C. Jake Lambert, Jr. v. Baptist Memorial Hospital - North Mississippi, Inc
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-CA-00043-COA
C. JAKE LAMBERT, JR., M.D.
APPELLANT
v.
BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - NORTH
MISSISSIPPI, INC. AND BAPTIST MEMORIAL
HEALTH SERVICES, INC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
10/23/2009
HON. ANDREW K. HOWORTH
LAFAYETTE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
LOUIS H. WATSON JR.
ROBERT NICHOLAS NORRIS
STEPHAN L. MCDAVID
CIVIL - CONTRACT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED FOR
DEFENDANTS
AFFIRMED: 02/08/2011
BEFORE KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
C. Jake Lambert Jr., M.D., filed suit against Baptist Memorial Hospital - North
Mississippi, Inc. (“Hospital”) and Baptist Memorial Health Services, Inc. (“Baptist Health
Services”) after he was terminated from his position as a heart surgeon. The Lafayette
County Circuit Court found that Dr. Lambert had failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact; therefore, summary judgment was granted for the Hospital and Baptist Health Services.
Dr. Lambert appeals claiming that summary judgment was improper as to his claims for
breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We find no
error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Dr. Lambert signed an employment agreement with Baptist Health Services on
February 26, 2004. He agreed to provide cardio-thoracic-surgery services to the Hospital
located in Oxford, Mississippi. Almost immediately after Dr. Lambert’s employment began,
the Hospital began to receive complaints from staff and patients about Dr. Lambert’s angry
and abusive behavior. They reported his demeaning attitude, insecurity and hesitancy in
decision making, hand shaking, freezing up during surgery, and anger toward patients and
their families.
¶3.
After numerous complaints about Dr. Lambert’s anger issues were filed, Zach
Chandler, the Hospital’s CEO, requested that Dr. Lambert attend a discretionary interview.
At the interview, Dr. Lambert agreed to be referred to the Mississippi Professional Health
Program (“MPHP”). The MPHP then referred him to Dr. Edward Anderson at Pine Grove
Recovery Center in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.
¶4.
Dr. Lambert was evaluated by Dr. Anderson on December 15, 2004. Dr. Anderson
submitted his detailed evaluation to the Hospital.
Dr. Anderson made the following
recommendations:
1. Dr. Lambert should enter a monitoring contract with Dr. Gary Carr and the
Mississippi Professionals Health Program for a period of no less than five
years. This monitoring should include parameters of disruptive physician
behavior as well as monitoring of his surgical performance, due to the fact that
there have been several occasions on which his team has felt he has “frozen
up” during the surgical process.
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2. Dr. Lambert should enter an intensive, structured treatment to address the
disruptive behavior described above and his underlying personality disorder.
The treatment program should be one approved by the Mississippi
Professionals Health Program.
3. Dr. Lambert, the administration of Baptist Hospital of North Mississippi,
or the Mississippi Professionals Health Program are invited to seek a second
opinion, should they disagree with these findings or recommendations.
The report also stated the following findings under the heading titled “Diagnostic
Impressions”:
Axis I.
1. Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder. (Axis II issues
is the primary presenting problem and is causing impairment at
the level of an Axis I issue with acute and chronic
manifestations.).
2. Occupational Problem
Axis II.
Axis III.
None
Axis IV.
Severe primarily related to occupational issues.
Axis V.
¶5.
See above
R/O paranoid features
Highest level of adaptive functioning at the time of the
evaluation was a GAF of 40 with serious impairment in
occupational functioning.
Chandler testified that he was concerned about some of the language in the diagnosis,
specifically, the phrase “serious impairment in occupational functioning.” Chandler stated
that he did not understand the meaning of the Axis levels or the term GAF. Chandler
contacted Dr. Anderson for clarification of the report. Dr. Anderson filed an addendum,
which stated:
It is our impression that Dr. Lambert is currently unfit to practice medicine
with reasonable skill and safety, based on the report of a credible source that
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he has “frozen up” on three separate occasions in the midst of a surgical
procedure. However, this is based upon a secondhand report. Dr. Lambert
would not allow us consent to speak with the original sources to verify this
report. . . . We believe that Dr. Lambert needs intensive treatment as quickly
as possible.
¶6.
Based on Dr. Anderson’s conclusion that Dr. Lambert was unfit to practice medicine,
the Hospital suspended Dr. Lambert’s staff privileges. A letter from the Hospital informed
Dr. Lambert that his staff privileges were suspended pending successful completion of a
treatment program recommended by Dr. Anderson or the MPHP. The letter also stated that
the staff privileges may be reinstated subject to supervision and a probationary period upon
Dr. Lambert’s successful completion of a treatment program. The Hospital informed Dr.
Lambert that he was entitled to apply for a hearing under the Hospital’s Fair Hearing Plan.
¶7.
