Scott Favre v. Hancock County Board of Supervisors
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CA-00764-COA
SCOTT FAVRE AND JEFFERSON PARKER
APPELLANTS
v.
HANCOCK COUNTY BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS AND JOURDAN RIVER
ESTATES, LLC
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
APPELLEES
04/03/2009
HON. JERRY O. TERRY SR.
HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ROBERT B. WIYGUL
RONALD J. ARTIGUES JR.
PATRICK W. KIRBY
HENRY LAIRD
SAMUEL TRENT FAVRE
CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
AFFIRMED BOARD OF SUPERVISORS’
DECISION TO APPROVE CONDITIONALUSE PERMIT AND SITE PLAN
AFFIRMED - 01/25/2011
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, P.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
Jourdan River Estates (Jourdan River) owns two-hundred-and-sixty-nine acres in Kiln,
Mississippi, which is located in Hancock County. The property in question is accessed by
way of Nicola Road, which is located north of Interstate 10 directly off of Highway 603.
There is another entrance to the Jourdan River property off of Crump Road, which is also
directly off of Highway 603. In early 2007, Jourdan River submitted a proposal to the
Hancock County Planning and Zoning Commission (the Commission) requesting rezoning
of the property from A-1 General Agricultural to a Waterfront Special Use District. Jourdan
River planned to develop a 1,000-unit condominium complex and a 130-slip marina. The
Commission approved Jourdan River’s request, but two local property owners, Scott Favre
and Jefferson Parker (collectively Parker), appealed this decision to the Hancock County
Board of Supervisors (the Board). The Board then denied Jourdan River’s request.
¶2.
In early 2008, Jourdan River resubmitted its plans to the Commission for approval.
The new plans, which did not call for rezoning, reduced the number of condominium units
from 1,000 to 472, and it changed the marina to a yacht club. The yacht club included
construction of a three-to-five-acre yacht basin. Under A-1, condominiums require planning
commission approval, but a yacht club is considered a “permitted use by right.” After a
hearing on the matter, the Commission unanimously approved Jourdan River’s proposal.
Parker appealed to the Board. The Board conducted a hearing; then it took the matter under
advisement in order to review the record. The Board approved the plan, subject to several
conditions, the most significant that the Hancock County Engineer approve the plans for the
road providing ingress and egress for the development.
¶3.
Parker subsequently filed a bill of exceptions in the Hancock County Circuit Court.
The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. Parker now appeals, asserting four issues
that we have reordered as follows: (1) the Board erred by failing to articulate specific
2
findings; (2) the Board erred in approving a yacht club as a “permitted use by right;” (3) the
record does not contain substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision; and (4) the
Board erred by declining to make findings regarding access to the property where a finding
of adequate access is specifically required by the zoning ordinance.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4.
“Unlike decisions to zone or re-zone, which are legislative in nature, decisions on
requests for special exceptions are adjudicative, and a reviewing court thus subjects such
decisions to the same standard as is applied to administrative agency adjudicative decisions.”
Hearne v. City of Brookhaven, 822 So. 2d 999, 1002 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). This Court
will not disturb an administrative agency’s findings “unless the agency’s order 1) is not
supported by substantial evidence, 2) is arbitrary or capricious, 3) is beyond the scope or
power granted to the agency, or 4) violates one’s constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Miss.
Employment Sec. Comm’n, 767 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Sprouse
v. Miss. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 639 So. 2d 901, 902 (Miss. 1994)).
DISCUSSION
I. SPECIFIC FINDINGS
¶5.
Parker argues that this Court should reverse and remand this case for the Board to
make specific findings supporting its decision. However, in Barnes v. Board of Supervisors,
DeSoto County, 553 So. 2d 508, 511 (Miss. 1989), the Mississippi Supreme Court found that
although the Board should have made specific findings of fact, the evidence in the record
supported the Board’s decision. The supreme court stated that “granting the conditional use
permit and imposing conditions upon the granting of that permit, [was] tantamount to a
3
finding of fact by the DeSoto County Board of Supervisors . . . .” Id. The absence of
findings does not necessarily warrant reversal. Caver v. Jackson County Bd. of Supervisors,
947 So. 2d 351, 353 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). We must review the record to determine
whether the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 354 (¶8). Based
upon our review, we find that this issue is without merit.
II. YACHT CLUB
¶6.
Parker argues that Jourdan River’s 2008 application simply relabeled the marina as
a yacht club/yacht basin in order to meet the zoning requirements under A-1. According to
the local zoning ordinances, a marina is defined as “a boat basin, harbor or dock, with
facilities for berthing and servicing boats, including bait and fishing tackle shop and eating
establishments.” Neither yacht club nor yacht basin is defined in the zoning ordinance. The
Commission commented that a yacht club would include a basin to dock boats and access to
and from this area. Jourdan River contends that the yacht club is private and will not permit
fueling or repair services on the premises.
¶7.
