Louise Reid v. Mississippi State Hospital
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CC-01670-COA
LOUISE REID
APPELLANT
v.
MISSISSIPPI STATE HOSPITAL/MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
07/10/2009
HON. WILLIAM F. COLEMAN
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
LEVI BOONE III
GENE W. ROWZEE JR.
CIVIL - OTHER
AFFIRMED TERMINATION OF REID’S
EMPLOYMENT BY MISSISSIPPI STATE
HOSPITAL
AFFIRMED - 02/01/2011
EN BANC.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
Louise Reid’s employment was terminated by the Mississippi State Hospital for
alleged misconduct that occurred at the Cleveland Crisis Intervention Center. Reid alleges
she was terminated because of her race. She appealed her termination to the Employee
Appeals Board (EAB). A hearing was held, and an order was entered upholding Reid’s
termination. The order was affirmed by the full EAB.
¶2.
Reid then appealed to the Circuit Court of Hinds County. The circuit court affirmed
the decision of the EAB.
¶3.
Reid now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that she was not the
subject of racial discrimination. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the EAB.
FACTS
¶4.
Reid, an African American female, was employed as a family nurse practitioner at the
Cleveland Crisis Center from October 2005 through October 11, 2007. She was a non-state
service employee. Two fellow employees made the following allegations against Reid: (1)
she verbally abused and threatened a patient; (2) she wrote a “cocktail” order for a
combination of drugs to sedate a patient; (3) she entered the wrong date on a medical chart;
(4) she allowed a social worker to use her credit card to pay for a moving truck for a patient;
and (5) she authorized medication to be given to a fellow employee. Reid was terminated
after an investigation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
The decision of an employee appeals board will be upheld unless it is: “(a) [n]ot
supported by any substantial evidence; (b) [a]rbitrary or capricious; or (c) [i]n violation of
some statutory or constitutional right of the employee.” Miss. Code Ann. § 25-9-132 (Rev.
2006).
¶6.
An appellate court will not disturb a decision of an administrative agency if substantial
evidence supports that agency’s finding, and the scope of review is limited to the factual
findings of the agency. Walters v. Miss. Dep’t of Econ. and Cmty. Dev., 768 So. 2d 893, 895
(¶8) (Miss. 2000). This Court “may neither substitute its own judgment for that of [the]
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administrative agency which rendered the decision nor reweigh the facts of the case.” Miss.
Transp. Comm’n v. Anson, 879 So. 2d 958, 964 (¶18) (Miss. 2004).
DISCUSSION
¶7.
Reid was a non-state service employee of the Mississippi State Hospital. She alleges
that her employment was terminated because she is an African American. The rights of nonstate service employees have been explained by this Court as follows:
Non-state service employees are those “employees serving in state
departments, agencies, or institutions that are excluded from state service.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 25-9-107 (Rev. 2006). A key distinction between state
service employees and non-state service employees is that state service
employees may only be terminated for good cause, after written notice and a
hearing. Miss. Code Ann. § 25-9-127 (Rev. 2006). However, non-state
service employees, including probationary state service employees during the
first twelve months of employment, are not afforded this protection. Id.
Non-state service employees may be terminated, without notice, for any reason
other than “on the basis of race, color, creed, sex, religion, national origin, age,
disability, or political affiliation; and/or a violation of a right otherwise
specifically protected by the U.S. Constitution or other law.” Employee
Appeals Board Administrative Rules, July 2003, Appendix A, Grievable
Issues, P. 19 section D.
Miss. Dep’t of Transp. v. Rutland, 965 So. 2d 696, 699-700 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
¶8.
The United States Supreme Court has established a three-prong test to prove racial
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Gulf Coast
Research Lab. v. Amaraneni, 722 So. 2d 530, 535 (¶21) (Miss. 1998). First, the complainant
must show a prima facia case of racial discrimination. Id. Second, “[t]he burden then must
shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee’s rejection.” Id. If the employer succeeds “in carrying its burden of production,
the McDonnell Douglas framework – with its presumptions and burdens – is no longer
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relevant.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993). Third, the plaintiff
is then required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence “‘that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against [him]’ because of his race.” Id. at 511 (citation omitted).
¶9.
In order to prove a prima facia case of intentional racial discrimination, Reid must
prove that she:
(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at
issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the
employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside his [or her] protected
group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees
outside the protected group.
McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007).
¶10.
It is undisputed that Reid is a member of a protected class. It is also undisputed that
she was qualified for her position, and she suffered an adverse action by her employer. The
only contention on appeal is whether Reid was treated less favorably than other similarly
situated employees.
¶11.
