Thomas Sturdavant v. Regina Sturdavant
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CA-01855-COA
THOMAS STURDAVANT
APPELLANT
v.
REGINA STURDAVANT
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
11/02/2009
HON. JOHNNY LEE WILLIAMS
LAMAR COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
DEBORAH J. GAMBRELL
CAROL LEATRICE JONES
S. CHRISTOPHER FARRIS
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY GRANTED
AFFIRMED - 02/08/2011
BEFORE KING, C.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Thomas and Regina Sturdavant were granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce in
the Lamar County Chancery Court. The couple agreed on a property-settlement agreement,
alimony payments, and child-custody arrangements, which were incorporated into the final
decree for divorce. The chancellor granted Regina’s subsequent petition to modify and
increase Thomas’s child-support and periodic-alimony payments. Thomas contends that the
chancellor erred in modifying the periodic-alimony requirement and child-support
requirement in his and Regina’s judgment of divorce. Finding no abuse of discretion, we
affirm the chancellor’s judgment.
FACTS
¶2.
Thomas and Regina entered into marriage on May 19, 1990. Thomas worked as a
physician at a private clinic, and Regina worked as a registered nurse. The marriage
produced two children, Malik, born on October 17, 1997, and Maya, born on November 1,
2004.
¶3.
Regina and Thomas filed for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, and
on May 20, 2008, the Lamar County Chancery Court entered the judgment of divorce. The
chancellor incorporated the issues of child custody, child support, and the property-settlement
agreement into the judgment. Pursuant to the judgment, the chancellor ordered Thomas to
pay $25,000 to Regina for her portion of the equity in the marital home. The judgment also
mandated that Thomas pay $1,000 per month in child support for the couple’s two children 1
and $500 per month in periodic alimony.
¶4.
The chancellor outlined the judgment upon the backdrop of various events, including
the recusal of the initial chancellor. The record reflects that Thomas first hired James K.
Dukes Sr. to represent him in the divorce proceedings. Thomas later fired Dukes and hired
new counsel, Ed Pittman Jr., who was running for chancellor against the presiding
chancellor, the Honorable Sebe Dale Jr. As a result, Judge Dale recused himself from
presiding over the divorce proceedings. The Honorable Johnny L. Williams was then
1
We note the property-settlement agreement reflected that the chancellor based this
child-support award on twenty percent of Thomas’s income, although Thomas testified that
at the time of the divorce, his gross annual income only amounted to approximately $37,000.
2
assigned as the chancellor and proceeded to preside over the case. While the divorce was
pending, Thomas quit paying the mortgage on the marital home, and the bank foreclosed
upon the house. Thomas also filed for bankruptcy during the divorce proceedings.
¶5.
Shortly after the judgment of divorce, Thomas closed his clinic and joined the staff
at Gulfport Memorial Hospital. On February 10, 2009, Regina filed a petition to cite Thomas
for contempt and for modification asserting, among other things, Thomas’s failure to fulfill
his child-support obligation in a timely manner as a ground for contempt. Regina further
asserted that the financial needs of the children had increased, and Thomas had failed to
fulfill his obligation with respect to providing child care while she worked.2 Regina also
claimed that Thomas’s income had substantially increased since the divorce due to his new
employment.
¶6.
On October 7, 2009, the chancellor held a hearing on Regina’s petition for contempt
and modification. The chancellor subsequently dismissed the contempt action, but he found
that Thomas’s annual income had increased from $37,000 to $240,000. The chancellor
proceeded to modify and increase Thomas’s child-support obligation to $1,800 per month,
and he increased Thomas’s periodic-alimony obligation to $1,200 per month. The chancellor
entered a judgment, incorporating his bench opinion, on November 2, 2009.
¶7.
Thomas now appeals, arguing that the chancellor erred in modifying and increasing
the child support and periodic alimony.
2
In her petition for modification and contempt, Regina alleges that Thomas had
agreed to provide baby-sitting assistance while Regina worked, but she claims that Thomas
only fulfilled this obligation one day a week. Regina asserted that she could not financially
afford the baby-sitting fees without additional financial assistance from Thomas.