Parker focuses on the fact that the plans submitted by Jourdan River in 2008 included
references to a marina as well as the original drawing of the proposed marina from the 2007
rezoning application. The record is clear that Jourdan River decided to submit the original
plans in an effort to save money since the yacht club would be located in the same spot as
the marina.
¶8.
“[T]he best interpretation of what the wording in the ordinance means is the manner
in which it is interpreted and applied by the enacting and enforcement authorities.” Faircloth
v. Lyles, 592 So. 2d 941, 945 (Miss. 1991). From the record, it is clear that the Commission
4
and the Board concluded that a yacht club includes a basin to dock boats and access to and
from this area. This issue is without merit.
III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
IV. ADEQUATE ACCESS
¶9.
Parker next contends that the Board’s decision to grant the conditional-use permit for
the condominiums was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Parker argues
that Jourdan River failed to prove that the project would have sewer and water service and
that there was adequate access to the area.
¶10.
In regard to conditional-use permits, Hancock County Zoning Ordinance 411.01-02
provides as follows:
The uses listed in the chart are permitted upon approval of location and the site
plane thereof by the planning commission as being appropriate with regard to
transportation and access, water supply, waste disposal, fire and police
protection, and other public facilities, as not causing undue traffic congestion
or creating a traffic hazard and as being in harmony with the orderly and
appropriate development of the district in which the use is located.
Additionally, Section 905.03 of the zoning ordinance enumerates several factors that “shall
be established where applicable as necessary” in order not to cause an adverse effect on
“other properties in the neighborhood.”
¶11.
According to testimony presented by Jourdan River at the time of the hearing before
the Board, the property already had a water line running toward it. The record contains a
letter submitted by Jourdan River from Southern Regional Wastewater Management District
indicating its willingness to treat wastewater from the development. There is also a letter
from the Hancock County Water and Sewer District indicating that it would service the
5
development’s sewage needs. However, on the day of the hearing before the Board, Parker
presented another letter, dated the day of the hearing, which stated that the Hancock County
Water and Sewer District no longer had the capacity to handle the sewage needs of the
development. The letter stated that the development was outside the District’s area. Jourdan
River asserts that this letter was not authorized.
¶12.
Shortly after the hearing, Jourdan River submitted two letters to the Board, one from
the Hancock County Utility Authority that demonstrated it would provide wastewater
treatment services to the development, and one from the Kiln Water and Fire Protection
District that indicated its approval. The letter from Kiln Water noted that the city of Kiln did
not have adequate water service in the area of the development but anticipated it in the near
future. According to testimony at the time of the hearing, a sewer treatment plant in Kiln was
under construction. Alternatively, Jourdan River presented testimony that it was prepared
to construct and operate a decentralized system for water, sewer collection, and sewer
treatment.
¶13.
Although sewer and water service is only one of the factors to consider when
approving a conditional-use permit, we find that there was substantial evidence in the record
to support the Board’s decision.
¶14.
In regard to the access issue, Parker contends that the Board did not make the required
findings regarding access to the development. In its decision, the Board approved the
conditional-use permit with certain restrictions:
1. That the developer submit plans and specifications for the construction of
a road to provide ingress/egress for this development that will adequately
handle the volume of traffic to the fully proposed development (includes all
6
phases) as determined and approved by the County Engineer; and
2. That the developer post a Performance Bond for the benefit of the County
to insure the construction of said road for ingress/egress, and the amount of
said bond shall be based upon the anticipated cost of construction of said road
as determined by the County Engineer; and
3. Must be in full compliance with all regulations and requirements that may
be imposed by the Hancock County Utility Authority; and
4. That Crump Road not be used for ingress or egress to the development
except for emergency vehicles and emergency purposes.
Parker’s sole argument is that because the Board failed to make specific findings regarding
access to the development, the Board’s decision violated the zoning ordinance and is
arbitrary and capricious. Parker contends that the Board should have denied the conditionaluse permit rather than issuing the permit subject to the submission of additional information.
In Barnes, the Board granted the conditional-use permit with certain restrictions, similar to
the situation in the present case. Barnes, 553 So. 2d at 511. As previously stated, we will
not automatically reverse the Board for granting the conditional-use permit subject to certain
restrictions. See Caver, 947 So. 2d at 353 (¶8).
¶15.
The deed to Jourdan River’s property includes an easement for access, which ends at
the terminus of Nicola Road. According to a survey commissioned by the Hancock County
Engineer, Hancock County had been maintaining Nicola Road up to the point where Jourdan
River’s easement begins. Neel-Schaffer Engineering performed a traffic analysis of the area
that included diagrams of Nicola Road showing sufficient width to expand the road. This
analysis demonstrated that Nicola Road was the safest and most effective means of ingress
and egress to the property. We find that the Board’s decision to grant the conditional-use
7
permit subject to certain restrictions is tantamount to a finding of fact that all questions were
answered and found in favor of Jourdan River. This issue is without merit.
¶16.
The circuit court was correct in affirming the Board’s decision; therefore, we affirm
the court’s judgment.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANTS.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
8
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.