Baptist Health Systems then terminated Dr. Lambert’s employment due to the
suspension of his staff privileges at the Hospital. Dr. Lambert’s employment contract
specifically states that Baptist Health Systems may terminate the contract for cause due to
the termination or restriction of Dr. Lambert’s clinical privileges at the Hospital. The notice
of termination provided that Dr. Lambert had the option to use Baptist Health Systems’
Problem Solving Procedure. Dr. Lambert never exercised his rights to a hearing; indeed, his
attorney waived those rights.
¶8.
On January 12, 2006, Dr. Lambert filed a complaint against the Hospital, Baptist
Health Systems, Dr. Anderson, and Forrest General Health Services, Inc. d/b/a Pine Grove
Recovery Center. Pine Grove and Dr. Anderson were dismissed due to Dr. Lambert’s failure
to comply with the requirements of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
¶9.
Dr. Lambert’s complaint set forth claims of breach of contract, tortious interference
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with a business and/or contractual relationship, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, defamation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, dueprocess violation, and punitive damages.
¶10.
Both the Hospital and Baptist Health Systems filed motions for summary judgment.
They claimed that each of Dr. Lambert’s claims were based on the allegation that the
Hospital had a duty to investigate the findings in Dr. Anderson’s report, which were the
bases for the suspension of Dr. Lambert’s staff privileges. They argued that Dr. Lambert had
failed to prove that such duty existed; therefore, Dr. Lambert’s claims must fail. The circuit
court agreed and granted summary judgment for both defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11.
We review the circuit court's granting of summary judgment using a de novo standard
of review. Richmond v. Benchmark Const. Corp., 692 So. 2d 60, 61 (Miss. 1997). Summary
judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Byrne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 877 So. 2d 462, 464-65 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). “We
have to review the facts presented to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact
and, if such fact exists, whether that fact is outcome determinative.” Evans v. Jackson
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 771 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
ANALYSIS
¶12.
Dr. Lambert argues that summary judgment was not proper as to three of his claims:
(1) breach of contract, (2) defamation, and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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We review each of these claims separately.
1.
¶13.
Breach of Contract
The employment agreement unambiguously provides that Baptist Health Systems
could terminate the agreement for cause upon the termination or restriction of Dr. Lambert’s
staff privileges at the Hospital. There is no dispute that this was the reason for the
termination of the agreement. Dr. Lambert does not allege a breach of the terms of the
contract; instead, he claims that Baptist Health Systems breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of the contract.
¶14.
Specifically, Dr. Lambert states that Baptist Health Systems terminated his
employment based on Dr. Anderson’s report before Dr. Lambert was given the opportunity
to seek a second opinion. Dr. Lambert asserts that he should have been given a medical leave
of absence before the agreement was terminated. Underlying this argument is Dr. Lambert’s
assertion that the Hospital improperly relied upon Dr. Anderson’s report. Dr. Lambert claims
that the report and the addendum are contradictory because the report recommends that he
enter into a monitoring contract while the addendum states that he is unfit to practice
medicine.
¶15.
In response, Baptist Health Systems and the Hospital claim that Dr. Lambert has failed
to show that they breached any duty. The Hospital claims that it was in full compliance with
its bylaws, as well as federal and state laws when it suspended Dr. Lambert’s staff privileges
based on Dr. Anderson’s report. The suspension then gave Baptist Health Systems the full
authority under the employment contract to terminate Dr. Lambert’s employment.
¶16.
In his complaint, Dr. Lambert asserted that the Hospital had the duty to investigate the
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findings in Dr. Anderson’s report before it suspended his staff privileges. Dr. Lambert fails
to cite any basis for this duty. The Hospital had numerous documented complaints by
members of its staff and patients of Dr. Lambert. The Hospital was well aware of Dr.
Lambert’s anger issues. Most disturbingly, the staff reported that Dr. Lambert would freeze
up in surgery until another member of the surgical staff was able to get him back on task.
Based upon his thorough examination of Dr. Lambert and the documented complaints, Dr.
Anderson concluded that Dr. Lambert was unfit to practice medicine.
¶17.
Based on Dr. Anderson’s report, the Hospital determined there was a need to protect
the Hospital’s patients. The Hospital suspended Dr. Lambert’s staff privileges. Dr. Lambert
has not asserted that the complaints against him are unsubstantiated. Dr. Lambert has not
asserted that Dr. Anderson’s report was based on false information. Dr. Lambert merely
asserts that he should have been afforded the opportunity to seek a second opinion before the
Hospital took action. However, Dr. Lambert has failed to provide any support for his
argument that the Hospital owed him such a duty.
¶18.
Baptist Health Systems’ actions did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing because Baptist Health Systems exercised its contractual right to terminate the
agreement. The issue of whether a party can act in bad faith by exercising a contractual right
to terminate an agreement was addressed in Limbert v. Mississippi University for Women
Alumnae Association, Inc., 998 So. 2d 993, 998 (Miss. 2008). There, the supreme court held:
All contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
performance and enforcement. Morris v. Macione, 546 So. 2d 969, 971 (Miss.