3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has made it clear that the “scope of review in
domestic relations matters is limited . . . .” Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1285
(Miss. 1994). On appeal, this Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings of fact which are
supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong or clearly
erroneous. Dix v. Dix, 941 So. 2d 913, 915 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). However, as to
matters of law, this Court applies a de novo standard of review, and “if we determine that the
chancellor applied an incorrect legal standard, we must reverse.” Id. at 915-16 (¶12).
Additionally, this Court reviews all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellee.
Rawson v. Buta, 609 So. 2d 426, 429 (Miss. 1992).
DISCUSSION
I.
¶9.
Whether the chancellor erred in modifying the periodic-alimony
requirement of the parties’ judgment of divorce.
Thomas claims that the chancellor erred in modifying his periodic-alimony payments
because Regina failed to show that a material change of circumstances had occurred since
the chancellor entered the divorce decree. Thomas contends that a property-settlement
agreement may not be modified without either a showing of fraud or a contractual provision
allowing modification, and since Regina failed to assert fraud, Thomas claims that the
agreement cannot be modified.
¶10.
The supreme court has established that alimony awards for divorces granted on the
ground of irreconcilable differences are subject to modification. Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So.
2d 771, 776 (¶15) (Miss. 2001). Periodic alimony can be modified by increasing, decreasing,
4
or terminating the award; and such modification can occur “only if there has been a material
change in the circumstances of one or more of the parties.” Id.; Landrum v. Landrum, 498
So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Miss. 1986); Austin v. Austin, 766 So. 2d 86, 90 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App.
2000). The material change must also be “one that could not have been anticipated by the
parties at the time of the original decree.” Tingle v. Tingle, 573 So. 2d 1389, 1391 (Miss.
1990).
¶11.
When deciding whether to modify an award of periodic alimony, the chancellor must
consider the Armstrong factors, “comparing the relative positions of the parties at the time
of the request for modification in relation to their positions at the time of the divorce decree.”
Steiner, 788 So. 2d at 776 (¶16). Thomas asserts that the chancellor failed to consider all of
the Armstrong 3 factors during the modification hearing. He argues that the chancellor found
that a material change of circumstances occurred based solely on Thomas’s increased income
– only one-half of one Armstrong factor – and thus Thomas claims that the chancellor applied
the wrong standard in determining whether to increase the amount of alimony payments to
Regina. However, we observe that “the central issue to periodic alimony modification is
whether there has been a material change in circumstances subsequent to the decree of
divorce and not a balancing of the Armstrong factors[.]” Reid v. Reid, 998 So. 2d 1032,
1041 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
3
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).
5
¶12.
At the time the original divorce decree was entered in May 2008, Thomas had
represented to the chancellor that his income for 2007 was estimated to be $37,252.4 Thomas
also represented to the chancellor that he had filed for bankruptcy at the time of the divorce.
However, at the modification hearing, Thomas testified that his yearly income for 2008
amounted to $109,465.64, and his gross monthly income for 2009 amounted to $20,768.
Thomas attributed his increase in salary to his new employment at Gulfport Memorial
Hospital, a position that he accepted in June 2008, shortly after the chancellor issued the
judgment of divorce. In determining whether to modify an award of periodic alimony in the
event of a material change in circumstances, the supreme court has held that a chancellor
should consider a substantial increase in earnings by one party subsequent to the divorce
decree. Bracey v. Bracey, 408 So. 2d 1387, 1389 (Miss. 1982); Spradling v. Spradling, 362
So. 2d 620, 623 (Miss. 1978).
¶13.
During the modification hearing, the chancellor noted that Regina provided evidence
that she could barely meet her living expenses based on Thomas’s alimony payments. The
chancellor also stated that Regina’s testimony revealed that she had cut back on what she and
the children “had been able to do before the divorce in terms of leisure and activities.” The
chancellor found that although Regina is employed as a registered nurse and may be able to
earn more money if she chose to do so, “the [c]ourt is not sure as to how that would impact
on her being able to raise the kids because she is able to spend more times with the kids by
4
Neither Thomas’s nor Regina’s Rule 8.05 financial statement appears in the record
provided to this Court.
