Edna Mae Sanders v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-KA-01925-COA
EDNA MAE SANDERS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
04/09/2008
HON. LAWRENCE PAUL BOURGEOIS JR.
HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
BRIAN B. ALEXANDER
WILL BARDWELL
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: W. GLENN WATTS
LADONNA HOLLAND
CONO A. CARANNA II
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF MURDER AND
SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
REVERSED AND REMANDED-03/08/2011
LEE, C.J., ISHEE AND MAXWELL, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On or about July 28, 2006, Sherman Sanders (Sherman) instigated a physical
altercation with his wife, Edna Mae Sanders (Sanders), that ultimately resulted in Sherman’s
death. In January 2007, Sanders was charged with murder. Following a two-day trial held
in Hancock County Circuit Court in April 2008, Sanders was convicted of murder and
sentenced to life in prison in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
(MDOC). She appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay statements
made by Sherman into evidence, by declining to instruct the jury that she was not under a
duty to retreat from an assault made on her in her home, and by declining to admit evidence
in support of her theory of self-defense and defense of others. We find that the trial court
erred by failing to instruct the jury that Sanders was not required to retreat and by excluding
evidence in support of her theory of self-defense and defense of others. Therefore, we
reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
In July 2006, Sherman began a physical confrontation with Sanders in their home in
Diamondhead, Mississippi, where the couple lived with Sanders’s two children. While the
circumstances leading up to the confrontation were disputed, it is certain that Sanders poured
a pot of hot cooking oil on Sherman, causing instantaneous severe injuries and, eventually,
Sherman’s death.
¶3.
When emergency responders arrived to assist Sherman, they found him alive and
conscious.
Before being taken to the hospital, Sherman made several statements to
emergency responders regarding the incident in question, and, in doing so, implied that his
wife had poured hot oil on him. Some time later, Sherman died in the hospital from his burn
injuries.
¶4.
Thereafter, Sanders was charged with murder. The trial was held before Judge
Stephen B. Simpson. At the trial, counsel for the defense proceeded on a theory of selfdefense and defense of others, as Sanders asserted that Sherman’s death was the result of her
protecting the lives of herself and her children. In support of Sanders’s claim that she had
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a reasonable apprehension that she and her children were in imminent danger from Sherman,
her counsel attempted to present testimony which would prove Sherman’s violent nature
toward her and her children. However, the trial court excluded most of the testimony
regarding Sherman’s violent character. Specifically, Sanders was prevented from discussing
her discovery of Sherman raping her then thirteen-year-old daughter on the night of the
incident and threats made by Sherman on her life. Likewise, Sanders’s daughter was
prohibited from testifying as to the violent sexual assault made on her by Sherman, which
was the immediate precursor to Sherman’s physical attack on Sanders.
¶5.
Additionally, Sanders testified that she was aware Sherman possessed a gun.
Although Sanders’s counsel attempted to question her regarding her knowledge that Sherman
kept the gun hidden under the mattress in their bedroom, the trial court sustained an objection
to the testimony on the ground that the information was irrelevant. However, Sanders was
allowed to testify that toward the end of the altercation, Sherman let go of her and headed
toward their bedroom in the back of the house. She attempted to testify as to a threat made
by Sherman against her life upon his letting her go and walking to the bedroom, but she was
again stopped by the court. Sanders then stated that she followed Sherman to the bedroom
in fear of her life and the lives of her children and on the way, she reached for the nearest
weapon she could find – a pot of hot oil that she had heated on the stove to cook a late-night
snack. Upon reaching the bedroom, Sanders testified that she found Sherman reaching for
his gun and then turning to her with it. It was then that she tossed the pot of oil on him and
fled from the house with her children.
¶6.
During cross-examination of Sanders, the prosecution made pointed references to
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Sanders’s location in the house before Sherman let her go and started toward the bedroom.