Crosby Tanner, chief investigator of the Mississippi State Hospital, an African
American, testified that his office investigated the allegations against Reid. Tanner testified
that Reid admittedly made the following statement to a mentally-ill patient: “going to be one
more ‘bitch’ and then I’m going to jump across this desk and it’s going to be on.” Reid told
another patient to “get out of [her] face.” Reid admitted that she allowed a patient to use her
credit card for moving expenses in exchange for cash. She also admitted that she instructed
a nurse to give an employee pain medication, although she denied that the medication was
intended for a patient. Reid denied the accusation that she yelled at patients; however,
Tanner noted that she was asked to stop yelling at one of the investigators. Tanner testified
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that if a white employee had committed the same offenses as Reid, his recommendation
would have been the same.
¶12.
Dr. Lydia Weisser, clinical director of the Mississippi State Hospital, testified that she
held a staff meeting after becoming aware of problems at the Cleveland Crisis Center. Dr.
Weisser addressed the use of drug “cocktails” at the meeting. The “cocktails” were a
combination of drugs given by injection to provide a chemical restraint of an unruly patient.
Dr. Weisser testified that the injection was being used on nearly all admitted patients. She
ordered the use of it to stop. Reid admittedly allowed a patient to be given the drug cocktail
after being instructed not to do so. Reid contends that Dr. K.A. Hamdan approved all the
orders, but sometimes his approval would be after the fact. Dr. Weisser testified that Dr.
Hamdan had not been present at the staff meeting and was subsequently advised to stop using
the injections.
¶13.
Reid argues that two of her fellow employees committed conduct that was similar or
worse than her conduct and received no reprimand. First, Reid alleges that Manette Durand,
a white female, physically and verbally abused patients, wrote “cocktail” orders without
authorization, and made medical-chart errors. Reid admitted that she had no personal
knowledge of the allegations against Durand; her knowledge was based on what she
overheard about the incidents. Durand is seventy-one years old, and she was working for the
Mississippi State Hospital as a certified nurse practitioner. An investigation was conducted
by the Department of Safety and Investigative Services into the accusation that Durand
slapped a patient. Durand testified that she was trying to prevent a patient from spitting on
two other employees, Marcellous Chatman and Sedric Mason, who were on either side of the
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patient. The patient began hitting his head on the arm of the chair, and Durand put her hands
over his ears to hold his head. Durand testified that she did not remember slapping the
patient, but she admitted that she put her hand on his cheek to turn his head. Mason testified
that he did not see or hear a slap. Chatman testified that he heard a slap. However, during
the initial investigation of the matter, Chatman told investigators that he did not hear a slap.
The hearing officer found his initial testimony more credible. Durand denied the allegation
that she wrote orders for drug “cocktails.”
She testified that she only initiated such
“cocktails” when ordered by a physician.
¶14.
Second, Reid alleges that Dr. Lillian Frankhart, a white female working as a
psychologist, violated the rule against fraternizing with patients. Dr. Frankhart admitted that
she loaned her personal guitar to a patient for therapeutic purposes. Reid reported Dr.
Frankhart’s action to risk management. Dr. Frankhart was not disciplined. Reid argues that
Dr. Frankhart’s loaning of a guitar to a patient was equivalent to her allowing a patient to use
her credit card for moving expenses.
¶15.
Reid argues that Durand and Dr. Frankhart were similarly situated employees outside
the protected group, yet they were not disciplined for their actions. Reid argues that her
actions were no worse, and she was treated unfairly solely because of her race. The hearing
officer found no racial discrimination against Reid. He also found that Durand and Dr.
Frankhart’s actions were not comparable to Reid’s actions. He found that Reid’s actions,
based on her admissions alone, were sufficient grounds for termination. The hearing officer
also noted that the chief investigator assigned to this cause was African American, and many
of the witnesses were African Americans.
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¶16.
Reid bore the burden of proving that similarly situated employees outside the
protected class were treated more favorably. The EAB found that the employees named by
Reid were not similarly situated and upheld Reid’s termination.
Based on the facts
presented, we find that the decision of the EAB was not arbitrary or capricious. Durand was
investigated, and it was determined no further action was necessary. As for the accusation
that Dr. Frankhart is a similarly situated employee, it is a stretch to compare her action of
loaning a guitar to a patient to Reid’s actions of threatening patients and allowing a patient
access to her credit card. We find that the EAB had substantial evidence to support its
findings. This issue is without merit.
¶17.
Before concluding we note that in its appellee brief, the State Hospital asserts that
Reid’s appeal to the full EAB was time-barred. As this issue is being raised for the first time
on appeal, it will not be addressed by this Court. Miss. Dep’t of Transp. v. Trosclair, 851 So.
2d 408, 415 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
¶18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND
MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. KING, C.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. IRVING,
J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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