Roger Patterson v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-KA-01353-COA
ROGER PATTERSON
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
08/11/2010
HON. ROBERT WILLIAM ELLIOTT
CALHOUN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND
BENJAMIN F. CREEKMORE
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF SALE OF COCAINE AND
SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH
EIGHT YEARS SUSPENDED, TWELVE
YEARS TO SERVE, AND FIVE YEARS OF
POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION
AFFIRMED – 08/23/2011
BEFORE IRVING, P.J., ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ.
IRVING, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This appeal arises out of Roger Patterson’s conviction, in the Calhoun County Circuit
Court, for sale of a controlled substance (cocaine) and resulting sentence of twenty years in
the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with eight years suspended, twelve
years to serve, and five years of post-release supervision. Patterson alleges that his statutory
and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated by the amount of time that it took to
bring him to trial.
¶2.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
FACTS
¶3.
Patterson was arrested and charged with sale of cocaine as the result of a sting
operation involving a confidential informant. As Patterson has not challenged the factual
basis for his conviction, we will discuss only those facts that are pertinent to the issue raised
by him in this appeal.
¶4.
The indictment against Patterson was filed on May 16, 2008. On June 13, 2008,
Patterson waived arraignment. For reasons that are not related in the record, Patterson was
not tried until August 10, 2010. Despite the delay of over two years, Patterson never asserted
his right to a speedy trial or raised the issue of his trial date with the circuit court.
¶5.
Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of
the issue.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
¶6.
Patterson claims that both his statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights were
violated. We note again that Patterson never asserted his speedy-trial rights or raised the
issue of his trial date with the circuit court.
¶7.
Patterson’s statutory claim is procedurally barred due to his failure to raise it with the
circuit court. Drummond v. State, 33 So. 3d 507, 512 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009); Smiley
v. State, 798 So. 2d 584, 587 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
¶8.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has set out the standard for reviewing constitutional
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speedy-trial claims that are raised for the first time on appeal:
Given that the constitutional right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right, see
Klopfer [v. State of North Carolina], 386 U.S. . . . 213 [(1967)], this Court
must determine whether plain-error review is applicable, i.e., whether an “error
of the trial court has impacted upon a fundamental right,” Sanders [v. State],
678 So. 2d [663,] 670 [(Miss. 1996)], and is “so fundamental that it generates
a miscarriage of justice.” Morgan [v. State], 793 So. 2d [615,] 617 [(¶9) (Miss.
2001) (citations omitted)]. Absent the plain-error criteria being satisfied
unequivocally, appellate courts are loath to address issues not presented to the
trial court.
Dora v. State, 986 So. 2d 917, 925 (¶19) (Miss. 2008). The Dora court went on to note that
Terry “Dora seeks to leapfrog over the required plain-error analysis by making Barker[]genre 1 assertions, i.e., prejudice caused by length of delay, prejudice by virtue of the
amended indictment which included prior felony convictions, and prejudice due to a change
in [a witness’s] testimony.” Id. at 925-26 (¶20).
¶9.
Similarly, Patterson makes blanket assertions of prejudice rather than pointing out any
instance of actual prejudice. However, he acknowledges that his claim must constitute plain
error to proceed and points out that the State bears the burden of bringing a defendant to trial
and that “such a critical and basic right as the right to a speedy trial should not be summarily
dismissed where more than two years have elapsed.” He cites no case for the proposition that
delays of any particular length automatically overcome the procedural bar or constitute plain
error, and this Court knows of no such authority. We note that “[t]hree years, three months,
and six days elapsed between Dora’s arrest and trial.” Dora v. State, 986 So. 2d 965, 971
(¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (overruled on other grounds). It appears from the record that
Patterson was arrested in May 2008, and his trial commenced in August 2010; accordingly,
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Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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approximately two years and three months elapsed between his arrest and his trial. We note
that this amount of time is significantly less than the amount of time that elapsed in Dora;
nonetheless, our supreme court affirmed Dora’s conviction. We find no reason to do
otherwise in this case.
¶10.
This contention of error is without merit.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CALHOUN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF SALE OF COCAINE AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH
EIGHT YEARS SUSPENDED, TWELVE YEARS TO SERVE, AND FIVE YEARS OF
POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED TO CALHOUN COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON,
MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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