The prosecution noted several exit doors in the home and asked Sanders to state her
accessibility to the exit doors during the attack. In sum, the prosecution presented the jury
with the possibility that Sanders was able to have escaped through an exit door in the house
prior to Sherman threatening her with the gun and her tossing the hot oil on him.
¶7.
At the close of the trial, Sanders’s counsel asked that jury instruction D-9 be included
in the final list of jury instructions. D-9 outlined Mississippi statutory law providing that as
long as Sanders was not the initial aggressor, was not engaged in unlawful activity, was in
a place where she had a right to be, and was acting in defense of herself or others due to
imminent danger, then she had no duty to retreat before using deadly force. However, the
trial court denied the use of D-9 in the final jury instructions. The trial court did not allow
any jury instruction informing the jurors that Sanders had no duty to retreat from her home
during the attack.
¶8.
Sanders was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life. Thereafter, Judge Simpson
stepped down from the bench and was replaced by Judge Lawrence Paul Bourgeouis Jr.
Sanders’s counsel filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which
was denied by Judge Bourgeouis. Aggrieved, Sanders appeals. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with our findings.
DISCUSSION
I.
¶9.
Admission of Sherman’s Statements
Sanders first challenges the trial court’s use of the hearsay exceptions “present sense
impression” and “excited utterance” to admit hearsay statements made by Sherman to
4
emergency responders. It is well settled that this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on
admissibility of evidence using an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Peterson v. State,
37 So. 3d 669, 673 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Edwards v. State, 856 So. 2d 587, 592
(¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003)).
¶10.
The hearsay exception of present sense impression is found in Mississippi Rule of
Evidence 803(1) and allows for out-of-court statements to be deemed admissible in court if
the statements are “describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.” M.R.E. 803(1). This
exception is “based on the theory that the contemporaneousness of the occurrence of the
event and the statement render it unlikely that the declarant made a deliberate or conscious
misrepresentation.” Clark v. State, 693 So. 2d 927, 932 (Miss. 1997).
¶11.
The record indicates that after Sanders threw the hot oil on Sherman and fled from the
premises, Sherman gained the attention of neighbors by honking his car horn and asking for
help. Shortly thereafter, emergency responders arrived at the scene of the incident and asked
Sherman a series of questions in order to determine the proper measures to investigate the
crime and in order to treat his severe burn injuries. An officer with the Hancock County
Sheriff’s Office was one of the first responders at the scene. The officer testified that he
immediately asked Sherman, “what happened.” The officer stated Sherman said, “his wife
poured oil on him, or burned him rather.”
¶12.
Sanders asserts that Sherman’s statements were made in response to an inquiry from
the officer and not spontaneously. Sanders argues that all testimony from emergency
responders should be barred as the responders elicited Sherman’s response as opposed to
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Sherman speaking without a prompt. Sanders further claims that too much time had passed
between Sherman receiving the burn injuries and the emergency responders arriving on the
scene for Sherman’s statements to be considered a “present sense impression” under Rule
803(1).
¶13.
The record reflects that emergency responders arrived shortly after the incident had
occurred and found Sherman alive and conscious. In speaking with him to determine
criminal investigatory needs and medical diagnoses, the responders stated that Sherman’s
voice was “shaky,” but understandable. While the responders did ask Sherman basic
preliminary questions in order to provide proper medical care and help for Sherman, we find
that it is feasible to interpret Sherman’s statements as spontaneous descriptions of what had
just occurred. After receiving such severe burn injuries, it is indisputable that Sherman was
in an excited condition, possibly shock, for some time after his injuries were inflicted.
Accordingly, while simple questions may have been asked as to Sherman’s condition, it is
legitimate to perceive Sherman’s response that his wife had burned him as Sherman’s general
present sense impression of what was happening to him and not necessarily specific answers
to the responders’ questions. It is reasonable to conclude that Sherman was in such a state
of shock when speaking to responders that his statements were more likely the product of
him reflecting on the circumstances than answering specific questions.
¶14.