1989). Good faith has been defined as “the faithfulness of an agreed purpose
between two parties, a purpose which is consistent with justified expectations
of the other party.” Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1272 (Miss. 1992). Bad
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faith has been defined by this Court as requiring “a showing of more than bad
judgment or negligence; rather, ‘bad faith’ implies some conscious
wrongdoing ‘because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.’” Univ. of S.
Miss. v. Williams, 891 So. 2d 160, 170-71 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Bailey v.
Bailey, 724 So. 2d 335, 338 (Miss. 1998)).
Id.
¶19.
In Limbert, the appellant exercised her express right to terminate an agreement by
giving sixty days’ notice to the other party. The supreme court noted that there had been no
attack on the validity of the agreement. Further, the supreme court ruled that: “This Court
has held that a party has not breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
when the party ‘took only those actions which were duly authorized by the contract.’” Id. at
999 (¶14) (quoting GMAC v. Baymon, 732 So. 2d 262, 269 (Miss. 1999)). The appellant did
not act in bad faith by merely exercising her contractual right to terminate the agreement.
Id.
¶20.
Here, we must reach the same conclusion. Baptist Health Systems did not act in bad
faith when it exercised its right to terminate Dr. Lambert’s employment agreement upon the
suspension of his staff privileges. Dr. Lambert has shown no breach of either an express or
implied contractual duty by Baptist Health Systems or the Hospital. The circuit court
correctly granted summary judgment as to Dr. Lambert’s breach-of-contract claim.
Accordingly, this issue has no merit.
2.
¶21.
Defamation
Dr. Lambert next contends that he was defamed when the Hospital reported his
suspension to the National Practitioners Data Bank (“data bank”). The report indicated that
Dr. Lambert had been suspended because he was “unable to practice safely.” Dr. Lambert
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claims that this statement is false because Dr. Anderson’s addendum should be interpreted
to mean that he could practice if he followed Dr. Anderson’s recommendation of entering a
monitoring contract.
¶22.
In Smith v. Magnolia Lady, Inc., 925 So. 2d 898, 904-05 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006),
this Court held:
In order to succeed on a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a false
and defamatory statement concerning plaintiff; (2) unprivileged publication to
a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and (4) either actionability of statement irrespective of special harm
or existence of special harm caused by publication. The threshold question in
a defamation suit is whether the published statements are false. A statement
is defamatory when it tends to injure one's reputation, and thereby expose him
to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, degrade him in society, lessen him in
public esteem or lower him in the confidence of the community. Truth is a
complete defense to libel or slander.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted).
¶23.
The alleged defamatory statement is that Dr. Lambert was unable to practice medicine
safely. This was Dr. Anderson’s conclusion, and Dr. Lambert has not presented evidence to
show that the statement was false. Dr. Lambert argues that Dr. Anderson’s report was
inconsistent, but he fails to prove the falsehood of the statement at issue. The Hospital had
documented several instances when Dr. Lambert’s anger had caused him to freeze up in
surgery. He belittled the staff; he was indecisive; and he showed anger to the patients and
staff. Such behavior worried the staff and caused the Hospital to fear for the safety of its
patients. Dr. Lambert did not refute the reports by the staff. Because Dr. Lambert has failed
to provide evidence of a false statement, summary judgment on his claim of defamation was
proper. Accordingly, this issue has no merit.
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3.
¶24.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Dr. Lambert argues that summary judgment was improper as to his claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. He asserts that the Hospital and Baptist Health
Systems intentionally breached his employment agreement, took away his livelihood, and
intentionally presented false information to the data bank stating that he was unfit to practice
medicine. Dr. Lambert argues that those actions combined amount to the extreme and
outrageous conduct required to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress.
¶25.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress results when the actions of the defendant
were “wanton and willful and evoked outrage or revulsion.” Riley v. F.A. Richard & Assocs.,
Inc., 16 So. 3d 708, 719 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). “The severity of the acts must be ‘so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’”
Id. (quoting Speed v. Scott, 787 So. 2d 626, 630 (¶18) (Miss. 2001)).
¶26.
Dr. Lambert states that termination alone may not be outrageous conduct. Essentially,
he claims that the outrageous conduct was the Hospital’s report to the data bank. However,
Dr. Lambert provides no evidence that this action was outrageous conduct. On the contrary,
the Hospital relied on the professional opinion of Dr. Anderson who, in a detailed report,
found that Dr. Lambert’s occupational functioning was seriously impaired.
¶27.
The Hospital informed Dr. Lambert that his staff privileges were suspended so Dr.
Lambert could receive necessary treatment. The Hospital found that the suspension was
necessary because Dr. Lambert’s actions were “detrimental to patient safety.” Further, the
Hospital found that Dr. Lambert’s inability to work with and relate to other staff members
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in a professional manner was a violation of the Hospital’s medical staff bylaws. The
suspension letter informed Dr. Lambert that his suspension would be reportable to the data
bank.
¶28.
Dr. Lambert has presented no evidence of conduct by the Hospital or Baptist Health
Systems that is so outrageous that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency. As such,
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to his claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Therefore, this issue has no merit.
¶29. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAFAYETTE COUNTY
IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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