6
her work schedule that she currently has.” 5 Based on these findings, and Thomas’s increase
in income, the chancellor found that the parties’ circumstances warranted a modification of
the alimony payments.
¶14.
We find that the evidence in the record supports the chancellor’s decision to increase
the amount of periodic alimony awarded to Regina based on the substantial increase in
Thomas’s income. The record also shows that the chancellor properly weighed the relative
positions of the parties at the time of the request for modification in relation to their positions
at the time of the divorce decree. Therefore, we find that the chancellor did not abuse his
discretion in increasing the award of periodic alimony to Regina. This issue lacks merit.
II.
¶15.
Whether the chancellor erred in modifying the child-support
requirement of the parties’ judgment of divorce.
Next, Thomas argues that the chancellor erred in finding that his increase in income
warrants a modification in the child-support payments for Thomas and Regina’s two
children. We note that child support can be modified if there has been a “substantial or
material change in the circumstances of one or more of the interested parties.” Caldwell v.
Caldwell, 579 So. 2d 543, 547 (Miss. 1991). However, Thomas argues that the chancellor
erred in finding that his increase in income constituted a material change in circumstances.
Thomas also claims that the evidence presented during the hearing did not demonstrate any
increased needs of the children. As stated above, we have established that the findings of the
5
As previously noted, Regina stated in her petition for contempt and modification,
and also testified at the hearing, that Thomas failed to fulfill his baby-sitting obligations for
Malik and Maya while Regina worked. Regina testified that not having anyone available
to supervise the children, and not having sufficient funds to pay for a babysitter while she
worked, impacted her ability to work additional hours.
7
chancellor in this case do not amount to an abuse of discretion; he determined that Thomas’s
substantial increase in income indeed constituted a material change in circumstances.
¶16.
Regina argues, however, that the chancellor erred by failing to increase the child
support to an amount based upon twenty percent of Thomas’s income,6 which would result
in a monthly child-support payment of $2,600, instead of the chancellor’s modified award
of $1,200 per month, which amounts to less than twenty percent of Thomas’s adjusted gross
income. Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101(1) (Rev. 2009) provides a rebuttable
presumption regarding the modification of child-support awards, and this Court will not
affirm a modification of a child-support award that deviates from the statutory guidelines
unless the chancellor “overcome[s] the rebuttable presumption . . . by making an
on-the-record finding that it would be unjust or inappropriate to apply the guidelines in the
instant case.” Chesney v. Chesney, 910 So. 2d 1057, 1061 (¶7) (Miss. 2005).
¶17.
During the hearing, the chancellor acknowledged that section 43-19-101(4) (Rev.
2009) mandates that if the adjusted gross income is more than $50,000, “the court shall make
a written finding in the record as to whether or not the application of the guidelines
established . . . is reasonable.” In the present case, the chancellor stated that:
Based on the proof today for child support – it’s been offered as proof that the
expenses outside of shelter and food and other normal expenses that go along
with that, that the expenses come to $1,042. The court in looking at the
income of [Thomas] of $240,000 annually is going to set the child support at
$1,800 per month based on the documentation and the proof that the court
heard today. Ordinarily if we went the entire [twenty] percent, child support
would be $2,600, but the court is going to set it at $1,800.
6
Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101(Rev. 2009) establishes that twenty
percent of the party’s adjusted gross income shall be awarded for the support of two children.
8
¶18.
This Court recognizes that “[i]n cases involving child support, we afford the
chancellor considerable discretion, and his findings will not be reversed unless he was
manifestly in error or abused his discretion.” Sessums v. Vance, 12 So. 3d 1146, 1147 (¶3)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). Here, we find that the chancellor provided the
required findings explaining his calculation of expenses and his decision to deviate from the
statutory guidelines mandating that the child-support award shall be based upon twenty
percent of Thomas’s adjusted gross income for his two children. The record supports
Regina’s expenses and the calculations of the chancellor. We find no abuse of discretion in
the chancellor’s award. This issue lacks merit.
¶19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF LAMAR COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
9
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.