After reviewing the evidence, the trial judge opined that in considering “the
consistency of the statements and the time in which they were made in conjunction with the
time that [Sherman] clearly started seeking help . . . he was in a sufficient excited condition
and reaction to the event or condition that caused his injuries such as to make these
6
statements reliable.” The trial judge further held that Sherman’s statement, “although while
not perceiving the event . . . were sufficiently immediately thereafter or close in time and
proximity to be admissible.” We cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion by
applying the present-sense-impression exception to Sherman’s hearsay statements.
¶15.
Nonetheless, even if the hearsay statements did not fall within the present-sense-
impression exception, the trial judge further admitted them under the excited-utterance
exception. The excited-utterance exception to hearsay is found under Mississippi Rule of
Evidence 803(2) and allows for statements, “relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”
M.R.E. 803(2).
¶16.
It has been established by the record that the statements in question were obtained by
emergency responders who arrived at the scene shortly after Sherman had suffered his
injuries. It is reasonable to determine that at the time Sherman spoke with responders, he
was still under extreme stress caused by his severe burn wounds.
¶17.
Here too, Sanders argues that the statements made by Sherman were not spontaneous
enough to fall within the excited-utterance exception because they were preceded by
questions from responders as to Sherman’s condition. However, this Court has held that
“where the excited utterance is prompted by a simple question, even from an officer, such
as ‘What happened?’ or ‘What’s wrong?’ it may still fall under the exception.” Eubanks v.
State, 28 So. 3d 607, 611 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Carter v. State, 722 So. 2d
1258, 1261 (¶10) (Miss. 1998)). Specifically, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that
the simple question of “What happened?” is “an example of a question that, while bearing
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upon the spontaneity requirement, does not necessarily preclude admission of the statement
as an excited utterance.” Carter, 722 So. 2d at 1261 (¶10).
¶18.
Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting
Sherman’s statements under either the present-sense-impression exception or the excitedutterance exception to hearsay. This issue is without merit.
II.
¶19.
Failure to Grant a Jury Instruction Negating a Duty to Retreat
Sanders next asserts that the trial court erred by failing to provide the jury with an
instruction that she was not under a duty to retreat from an assault made on her in her home.
“It is well settled that jury instructions generally are within the discretion of the trial court,
so the standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.” Newell
v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010). Furthermore, “the instructions actually given
must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case
and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found.” Id. (quoting Rubenstein v. State,
941 So. 2d 735, 785 (¶224) (Miss. 2006)). Nonetheless, the Mississippi Supreme Court has
held that “a defendant is entitled to have every legal defense he asserts to be submitted as a
factual issue for determination by the jury under proper instruction of the court.” Giles v.
State, 650 So. 2d 846, 849 (Miss. 1995).
¶20.
Jury instruction D-9 states the following:
The court instructs the Jury that while the danger which will justify the taking
of another’s life must be imminent, impending and present, such danger need
not be unavoidable except by killing in self-defense. The Defendant, Edna
Mae Sanders, need not have avoided the danger to her person presented by the
victim by flight. So long as the Defendant was in a place where she had the
right to be and was neither the immediate provoker nor aggressor, she may
stand her ground without losing the right of self-defense.
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Sanders asserts that the trial court, by declining to include this instruction, committed
manifest error because failure to inform the jury of this pertinent law undermined her claim
of self-defense.
¶21.
The pertinent law in question was codified in Mississippi in 2006 and is commonly
referred to as the “Castle Doctrine.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-15 (3)(4) (Rev. 2006). The
Castle Doctrine reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(3) A person who uses defensive force shall be presumed to have reasonably
feared imminent death or great bodily harm, or the commission of a felony
upon him or another . . . and the person who used defensive force knew or had
reason to believe that the . . . unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had
occurred.
(4) A person who is not the initial aggressor and is not engaged in unlawful
activity shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force . . . if the person
is in a place where the person has a right to be, and no finder of fact shall be
permitted to consider the person’s failure to retreat as evidence that the
person’s use of force was unnecessary, excessive or unreasonable.
