jury question. Therefore, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment for the defendants.
¶30.
The majority inaccurately asserts that Ann Doe entered the premises of the Jameson
Inn to perform the illegal activity of smoking marihuana, and that the trial court correctly
adjudicated A.D. to be a licensee. Maj. Op. at ¶ 13. In support of that assertion, the majority
relies on the portion of A.D.’s deposition at which she was questioned about the contents of
a statement that she had made to police. Id. However, the majority neglects to acknowledge
that A.D. had made more than one statement to the police, and that she admitted having been
dishonest in at least one of those statements. When questioned about her untruthfulness in
the police statement, Doe responded that she was dishonest because she was scared.36
¶31.
The record includes contradictory deposition testimony with regard to the purpose of
A.D.’s having been inside the Jameson Inn on March 1, 2003. The child first testified that
she had not wanted to go to the hotel and agreed to do so only because she did not want her
36
Doe was a thirteen-year-old seventh grader at the time she was questioned. The
majority concedes that the child was, in fact, raped. Maj. Op. at ¶ 11.
14
friend to go there alone.
A.D. also testified that she had not known whether she would
smoke marihuana with her friend and the men once they had entered the hotel room. Later
in her deposition, in response to a leading question of dubious clarity, A.D. tacitly
acknowledged that she had gone to the hotel room to smoke marihuana. She also said that
she had taken one puff of a marihuana cigarillo. A.D.’s assailant, Rodriguez Smith, testified
in his deposition that the group did not go to the hotel room to smoke marihuana and that no
one smoked marihuana in the room on the night in question. Smith later testified that he
could not remember whether anyone else had smoked marihuana that night, but he was
certain that he had not. This brief review of the pertinent testimony illustrates that material
facts of this case were genuinely disputed, so much so that the grant of summary judgment
was inappropriate.
¶32.
Patrons of a hotel are business invitees of the hotel. Pigg v. Express Hotel Partners,
LLC, 991 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Miss. 2008) (citing Thomas v. The Columbia Group, LLC,
969 So. 2d 849, 852 (Miss. 2007)). However, this Court has never spoken specifically on
the duty, if any, owed by a hotel to a guest of a hotel guest. Florida case law is instructive
on the duty owed by a hotel owner to the guest of a hotel guest.
¶33.
In Steinberg v. Irwin Operating Co., 90 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 1956), the Florida
Supreme Court held:
There is no doubt that a registered guest of a hotel is a business invitee and is
entitled to receive the degree of care applicable to invitees. We are of the view
that one entering a hotel to communicate with a registered guest is entitled to
receive and enjoy the same degree of care . . . . A hotel is not to be considered
an insurer of the safety of every person who decides to roam around its lobby
or other public rooms. On the other hand, by the very nature of the business,
the operator of the hotel is bound to anticipate that a registered guest is apt to
15
have business and social callers. The invitation to such callers arises by
operation of law and out of the relationship between the hotel and its registered
guests.
Steinberg, 90 So. 2d at 461. In that case, a friend of a hotel guest came to a hotel to deliver
a message to the guest; however, the guest was not in his room. Id. Unable to find the hotel
guest, the friend decided to explore various rooms adjacent to the lobby. Id. While thus
engaged, the friend fell and suffered injuries as she walked from the “TV Room” to the
“Movie Room.” Id. The Florida court found that the friend of the hotel guest “enjoyed the
status of an implied invitee when she entered the hotel lobby.” Id. However, when the hotel
guest was unavailable for the friend to visit, the friend became a licensee of the hotel when
she began to explore various rooms adjacent to the lobby, because she had exceeded the
implied invitation. Id.
¶34.
In this case, Kelvin Washington rented a room for Smith and several other young men.
After paying for the room, Washington relinquished the room keys to Smith. Smith and his
cohorts invited A.D. and her friend to accompany them to the rented room. A.D. and her
female friend were invited guests of Smith, a hotel guest. A.D. entered the hotel with hotel
guests, accompanied the guests to their room, and later left the hotel. Accordingly, A.D. did
not exceed the implied invitation of Jameson Inn. The presence on the hotel’s premises of
persons in A.D.’s circumstances was foreseeable – indeed, to be expected – by the hotel.
Consistent with the persuasive reasoning of Steinberg, Doe could have been found by a trier
of fact to have been the guest of a hotel guest, making her an invitee of Jameson Inn at the
time of the crime perpetrated upon her.
16
¶35.
Under controlling Mississippi case law, Doe’s status as invitee versus licensee is an
issue of fact for a jury’s determination. Sharp, 891 So. 2d at 156. Accordingly, I would
reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand the case for trial.
CHANDLER, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
17
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