Id.
¶22.
Here, the record reflects that Sanders was not the initial aggressor. Both Sanders and
her daughter testified that Sherman attacked Sanders first and without provocation. The
record also shows that Sanders was not engaged in unlawful activity and, clearly, had a right
to be in her own home. Additionally, the record reflects that Sanders feared great bodily
harm and imminent death to herself and her children at the hands of Sherman. Not only did
Sherman violently attack Sanders’s daughter and threaten Sanders’s life on numerous
occasions, he drew his gun and pointed it directly at her immediately after telling her he
would kill her. Accordingly, the Castle Doctrine is applicable to Sanders and directly relates
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to her self-defense theory.
¶23.
At trial, the prosecution repeatedly attempted to elicit testimony from Sanders on
cross-examination regarding her ability to exit the home during the attack. On at least one
occasion, the prosecution blatantly said to Sanders: “There’s a door right there, a front door
right there . . . you could have went [sic] out that door, correct?” As such, the jury was
completely unaware that Sanders did not have a duty to retreat from her home, but instead,
she had the right to remain in her home and defend herself and her children to whatever
degree necessary to avoid the great bodily harm and imminent death that Sanders testified
she feared from Sherman.
Furthermore, due to the prosecution’s pointed statements
regarding Sanders’s ability to retreat, the jury was, in fact, directed to note that Sanders may
have been able to escape through an exit door of the home.
¶24.
Without being informed of the rights Sanders possessed under the Castle Doctrine,
either through jury instruction D-9 or another informative instruction, the jury was
improperly allowed to consider Sanders’s failure to retreat as evidence that her use of force
was unnecessary, excessive, or unreasonable. We find that the trial judge’s refusal to grant
a jury instruction regarding the Castle Doctrine constituted reversible error.
III.
¶25.
Exclusion of Evidence Supporting Sanders’s Defense
Finally, Sanders argues that the trial court committed manifest error by excluding
testimony from defense witnesses that directly related to her self-defense theory. As stated
previously, this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on admissibility of evidence using an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Peterson, 37 So. 3d at 673 (¶15) (internal citation
omitted). “Unless [a trial] judge abuses this discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused,
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the Court will not reverse this ruling.” Robinson v. State, 940 So. 2d 235, 238 (¶7) (Miss.
2006). With regard to testimony, generally, “when a party objects to the exclusion of
evidence, he must make an offer of proof . . . on the record for the benefit of the appellate
court.” M.R.E. 103(a)(2) cmt. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court has also recognized
that Mississippi Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2) provides an alternative to making a formal
proffer of evidence and allows for appellate review of evidence that “was apparent from the
context” of the testimony and questions asked. Heidel v. State, 587 So. 2d 835, 844 (Miss.
1991).
¶26.
Sanders’s theory of the case rested upon self-defense and defense of her children. The
applicable statute for self-defense reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The killing of a human being by the act, procurement or omission of another
shall be justifiable . . . [w]hen committed in the lawful defense of one’s own
person or any other human being, where there shall be reasonable ground to
apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury, and
there shall be imminent danger of such design being accomplished.
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-15(1)(f) (Rev. 2006). Accordingly, Sanders’s counsel attempted to
present testimony to further Sanders’s assertion that she reasonably apprehended imminent
great personal injury or a felonious act committed by Sherman on herself and her children.
A.
¶27.
Sexual Assault of Sanders’s Daughter
Prior to the trial, Sanders’s counsel filed a motion for an overt-act hearing regarding
Sherman’s violent nature and submitted testimony from Sanders’s daughter, K.K.,1 with the
motion. K.K. was thirteen years old at the time of the incident. Her testimony reflected that
1
The Court of Appeals declines to identify sexual assault victims. In the interest of
the child’s privacy, the minor’s name has been substituted with initials.
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on the night in question, her mother left the home in order to run an errand and that she was
in the house with her brother and Sherman. She said that she went to bed and later awoke
to Sherman, with his pants off, on top of her pulling her clothes off. She further stated the
following:
I was pushing him off of me[,] trying to push him off of me[,] but he was just
so heavy I couldn’t move him. I was telling him to get off of me[,]
screaming[,] and I hit the wall. . .and. . .my mom comes into the room and you
know she opens the door and Mr. Sherman gets up and pulls up his pants and
he immediately walks to her and punches her and she falls to the floor and
when she falls. . .he punches and knocks her into the hallway.
Later in her testimony, when asked whether Sherman had raped her during the incident
described above, K.K. stated that he had.
¶28.
At trial, Sanders’s counsel attempted to introduce testimony from K.K. reflecting the
violent, felonious attack upon her by Sherman. Sanders’s counsel further attempted to allow
Sanders to testify as to hearing K.K. screaming, “Stop it, leave me alone,” and to entering
K.K.’s room to find Sherman attacking her daughter. K.K.’s testimony and Sanders’s
testimony were meant to support her claim of self-defense and defense of others, as it would
help to establish Sanders’s “reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony, or
to do some great personal injury” to Sanders and her daughter. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-315(1)(f). However, the trial judge prohibited all testimony regarding the sexual assault. The
trial court held that while K.K. could testify as to seeing Sherman attack her mother, since
it established that Sanders was not the initial aggressor, K.K’s testimony regarding the rape
was irrelevant. Likewise, the trial court determined that Sanders’s testimony as to seeing
Sherman attacking her daughter upon entering her daughter’s room was irrelevant.
12
¶29.
We disagree. While Sanders’s counsel only discussed this error in passing in the
appellate brief submitted to this Court, we address the issue under the plain-error-doctrine
which allows for our analysis of plain errors that were not properly raised by the defendant.
M.R.E. 103(d). This Court may review plain error which “seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
732 (1993) (citations omitted). “Plain-error review is properly utilized for correcting obvious
instances of injustice or misapplied law.” Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 294 (¶10) (Miss.
2008) (quoting Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 256 (1981)).
¶30.
Mississippi Rules of Evidence 404 and 405 govern admissibility of testimony
regarding a person’s character. Rule 404(a)(2) provides that evidence of a character trait of
a person is not admissible except in circumstances including where “[e]vidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim of the crime [is] offered by an accused.” Rule 405(b) then
permits the following: “In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances
of his conduct.” A victim’s character trait of violence is made an essential element of a
charge when an accused claims self-defense and defense of others. Heidel, 587 So. 2d at
845. Furthermore, Rule 404(b) states that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . may
. . . be admissible [to show proof of] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
¶31.
Accordingly, Rule 404(a)(2) provided Sanders with the requisite authority to
introduce evidence of Sherman’s violent character. Rule 405(b) further allowed her to
introduce evidence of specific instances of Sherman’s violence toward her and her children,
13
given her claim of self-defense and defense of her children. These rules alone make K.K.’s
testimony as to Sherman’s rape of her and Sanders’s testimony as to her sudden discovery
of the rape both relevant and admissible.
¶32.
Evidence regarding the sexual assault was also admissible under Rule 404(b) in order
to prove Sherman’s intent and plan to harm Sanders and her children. K.K.’s testimony
alone clearly explained the crucial incident that gave rise to Sanders’s reasonable
apprehension of great harm to K.K. As such, evidence of Sherman’s rape of K.K. directly
related to Sanders’s claim of self-defense and defense of others. Therefore, exclusion of
K.K.’s testimony as to Sherman’s sexual assault of her and Sanders’s testimony as to
Sherman attacking her daughter constituted reversible error.
B.
¶33.
Sherman’s Threats
At trial, Sanders took the stand in her own defense. During direct examination, her
counsel asked her if Sherman had ever threatened her. Sanders responded that he had
threatened her many times. Upon being asked to describe some of the threats she had
received from Sherman, she stated that he had threatened to “make [her] disappear.” The
prosecution objected to her testimony on the ground of hearsay.
The objection was
sustained.
¶34.
Later, Sanders’s counsel asked her to describe in detail a portion of Sherman’s attack
on her. She stated the following: “at one point Sherman had me on the back of the sofa, I’m
on this side of it, and had me choking me, telling me . . . .” Sanders, however, had been
previously warned by the trial court that she was not allowed to testify as to anything
Sherman had said to her, including threats he had made against her. Accordingly, Sanders
14
stopped her testimony mid-sentence.
¶35.
Sanders was periodically prevented from fully testifying throughout her time on the
witness stand, as evidenced by the following:
Q.
Did you say, I’m going to the police?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
Did he do anything when you started saying, “I’m going to the police”?
What did he do?
A.
What did he do, not what he said?
Q.
Not what he said. What did he do?
A.
Oh. By that time he headed back [toward the bedroom]. And I can’t
say what he told me?
THE COURT: No ma’am.
Q.
What did you at that time think he was going to do?
A.
He told me what he was going to do.
Q.
You can’t say it.
A.
I thought he was going back there to get a gun and shoot me.
A.
Could I say I was told I was going to be done harm?
Q.
You can’t say what anybody else said. Did you think that your life was
in danger?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Or the lives of your children?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you remember at some point breaking away from him?
15
A.
Q.
How did he let you go?
A.
It wasn’t a break away. He let me go.
Q.
How did he let you go?
A.
He just let go of me and said what he was going to do.
Q.
You can’t say it.
A.
¶36.
Oh, he let me go.
Oh, okay.
Additionally, earlier in Sanders’s testimony she was asked by her counsel if she had
ever seen Sherman with a gun while they were living in Diamondhead, Mississippi. She
began to answer affirmatively, but she was stopped by a sustained objection to relevancy.
Likewise, when her counsel asked if she knew where Sherman had hidden his gun, she began
to answer that she did, but she was halted by another sustained objection to relevancy.
¶37.
When a criminal defendant relies on a theory of self-defense and defense of others,
he or she is “of right entitled to offer evidence that [the victim] had previously and recently
threatened [the defendant]. . . . This evidence [is] relevant on the issue of [the defendant’s]
state of mind.” Heidel, 587 So. 2d at 844-45. Sherman’s threats to kill Sanders are certainly
relevant under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b) in order to show Sherman’s intent and
plan to kill Sanders. Furthermore, as noted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Heidel and
pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(3), Sherman’s statements become admissible
hearsay statements as they fall within Rule 803(3), which allows “[a] statement of the
declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health).”
16
¶38.
It is apparent from the context of the testimony that Sherman had threatened Sanders’s
life prior to this occasion and that he was threatening her life during the incident. It is also
clear that Sanders knew Sherman possessed a gun that was hidden in their bedroom.
Furthermore, Sanders’s testimony makes it apparent that upon letting her go, Sherman
threatened to kill her and subsequently headed toward the bedroom where he ultimately
retrieved his gun and began pointing it at her. The suppression of this evidence prevented
the jury from fully understanding Sherman’s state of mind and intention to kill Sanders,
Sanders’s state of mind during the attack, and the grounds for her reasonable apprehension
that she and her children were in serious imminent danger. Accordingly, we hold that the
trial court’s exclusion of this evidence constitutes reversible error.
CONCLUSION
¶39.
We find that the trial court’s decision to allow into evidence Sherman’s statements
made to emergency responders was not error. However, we find reversible error in the trial
court’s exclusion of a jury instruction informing the jury that Sanders did not have a duty to
retreat during the attack. We also find reversible error in the trial court’s suppression of
evidence regarding Sherman’s sexual assault of K.K. and evidence regarding Sherman’s
threats on Sanders’s life and evidence regarding Sanders’s knowledge of Sherman’s gun,
including the location in their house where Sherman had hidden the gun. Therefore, we
reverse the conviction and sentence and remand this case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
¶40. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
17
ASSESSED TO HANCOCK COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.,
CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT. IRVING,
P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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